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ABSTRACT  
Studies of governance have focused on the interactions among diverse actors 
while implicitly recognizing the role of power within those relationships. Explicit power 
analyses of water governance coordination are needed to better understand the conditions 
for and barriers to sustainability. I therefore utilized a novel conceptual framework to 
analyze vertical and horizontal governance, along with power, to address how 
governance interactions affect water sustainability in terms of (1) interactions among 
governance actors across local to state levels; (2) coordination among actors at the local 
level; and (3) the exercise of power among assorted actors. I adopted a qualitative case 
study methodology that involved triangulating interview transcripts, policy documents, 
and other data in the case study area of Prescott, Arizona. 
Across governance scales, my analysis found that informational and contentious 
interactions occur around water management plans, groundwater withdrawal fees, and 
growth debates due to the stipulations of Arizona’s Groundwater Management Act. 
Locally, municipalities in different groundwater basins coordinate by pooling resources 
for water development due to shared growth visions. However, municipalities within the 
same groundwater basin are divided in their pursuit of the state-mandated goal of safe 
yield due to discontent arising from differing growth visions, libertarian values of water 
control, and unequal responsibilities among actors in conserving water or monitoring use. 
Finally, local and state actors exercise power through litigation, legislation, and political 
processes to pursue their interests, thereby limiting coordination for water sustainability.  
My explicit analysis of power reveals that coordination occurs not just because of 
water policies but due to interest-based water narratives (growth and libertarian). The 
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emphasis of growth proponents on supply augmentation and libertarian opposition to 
regulations pose significant barriers to water sustainability. Successful policy-based 
pursuits of water sustainability will, thus, require an acknowledgment of these 
management asymmetries and commitments to addressing them.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Studies of governance coordination have focused on the interplay between and 
integration of governance actors, while implicitly recognizing the role of power within 
those relationships. Yet, explicit power analysis within studies of water governance 
coordination is important to better understand the conditions for and barriers to water 
sustainability. To address this research gap, I utilize a novel conceptual framework that 
combines propositions of vertical governance, horizontal governance, and power, to 
answer the following questions: (1) What interactions exist among governance actors 
involved in water management across local to state levels, and how do these interactions 
affect sustainable water governance? (2) In what ways do actors at the local level 
coordinate (or not) in governing water resources, and how do these interactions affect 
sustainable water governance? (3) How is power exercised among a variety of water 
governance actors across levels, and what are the implications for sustainable water 
governance? 
My explicit analysis of power reveals that coordination occurs not just because of 
water policies but due to non-sustainability focused, interest-based water narratives 
(growth and libertarian). The emphasis of growth proponents on supply augmentation and 
libertarian opposition to regulations pose significant barriers to water sustainability. 
Successful policy-based pursuits of water sustainability will, thus, require an 
acknowledgment of these management asymmetries and commitments to addressing 
them.  
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Problem Statement 
The world’s water crisis is increasingly due to inadequate or failed governance, as 
opposed to the physical scarcity of this critical resource (UN Water, 2006). Regardless, 
water scarcity is an issue threatening many regions of the world, whether rural or urban, 
and irrespective of geographic, economic, or social contexts (Swyngedouw, 2006; 
Wutich et al., 2014). Interestingly, water scarcity is not only a problem for arid regions 
but humid ones as well (Feldman, 2009). Rapid urbanization and changing climate, 
including their impacts on water quality and riparian ecosystem health, only exacerbate 
this water resource threat. Unfortunately, current water governance practices have proved 
insufficient in tackling these challenges.  
Despite many attempts at water sustainability, no water system in the world has 
achieved this but many are in transitions towards sustainable water governance (Brown et 
al., 2009). Feldman (2012) argues, in his book Water, that freshwater sustainability is 
threatened by the struggle for geopolitical control, which result in conflicts among 
contending parties. This struggle for control is often seen between countries, states, and 
among different water users. Examples across the United States show that in resolving 
conflict among users and promoting water sustainability, many states create statutory 
institutions to guide water governance (Blomquist, 2016; Sophocleous, 2012) similar to 
the case in Arizona.  
Conflicts among Arizona’s water users including the federal government threat of 
cutting funds for the Central Arizona Project (CAP) led to the enactment of Arizona’s 
1980 Groundwater Management Act (GMA) (Connall, 1982). The Act was a result of 
concessions made by the state’s major water users (agriculture, municipal, and industrial) 
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and has been shown to contain ‘loop-holes’ that constrain the state’s water sustainability 
by increasing groundwater overdraft (Maguire, 2007). Arizona’s GMA currently 
mandates the active management of water in only five urbanizing and urbanized areas of 
the state referred to as Active Management Areas (AMAs), while another three are 
designated as Irrigation Non-Expansion Areas (INA). The GMA mandates safe yield1 in 
Prescott, Phoenix, and Tucson AMAs, although only Phoenix and Tucson AMAs receive 
Colorado River water. Despite this imported water, it is recognized that groundwater 
overdraft is increasing in both areas and would continue under current water management 
(Maguire, 2007)—a situation that is detrimental to the state’s water sustainability.  
Within Arizona, many studies have researched the arid metropolitan Phoenix 
region. These studies have focused on the sensitivity of water demand in the area to 
climatic parameters (Balling and Gober, 2007), vulnerability analysis of its water supply 
system (Bolin et al., 2010), determinants of water demand (Harlan et al., 2009; Wentz and 
Gober, 2007), [in]effectiveness of water policies (Hirt et al., 2008; Larson et al., 2009), 
simulation modeling to explore long-term impacts of different water governance regimes 
(Keeler et al., 2015), and a sustainability appraisal of Phoenix’s water governance regime 
(Larson et al., 2013), to mention a few. The rationale for focusing on Phoenix is 
compelling given the fact that it is the 14th largest metropolitan area in the United States 
with a population of over 4.6 million people (U.S. Census Bureau, 2017). However, the 
interconnected nature of water resources makes research on places outside the Phoenix 
metropolitan area crucial, especially those areas connected to the Salt-Verde Watershed 
                                                        
1 Safe yield is a state where water withdrawn from an aquifer equals recharge to it (Sophocleous, 1997). As 
a concept, safe yield is one metric for assessing groundwater governance but reflects only a partial view of 
water sustainability (Alley and Leake, 2004). 
  4 
that supplies water to the Phoenix region. One such place is the greater Prescott area, 
where groundwater pumping threatens stream flows to downstream Phoenix. 
Meanwhile, there are a few studies on water governance in the greater Prescott 
area. These studies have focused on vulnerability to water scarcity (Collins and Bolin, 
2007), water, growth, and politics of scale in the Central Highlands (Bolin et al., 2008), 
information networks in the initial Verde River Basin Partnership (VRBP) (Muñoz-
Erickson et al., 2010), ego networks in the VRBP (Cutts et al., 2010), power and politics 
in Yavapai County’s water conflicts (Whitmire, 2013) among others. Despite these 
studies, not enough is known about the degree of coordination among water governance 
actors across levels related to the AMA. Also, there is a need to better understand to what 
degree the region’s ‘Active Management Area’ status promotes water sustainability.  
This focus on Prescott AMA is important because, first, the AMA relies heavily 
on dwindling non-renewable groundwater without access to adequate alternate surface 
water. Second, the area is experiencing persistent water conflicts due to planned water 
import from another sub-basin.  Third, there are conflicts of interests between actors in 
the study area and a major downstream surface water rights holder ─ the Salt River 
Project (SRP). Finally, Prescott AMA’s population is growing rapidly due to amenity 
migration and the pleasant climate (Figure 1). With focus on Prescott AMA, the purpose 
of this study is to assess the conditions for and barriers to water sustainability with 
respect to coordination among governance actors and their exercise of power. To 
accomplish this purpose, I integrate propositions of vertical governance, horizontal 
governance, and power while drawing from human-environment geography, political 
ecology, and socio-ecological governance literature. 
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Figure 1. Population Growth in Prescott AMA Municipalities since 1980 
 
Research Questions and Methodology 
The resource governance literature calls for coordination among governance actors across 
jurisdictional levels (Young, 2006) and around specific issues (as occurs in collaborative 
governance) (Emerson et al., 2012). Similarly, research shows that water sustainability is 
influenced by the degree to which actors have power commensurate to their roles in water 
governance, and how such power is exercised within governance (Norman and Bakker, 
2009, p. 112). In their study of groundwater governance, Knüppe and Pahl-Wostl (2011) 
evaluate vertical and horizontal integration across their case studies. Yet, a framework 
that combines vertical governance, horizontal governance, and power increases our 
understanding of the relationship between institutions and water sustainability in areas of 
persistent conflicts. In applying this novel framework in which the exercise of power is a 
key component of vertical and horizontal governance, this research examines issues of 
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coordination and power in water governance as it relates to water sustainability. With the 
focus on Prescott AMA as a case study, this study investigates the following research 
questions:  
1. What interactions exist among governance actors involved in water management 
across local to state levels, and how do these interactions affect sustainable water 
governance?  
2. In what ways do actors at the local level coordinate (or not) in governing water 
resources, and how do these interactions affect sustainable water governance?  
3. How is power exercised among a variety of water governance actors across levels, 
and what are the implications for sustainable water governance? 
Following a case study approach, I adopted a qualitative methodology for this 
research (Travers, 2001; Yin, 2013).  I ensured robust analysis through the triangulation 
of documents, semi-structured interviews, direct observation and archival records. Data 
collected with these instruments were analyzed with text analysis methods. For the 
interviews, both government and non-government actors were interviewed to capture the 
spectrum of actors involved in water governance. Respondents were identified through a 
purposive method. The first part of the research involved assessing the interaction 
between governance actors across local (municipal), regional (AMA), and state levels; in 
the second part, I assessed interactions between governance actors at the local level. 
Finally, in the third part, I investigated how power is exercised at different levels of water 
governance in the study area.   
 
Research Framing and Significance 
Of the four main traditions within Geography, namely: environmental sciences; 
methods, models, and GIS; nature and society; and people, place and region (American 
Association of Geographers, 2017), I situate myself within the nature and society 
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tradition. Within this tradition, my research focuses on water resource governance. Water 
resource governance as a field of inquiry cuts across disciplinary boundaries (such as 
geography, political sciences, economics, anthropology, sociology) and exists within 
interdisciplinary clusters (such as sustainability science), due to the diverse nature of 
water resource issues. In this dissertation, I contribute to the field of water governance by 
drawing from human-environment geography, political ecology, and socio-ecological 
governance literature to investigate the extent to which institutions created for water 
governance promote water sustainability.  
Using a research framework that integrates principles of sustainable water 
governance with theories of scale and power, this dissertation aims to refine insights on 
how different characteristics of vertical interactions in multilevel governance affect water 
sustainability. Specifically, this framework contributes to an understanding of the 
relationship between local level actors and those with regulatory authority and legitimacy 
at another level (Gupta and Pahl-Wostl, 2013; Markard et al., 2012). Also, this research 
provides essential information on the conditions surrounding collaborative endeavors 
around water—that is, which actors interact and why—that can be utilized and built upon 
by other studies on sustainable water governance in the study region (Larson et al., 2013).  
Regarding the power analysis in this dissertation, first, I present a deductive 
process for analyzing power in water governance research by drawing on content analysis 
methods and building on Avelino and Rotmans’ (2011) power framework. Next, I assess 
how different forms of power support or oppose decision making for sustainable water 
governance. Finally, I analyze the relationship between Prescott AMA’s governance 
framework and water sustainability in the Central Highlands. Overall, I investigate how 
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power is exercised in water governance interactions. This investigation aims to provide 
insights on factors that promote or inhibit water sustainability and the practice of 
sustainable water governance. 
 
Study Area 
Prescott Active Management Area (AMA) is located within Yavapai County in 
Central Arizona. Locally known as the Quad-City Area, the Prescott AMA consists of 
four incorporated municipalities and other smaller communities (Figure 2). This research 
focused on these incorporated municipalities, which are the City of Prescott, Town of 
Prescott Valley, Town of Chino Valley, and Town of Dewey-Humboldt. Some of the 
smaller communities are mostly served by the City of Prescott municipal water system 
and so are implicitly included in the study through focus on the City of Prescott. Since 
1980, population growth in the Quad-City Area has been significant despite the economic 
crisis that affected the entire state in 2008. This is in part due to amenity migration, 
especially the region’s year-round pleasant climate. Between 1990 and 2010, total 
population in the area more than doubled, with the 2010 US Census reporting 93,376 
residents (see Figure 1 above). 
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In terms of physical characteristics, Prescott AMA is located in the central 
highlands physiographic province of Arizona. Geology in this province is characterized 
by crystalline and sedimentary rocks with different degrees of fracture networks leading 
to highly variable amounts of available groundwater (Anderson et al., 2007). Natural 
recharge is low and average annual rainfall in the area is about 18 inches (Arizona 
Department of Water Resources, 2009), resulting in groundwater resources that are 
largely non-renewable and finite (Anderson et al., 2007). Meanwhile, the area is drained 
by the Verde River and Agua Fria River. The Verde River is important not just to this 
region but to the entire state, as it is one of Arizona’s last flowing perennial rivers. 
Prescott AMA was created as a result of the Groundwater Management Act 
(GMA), which was passed by state legislature in 1980 and adopted in 1984. The GMA is 
Figure 2. The Study Area: Prescott Active Management Area 
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the leading policy for managing water resources in Arizona. The policy’s goal is to stop 
groundwater overdraft in designated areas of the state by 2025, such that the amounts of 
water withdrawn from aquifers equal natural or artificial recharge ─ a state known as safe 
yield (Hirt et al., 2008; Larson et al., 2009). Pursuant to the GMA, the study area 
(Prescott AMA) has a water management goal of achieving safe yield by 2025 (Arizona 
Department of Water Resources, 2008).  
The study area’s ongoing attempt to secure alternate and external water resources 
(to supplement its groundwater) is through water import from a neighboring groundwater 
basin. In 1991, through amendments to the state’s water management statutes, the City of 
Prescott received exemptions to import water from the neighboring Big Chino basin 
(Arizona State Legislature, 2017; Town of Prescott Valley, n.d.a). However, water import 
from the Big Chino has been stalled due to disputes with a major surface water rights 
holder downstream – Salt River Project (SRP) – which supplies water to the downstream 
Phoenix metropolitan area (the 14th largest metropolis in the United States). This dispute 
is constructed around the hydrologic connection between groundwater and surface water, 
a connection that is not recognized by Arizona water laws. The City of Prescott (and its 
project partner, Prescott Valley) have claimed that their pumping in the Big Chino will 
not affect water flows in the Verde River while SRP claims that its rightful allocation 
from the Verde River will be affected by planned Big Chino pumping upstream (Bolin et 
al., 2008). The City of Prescott has rights to Watson and Willow Lakes which receive 
water from Granite Creek (a tributary of the Verde River) but with the absence of 
adequate surface water supplies and the stalled water import from the Big Chino, the 
region as a whole continues to rely heavily on its dwindling, non-renewable groundwater. 
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Organization of Dissertation 
 This dissertation is organized into five chapters. In Chapter 2, I review the 
literature on vertical governance, horizontal governance, and power. In Chapter 3, I 
provide a detailed exposition of the methods adopted in the study’s qualitative approach. 
Chapter 4 comprises the results obtained from analyzing the project’s primary and 
secondary data. Finally, in Chapter 5 I present first, a discussion of the project’s findings 
in relation to previous studies. Second, I provide concluding thoughts that summarize the 
core findings and implications of this water governance research.  
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
In this chapter, I review literature pertinent to this water governance research. The 
chapter is organized into three main parts. In the first part, I review the literature 
influencing my conceptualization of water governance. In the second part, I summarize 
and review previous water resource research in the Central Highland region of Arizona, 
focusing on studies within the past decade. Finally, I review the literature which 
comprises the conceptual framework for this dissertation, namely: vertical governance, 
horizontal governance, and power dynamics in water governance.  
 
Conceptualizing Water Governance 
In recent years, a number of water resource scholars have defined governance 
(Bakker, 2010; McKay, 2007). Bakker (2010) defines governance as “the range of 
political, organizational, and administrative processes through which stakeholders 
(including citizens and interest groups) articulate their interests, exercise their legal 
rights, make decisions, meet their obligations, and mediate their differences” (p. 44).  In 
other words, governance involves decision-making by both government and non-
government actors.  
Regarding water resources, the shift from ‘government’ to ‘governance’ seeks to 
address the wide array of actors who are involved in water resource decision-making, 
such as various water users, non-profit organizations, and business interests. This shift in 
academic discourse from government to governance has occurred to reflect changes that 
are occurring in the management of water resources (Norman, 2012; Pahl-Wostl, 2009). 
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Specifically, the shift in discourse reflects the increasing attention given to non-
government actors such as non-profit organizations and private businesses—in 
environmental governance and decision-making. Also, devolution of management has 
taken place, resulting in increased citizen participation through, for example, water 
advocacy groups at the local level and watershed organizations at the regional level. 
Basically, local community actors such as civil society and environmental groups now 
play more active roles in water management than they did in the past when water 
management mainly involved technocrats. 
Distinctions are also being made in water resource literature between water 
management and water governance. Water management places an emphasis on activities 
such as analyzing, monitoring, developing, and implementing measures that keep water 
resources within desirable limits, while water governance includes the actors that 
formulate and help implement the rules under which management takes place (Lubell et 
al., 2009; Pahl-Wostl, 2009; Wiek and Larson, 2012). In other words, water management 
involves the activities of specific actor groups such as water utilities in monitoring, 
developing, and providing water, while water governance involves all actors that make up 
the socio-ecological water system (Pahl-Wostl, 2009; Van der Brugge and Rotmans, 
2007; Wiek and Larson, 2012). Governance actors include both the water utilities 
(government actors) and water users (non-government actors). Thus, water governance 
provides a broader framing for water resource decision making. 
Water Sustainability. Defined simply, water sustainability is the provisioning of 
water for present human and ecological uses while ensuring adequate supply for future 
generations, and ecology (Larsen and Gujer, 1997; Marshall et al., 2010; Wiek and 
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Larson, 2012).  Research shows that no water system has fully achieved sustainability but 
many are transitioning towards sustainable water governance (Brown et al., 2009). Yet, 
transitions do not just happen.  Instead, practical implementation, coordination between 
all stakeholders, and active participation of local level non-government actors are needed 
for sustainability visions to be accomplished (Nastar, 2014; Van der Brugge et al., 2005). 
In their assessment of the Dutch water sector, Van der Brugge and Van Raak (2007) 
conclude that in addition to implementing strategic visions, a joint learning process 
amenable to experimentation and aimed at developing innovations were needed to 
achieve water sustainability. They further argue that successful transitions require a 
coordinated process that involves cooperation among governance (both government and 
non-government) actors. 
Water sustainability generally requires moving from socio-ecologically 
unsustainable practices to sustainable ones. In contributing to a solution-oriented water 
sustainability, Wiek and Larson (2012) argue that:  
The ultimate goal is to transition to water governance regimes that better 
comply with sustainability principles: optimizing economic and social 
welfare in an equitable manner without compromising the viability and 
integrity of the supporting ecosystems in the long term. (p. 3169) 
The foregoing quote aligns with the sustainable development vision outlined in the 
United Nations’ Brundtland Report (World Commission on Environment and 
Development, 1987). Whereas in previous years, water managers were solely tasked with 
water resource activities, the renewed involvement of non-government actors in water 
governing activities necessitates changes in the traditional means of decision-making 
within the water sector. Cooperation is needed between government and non-government 
actors.   
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Many concepts are offered in water governance practice and studies to describe 
and prescribe pathways to water sustainability. I review the concepts central to this study 
in the upcoming sub-sections. Specifically, I review safe yield, integrated water resource 
management, and sustainable water governance.  
Safe Yield. In the early twentieth century, the concept of safe yield was advanced 
in hydrogeology for managing groundwater. According to Sophocleous (1997), safe yield 
is the “attainment and maintenance of a long-term balance between the amount of water 
withdrawn annually and the annual amount of recharge” (p. 1).  However, many scholars 
argue that a safe-yield goal is inadequate for achieving water sustainability (Alley and 
Leake, 2004; Alley et al., 1999; Bredehoeft, 2002; Bredehoeft et al., 1982; Mays, 2013; 
Sophocleous, 1997; Theis, 1940). One of the main criticisms against this concept is that 
safe yield focuses on the balance between groundwater pumping and recharge, as the 
requirement for achieving sustainable groundwater use while ignoring natural 
groundwater discharge (e.g. to streams, or through evapotranspiration) (Bredehoeft, 
1997; Bredehoeft, 2002; Sophocleous, 1997). Groundwater use that supports water 
sustainability is one that recognizes the interconnectedness of groundwater and surface 
water, along with hydrologic cycle processes such as evapotranspiration. Safe yield is 
deficient in these considerations (Bredehoeft, 2002). According to Sophocleous (1997), 
“if pumping equals recharge, eventually streams, marshes, and springs dry up. Continued 
pumping in excess of recharge also eventually depletes the aquifer” (p. 1). Thus, safe 
yield though having a guise of sustainability does not promote overall water sustainability 
as it could lead to surface water ‘unsustainability’.  Yet, safe yield continues to be applied 
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in groundwater management policies around the world (Kalf and Woolley, 2005) but is 
inadequate as a metric for water sustainability.  
The study area (Prescott AMA) has a statutory water management goal of safe 
yield, a goal that is generally understood to be the region’s tool for achieving water 
sustainability (Upper Verde River Watershed Protection Coalition, 2010). However, 
previous research and stakeholder publications regarding the region suggest that safe 
yield is not being achieved (Arizona Department of Water Resources, 2014a; Bolin et al., 
2008; Upper Verde River Watershed Protection Coalition, 2010). Given the foregoing 
discussion, safe yield provides only a partial view of water sustainability whereas a 
comprehensive view is needed for ensuring sustainable water resources. In the following 
sub-sections, I review integrated water resource management and sustainable water 
governance which are two concepts advocated by water resource scholars for 
comprehensive water sustainability planning.  
Integrated Water Resource Management. Since the turn of the twentieth century, 
water scholars have advocated Integrated Water Resource Management (IWRM) as the 
method for effectively and sustainably managing water resources (Mukhtarov, 2008). 
IWRM includes features that scholars advocate as necessary for instituting sustainable 
water governance (Orlove and Caton, 2010). According to the Global Water Partnership 
(Global Water Partnership, 2000),  
IWRM is a process which promotes the co-ordinated development and 
management of water, land and related resources in order to maximize 
economic and social welfare in an equitable manner without 
compromising the sustainability of vital ecosystems. (p. 14) 
Due to the emphasis on coordination among different groups of political and social 
actors, IWRM is inherently a governance approach.  
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Integrated governance is needed because the dominant water governance model in 
practice is at-best fragmented, with little to inadequate coordination between government 
actors and other stakeholders (Biermann and Pattberg, 2008). This fragmentation in 
governance often involves little or no communication between different agencies whose 
decisions impact water sustainability (Zelli and Van Asselt, 2013). This limited 
communication is often the result of multiple agencies and water providers managing 
different aspects of water (Biermann et al., 2009). Furthermore, water flows across 
political boundaries and hence there are scalar mismatches in the hydrological functions 
of watersheds and boundaries of decision making.  Yet, the pursuit of water sustainability 
makes participation (and integration) of government and non-government actors across 
sectors and scale imperative (Wiek and Larson, 2012).  
One of IWRM’s main features is that it advocates the integration of different 
water use sectors such as agriculture and municipal, among others (Orlove and Caton, 
2010). This feature is in direct confrontation to the fragmentation generally found in 
water governance. Fragmentation in water governance is typically seen in the form of 
multiple government entities working at various scales and on different aspects of water 
resources without sufficient coordination between them (Biermann and Pattberg, 2008; 
Zelli and Van Asselt, 2013). Although IWRM has been contested and debated in terms of 
its ability to be operationalized in real-world water governance, it still serves as a 
standard for directing and assessing what constitutes ‘good’ governance of water 
resources (Biswas, 2004, 2008; Bouwer, 2000, 2002; Grigg, 2008; Medema et al., 2008; 
Rahaman and Varis, 2005; Van der Zaag, 2005). Fragmentation can be decreased through 
coordination of activities among stakeholders. 
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Sustainable Water Governance Principles. In an attempt to provide a 
comprehensive coverage of the varying aspects of water sustainability, Wiek and Larson 
(2012) define sustainable water governance as:  
the process that involves all relevant stakeholder groups in coordinating 
the water-related supply, delivery, use, and outflow activities in a way that 
ensures a sufficient and equitable level of social and economic welfare 
without compromising the viability and integrity of the supporting hydro-
ecosystems in the long-term. (p. 3162) 
They propose seven principles that combine narrower views (such as safe yield, water 
quality, adaptive capacity, social learning, inclusive governance, among others) of water 
sustainability. Their proposed principles are: (1) Social-ecological system integrity, (2) 
Resource efficiency and maintenance, (3) Livelihood sufficiency and opportunity, (4) 
Socio-ecological civility and democratic governance, (5) Intra-generational and inter-
generational equity, (6) Interconnectivity from local to regional to global scales, and (7) 
Precaution (mitigation) and adaptability (Table 1).  
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Table 1.  
Sustainable Water Governance Principles and Key Features 
Sustainable Water 
Governance Principle 
Key Features 
Socio-ecological system 
integrity 
Maintaining in-stream flows 
Maintaining water quality 
Stabilizing aquifers 
Coordinating resource use at appropriate scales 
 
Resource efficiency and 
maintenance 
Reduced water demand and increased water 
efficiency 
Encouraging water reuse 
Eliminating water loses 
Achieving balance between groundwater extraction 
and recharge 
 
Livelihood sufficiency and 
opportunity 
Sufficient water quality and quantity for livelihood 
activities 
Sufficient water quality and quantity for economic 
activities 
Fair compensation for stakeholders that lose water 
access without harm to other users 
 
Socio-ecological civility and 
democratic governance 
Involvement of all stakeholders 
Representation of different interests and 
perspectives 
Establishing collaborative water governance 
 
Intra-generational and Inter-
generational equity 
Access to safe, clean water for all residents 
Ensuring fair distribution of costs and benefits 
among stakeholders 
Facilitating inclusiveness among diverse 
stakeholders 
Ensuring the representation of future generations 
(e.g. through civil society participation) 
 
Interconnectivity from local to 
regional to global scales 
Eliminating negative impacts on other areas 
Coordinating between local and broader scale 
stakeholders 
 
Precaution (mitigation) and 
adaptability 
Anticipating water quality and scarcity problems 
Mitigating water quality and scarcity problems 
Incorporating activities that reduce vulnerability to 
water quality and scarcity problems 
Adapted from Wiek and Larson (2012) 
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These principles by Wiek and Larson (2012) guide the analysis conducted in this 
dissertation on the conditions for and barriers to water sustainability in Prescott AMA, 
with respect to coordination among governance actors and their exercise of power. In the 
remaining parts of this dissertation, I use the phrases ‘water governance for sustainability’ 
and ‘sustainable water governance’ interchangeably in referring to practices that promote 
comprehensive water sustainability. 
 
Previous Central Highlands Research 
 In this section, I provide in-depth reviews of five studies published within the past 
decade regarding the Central Highlands’ water resources. Four of the studies are peer-
reviewed journal publications (Bolin et al., 2008; Collins and Bolin, 2007; Cutts et al., 
2010; Muñoz-Erickson et al., 2010) while the fifth is a dissertation (Whitmire, 2013). 
This review is important because previous research highlights current water resource 
knowledge in the Central Highlands, which help situate this research and its findings. The 
subsequent in-depth reviews are presented chronologically. 
Vulnerability to Water Scarcity. Focusing on Prescott, Prescott Valley, Chino 
Valley, Dewey-Humboldt, and the surrounding rural area of unincorporated places, 
Collins and Bolin (2007) assessed vulnerability to water scarcity in the Central 
Highlands. Following Cutter (1996) and Cutter et al. (2000), the authors adopted the 
hazards-of-place conceptualization of vulnerability to identify the people and places that 
are both biophysically and socially vulnerable to water scarcity—referred to as place 
vulnerability. Using a Geographic Information System (GIS), they mapped the specific 
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people and places in the Central Highlands that are differentially affected by water 
scarcity.  
To assess biophysical vulnerability, the authors used spatial data on registered 
wells and regional aquifer(s) alongside census data from government agencies to develop 
biophysical variables, namely access to groundwater (determined by the number of 
exempt2 wells without access to basin-fill aquifer) and well spacing. The biophysical 
variables were transformed into indices, integrated, and mapped by census blocks to 
identify places of biophysical vulnerability to water scarcity. Collins and Bolin (2007) 
found that growing and unincorporated communities adjacent to Prescott and Dewey-
Humboldt have the highest biophysical vulnerability to water scarcity due to limited 
groundwater access influenced by local geology.  Meanwhile, places with relatively 
dense well spacing close to Chino Valley are vulnerable to water scarcity due to reduced 
groundwater storage and potential contamination despite overlying a basin-fill aquifer. 
The least biophysically vulnerable areas are unpopulated census blocks and Prescott 
Valley, where well-spacing density is low with few households depending on exempt 
wells.  
A sociodemographic index (determined by population structure, socioeconomic 
status, and place dependency) and water-provider type index (based on whether 
households were within municipal water provider service area, within a private water 
provider service area, or had exempt wells) were used in assessing social vulnerability to 
water scarcity. Collins and Bolin (2007) found households on exempt wells to be more 
                                                        
2 An ‘exempt well’ in Arizona is any well with maximum pump capacity of 35 gallons per minute. Exempt 
wells are not subject to the groundwater-withdrawal reporting requirement mandated by the Groundwater 
Management Act of 1980 – that is, they are ‘exempt’ from regulation. 
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socially vulnerable due to the high costs of mitigating and adapting to localized water 
scarcity. Also, social vulnerability increased due to the costs of deepening wells, as the 
water table drops, and treating arsenic and other contaminants in groundwater.  
Based on the sociodemographic index, the authors’ analysis shows that Prescott, 
Prescott Valley, Chino Valley, Dewey-Humboldt, and adjacent growing areas have high 
social vulnerability. However, the surrounding rural regions are less socially vulnerable 
due to lower housing density and population per census block. Areas of unregulated lot 
division (lot splits)3 in Chino Valley, Dewey-Humboldt, and north of Prescott Valley 
showed high social vulnerability to water scarcity, while provider-type social 
vulnerability is mediated at the community level. For example, residents of Prescott and 
Prescott Valley are less socially vulnerable to water scarcity because they are mainly 
served by municipal water providers.  
In combining sociodemographic and water provider indices, Collins and Bolin 
(2007) found that areas with high densities of vulnerable populations (that is, the elderly, 
children, female-headed households, non-white residents, and Hispanic residents) that 
rely on exempt wells have high levels of social vulnerability to water scarcity. Places 
with a high density of vulnerable populations served by either municipal or private water 
providers have moderate to high levels of social vulnerability to water scarcity. By 
contrast, places with little or no vulnerable populations (which were in mostly less or 
uninhabited areas outside Prescott, Prescott Valley, Chino Valley, and Dewey-Humboldt) 
are less socially vulnerable to water scarcity.  
                                                        
3 Lot splits occur when a landowner divides a lot into smaller lots. Lot splits in Prescott AMA mostly 
depend on exempt wells for their water, leading to an increased proliferation and density of exempt wells. 
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In terms of overall vulnerability to water scarcity, Collins and Bolin (2007) 
combined and assigned equal weights to the indicators of biophysical and social 
vulnerability (namely access to groundwater, well spacing, socio-demography, and water 
provider type) within a GIS. The authors found that the most vulnerable areas, overall, to 
water scarcity are densely populated lot-split subdivisions outside Prescott and Prescott 
Valley that are dependent on exempt wells. Generally, the authors observed the 
following:  
(1) Areas of biophysical vulnerability did not always intersect with areas of social 
vulnerability; 
(2) Adopting Cutter et al.’s (2000) characterization of vulnerable population results in 
a positive correlation between sociodemographic vulnerability and population 
density; and 
(3) Areas of sociodemographic vulnerability relate to those of water provision system 
vulnerability. However, the relationship between sociodemographic vulnerability 
and vulnerability by water provider type was reversed with higher population 
density. This reversal was due to the economies of scale and reduction of risks 
acquired through municipal water provision. The relationship described above 
explains why Prescott and Prescott Valley both have high sociodemographic 
vulnerability and low vulnerability based on water provision type.  
Although Collins and Bolin (2007) found that exempt well households are 
generally more vulnerable to water scarcity, the authors did not explain the factors 
responsible for the continued prevalence and proliferation of exempt wells. I fill this 
research gap by assessing how power is exercised by different governance actors across 
local to state levels. 
Water, Growth, and Politics of Scale in Arizona’s Central Highlands. In a 
subsequent study, Bolin et al. (2008) examined the scalar politics of citizen groups, 
government actors, and development interests in the Verde River watershed (which 
contains the Prescott Active Management Area, or Prescott AMA). Within the AMA, 
  24 
Prescott and Prescott Valley jointly pursue groundwater importation from the Big Chino 
basin, an endeavor made possible by a 1991 state legislation. Meanwhile, within the 
watershed, civil society groups, environmental groups, and Verde Valley municipalities 
argue for the effects of Big Chino water importation on the health of the Verde River and 
the water supply of Verde Valley communities. Salt River Project (SRP), a company that 
serves water to Phoenix residents, is a major political actor in the region’s water 
resources due to that entity’s priority rights to about 85% of Verde River flows.   
Using data from semi-structured interviews, informal interviews, and document 
review, the authors interrogated the water conflict that developed around Prescott AMA’s 
Big Chino Project4 (BCP). The authors described Prescott’s planned water import as a 
“spatial fix”5 that temporarily defers water scarcity in order to promote the region’s 
residential growth-dependent economy. Using interview quotes, Bolin et al. (2008) 
showed that although imported water is claimed as needed to achieve the AMA’s 
management goal of safe yield, the imported water was being earmarked to enable and 
support new residents, thereby facilitating growth. They further noted that Prescott's 
pursuit of a spatial fix reflects the “contradictions inherent in overconsumption of finite 
resources” (p. 1498). 
The authors used a ‘politics of scale’ lens to describe how different groups rescale 
the ongoing water conflict to suit their interests. Specifically, environmental groups draw 
on the effects of pumping on both the river and the endangered species in it, thereby 
                                                        
4 The Big Chino Project is the water import project being pursued by Prescott AMA municipalities to move 
water from the Paulden area (outside AMA boundaries) into the AMA. This water importation was made 
possible by an exemption passed by legislation, which countered statutory GMA restrictions on 
groundwater importation into AMAs. 
 
5 A spatial fix occurs when external material is brought in to replace current material deficit without dealing 
with the underlying conditions causing the deficit. 
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rescaling the area’s water conflicts from the local to federal scale. In 2004, the Center for 
Biological Diversity (CBD) filed a notice to sue Prescott, Prescott Valley, and a number 
of federal agencies for violating (or future violations of) three sections of the Endangered 
Species Act (ESA). Verde River Citizens Alliance (VRCA) rescaled the effects and 
impacts of the BCP from strictly AMA to watershed-wide, while CBD jumped scale by 
invoking the federal ESA. In another example, Citizens Water Advocacy Group (CWAG) 
jumped scale by calling for a federal Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) and invoking 
requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) for a project that 
proponents see as a local matter. Meanwhile, supporters of the BCP focus on scales that 
advance the project. A project supporter interviewed by Bolin et al. (2008), for example, 
focused on the project’s impact on only the first 25 miles of the Verde River, where there 
were no endangered species. Based on the politics of scale theory that informed their 
analysis, the authors showed how BCP proponents reinforce their stance by only referring 
to scales that favor their project. 
The claims of environmental groups and Verde Valley communities that the BCP 
would adversely impact the Verde River were based on evidence provided by USGS 
reports such as Corkhill and Mason (1995), Wirt (2005), and Wirt and DeWitt (2005). In 
addition, reports published by two retired USGS scientists, Meyers and Wolfe (2007), 
provided civil society groups with information which supported their opposition to the 
Big Chino Project (Bolin et al., 2008). However, as reported by Bolin et al. (2008), the 
USGS reports were sharply debated by Prescott AMA municipalities who invoked 
scientific uncertainty because they look to the BCP to allow growth in their cities. 
Proponents of the Big Chino Project debated the applicability of the USGS reports to the 
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water import project. Instead, BCP proponents (Prescott and Prescott Valley) pointed to 
consultant studies which suggested that BCP pumping will have minimal effect on Verde 
River flows. 
In their analysis, Bolin et al. (2008) framed the key political actors involved in the 
region’s water conflicts as upstream or downstream actors based on their support or 
opposition to the BCP. Political upstream actors in the watershed are Prescott and 
Prescott Valley, while downstream actors include CWAG, Verde Valley communities, 
Verde Watershed Association (VWA), VRCA, CBD: Save the Verde Campaign, and The 
Nature Conservancy’s Verde River Program (TNC), among others. Upstream actors 
advocate for the BCP project while downstream actors (in Verde Valley) do not. Thus, 
the terms upstream and downstream do not represent actual geographic areas but are 
terms that indicate political support or opposition to the BCP. For example, CWAG is a 
civil society group with a watershed-wide focus that started in the Upper Verde River 
watershed but aligns “politically with downstream groups and communities of the Verde 
Valley” due to its opposition to the BCP project (p. 1501).  
Bolin et al. (2008) also identified two major coalitions within the Verde 
Watershed, namely the Verde River Basin Partnership (Partnership) and Upper Verde 
Watershed Protection Coalition (Coalition) – upstream interests only, with both the 
Partnership and Coalition redrawing the map of governance and political allegiance 
around the region’s water conflict. The Partnership was created by a 2005 federal 
legislation as part of a public-private land exchange program in Yavapai County and 
included Prescott AMA municipalities at creation. However, Prescott AMA cities left the 
Partnership to form the Coalition, citing the disproportionate number of Partnership 
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members not “accountable to public scrutiny” (Verde River Basin Partnership as cited by 
Bolin et al., 2008). Bolin et al., (2008) concluded that:  
The current standoff between the Coalition and the Partnership reflects the 
rescaled spaces of environmental conflict. The Coalition has ‘scaled up’ political 
alignments by creating a new municipal network that operates outside the 
jurisdictional scales of the PrAMA or Yavapai County, but specifically represents 
interests that will benefit from the BCP. The Partnership, in contrast, establishes 
relationships among Verde Valley municipalities, civil society groups, and federal 
agencies seeking to promote environmental governance at a scale comprising 
much of the Verde River watershed. Together the new coalitions have engendered 
a reconfigured arena of conflict over the appropriate scales from which to 
organize environmental policy making and resource governance… However, no 
effective regional environmental governance has yet to emerge from these new 
scalar arrangements of stakeholders, and the future of the Verde remains in 
question (p. 1506, 1509 emphasis mine) 
At the regional level, the County and its Water Advisory Council lack the authority to 
regulate groundwater, which is a responsibility of the Arizona Department of Water 
Resources. Overall, despite the existence of the regional Active Management Area 
(which guides AMA level water management), there is no regional planning for 
managing growth in the Central Highlands. Yet, water in arid Arizona cannot be 
effectively managed without managing growth. Arizona’s elected officials lack 
enthusiasm for growth management due to the state’s economic dependence on 
construction and retail, which increase pressure on the region’s water resources. 
In summary, Bolin et al. (2008) identified the following major points as the 
features of politics of scale within the Central Highlands’ water conflicts:    
(1) The Groundwater Management Act (GMA) encourages the pursuit of spatial 
fixes to achieve safe yield and unregulated developments outside AMAs. In fact, 
the GMA is limited in its ability for “rationally planning sustainable water 
resources in the face of continued growth” (p. 1509);   
(2) The BCP is just one spatial fix option among many others that are being 
considered in the region. The dependence on spatial fixes is so great because 
Arizona’s political economy is dominated by residential growth with a lack of 
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alternative political-economic narratives. Thus, the common strategy for 
countering material limits to growth (that is, depleted aquifers and reduced 
surface flows) is to search for a spatial fix; 
(3) There is a mismatch between the management scale of the AMA and the scale 
at which the effects of BCP impacts would be felt. Environmental groups in the 
region use science to legitimize claims of future harm and the impacts of the BCP 
beyond the AMA’s management scale, rather than take the politically unpopular 
position of directly opposing new housing growth; 
(4) Environmental groups are rescaling the region’s water conflict to a national 
scale by invoking the Endangered Species Act and the National Environmental 
Policy Act. This strategy helps them overcome the challenge created by the 
statutory mandate for groundwater import into Prescott AMA; and 
(5) The Yavapai Ranch Land Exchange is a spatial fix produced by Arizona 
legislators at the federal level to promote growth which rescaled the region’s actor 
relations through the creation of the Verde River Basin Partnership. 
Similar to Bolin et al. (2008), I adopted propositions of scale in the present 
research. However, in my conceptualization of scale, I focused more on the interaction of 
governance actors across scales and how this has affected water governance in the region 
than the politics of scale (Marston et al. 2009). Bolin et al. (2008) found that non-
government actors employ different scales in supporting their claims of Verde River 
harm in the region’s water conflict – a strategy that involves resource mobilization and 
the exercise of power. However, the authors do not elaborate sufficiently on the ways 
through which other governance actors mobilize resources and exercise power in 
promoting or undermining water sustainability. To fill this gap, I analyzed resource 
mobilization by state, regional, and local level actors with respect to the study area’s 
water governance and the implications of their activities for Prescott AMA’s water 
sustainability. 
Information Networks in a Watershed Partnership. In their study, Muñoz-
Erickson et al. (2010) used social network theory and analysis to investigate the 
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relationship between information networks and conflicts in the Verde River Basin 
Partnership (VRBP or Partnership). In 2005, federal legislation had created the 
partnership with a mandate to develop science-based water management strategies for the 
Verde River watershed. 
Muñoz-Erickson et al. (2010) examined the relationship between information 
sharing and conflict due to the following: vertical stratification6 (that is, member interests 
across cities, county, watershed, state, federal), horizontal stratification7 (member 
interests focused geographically upstream or downstream of the Verde River), expertise 
of VRBP members (scientists versus nonscientists), and ideology (environmental values, 
perceived barriers to decision making, members’ view of science, members’ view of 
scientists, political ideology). Also, the authors investigated the distribution of power 
within the VRBP using measures of in-degree and betweenness centrality.  
Most VRBP members who responded to the study’s survey had perceived values 
and information as the main barriers to the VRBP’s decision making. They also 
expressed watershed-level interests with a focus on downstream impacts of upstream 
activities. VRBP survey respondents were not scientists themselves but tended to hold 
positivist views in support of science and to think scientists should play dominant roles in 
policy formation.  
                                                        
6 In terms of levels, the vertical governance analyzed in this dissertation is similar to Munoz-Erikson et al.’s 
(2010) vertical stratification. However, unlike Munoz-Erikson’s focus on various spatial levels between the 
federal level and cities, analytically, I focused on state, regional, and local levels. 
. 
7 The horizontal governance assessed in this dissertation are different from Munoz-Erikson et al.’s (2010) 
vertical stratification. Whereas Munoz-Erikson et al. (2010) categorized VRBP members according to 
upstream or downstream interests, I assessed governance interactions among the four municipalities in 
Prescott AMA, namely: Prescott, Prescott Valley, Chino Valley, and Dewey-Humboldt. 
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Through their analysis, Muñoz-Erickson et al. (2010) found that neither vertical 
nor horizontal stratification were responsible for the Partnership’s conflicts. They also 
found less interaction between scientists and nonscientists than expected. Munoz-Erikson 
et al. (2010) had expected contests over science, and thus more interactions between 
scientists and nonscientists, would occur due to the high media attention the VRBP had 
received and due to Bolin et al.’s (2008) observation that scientific studies are used in 
political ways within the region. However, the authors found the following:  
(1) Ecocentrists shared information more often with members that held views of 
the dominant social paradigm on environmental issues;  
(2) Those with conservative political views shared information more often with 
liberal respondents than conservatives did with other conservatives and more 
often than liberals did with other liberals; and  
(3) Respondents who thought of scientists as policy advocates occupied central 
positions in the VRBP’s social network, suggesting that they were most connected 
to other members, could influence information flow, and thus had more power in 
the Partnership’s network.  
The authors concluded that the lack of interaction between scientists and nonscientists as 
well as the central position occupied by actors who responded that science should 
influence policy (when the rest of the group did not share the same view) could be 
responsible for science not being deliberated in the Partnership, thereby limiting the 
Partnership’s ability to achieve its goal of developing regional water governance based on 
science.  
 Munoz-Erikson et al. (2010) is another study within the Central Highlands that 
incorporated conceptualizations of scale. Specifically, the authors differentiated levels 
from local to federal government and at the watershed level. However, the authors 
focused on members of the initial VRBP while assessing information networks in the 
Verde River watershed. Although this focus was sufficient for Munoz-Erikson et al.’s 
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(2010) goal of understanding information networks, their focus on the initial VRBP only 
provides a partial understanding of stakeholder engagement for water sustainability in the 
Verde River watershed. Despite having slightly different study areas (Verde River 
watershed versus Prescott AMA), in analyzing governance interaction and implications 
for water sustainability, I build on Munoz-Erikson’s et al. (2010) study by assessing 
coordination and collaboration among a broader group of stakeholders.  
Ego Networks in a Watershed Partnership. Building on Muñoz-Erickson et al. 
(2010), Cutts et al. (2010) examined the ego networks of members of the VRBP to 
understand if member contacts and composition of networks explained why members 
who think science should influence decision making occupy central network positions 
within the Partnership. An ego network refers to the network of individual actors, 
compared with analyzing the whole network of a group or organization as done by 
Munoz-Erikson et al. (2010). Cutts et al.’s (2010) approach follows social network 
theory, which suggests that a higher number of personal contacts, higher proportion of 
external contacts, or higher proportion of unique contacts indicates access to more 
resources, which would allow central actors to exercise more power than others in the 
whole network. 
Cutts et al. (2010) found that first, there is no relationship between the number of 
contacts, proportion of external contacts to internal (that is, VRBP) contacts, and 
proportion of unique contacts in determining the central network position (power) 
observed. Second, those who acknowledged affiliation with the VRBP occupied central 
network positions compared with those who did not. Third, those who acknowledged 
affiliation with VRBP had more unique contacts that those who did not. Finally, the size 
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and composition of member contacts differed with ideology concerning the subjectivity 
of science but did not explain the centrality of actors who thought science was objective. 
Specifically, those who thought science was objective have more external contacts, while 
those who think science is not objective have more unique contacts. Based on these 
results, the authors concluded that power “appears to be generated from processes within 
the [VRBP] network” rather than an actor’s external or unique ties (p. 98). Also, Cutts et 
al. (2010) advanced the proposition that scientific discourse could be obscuring debates 
over values especially because the VRBP Act mandates science-based solutions whereas 
partnership members view values as the barrier to cooperation. According to Cutts et al. 
(2010): “It is plausible that the mismatch between a mandate to solve the Big Chino 
controversy through science and the belief of partnership members that conflict persists 
because of values plays a large role in halting cooperation” (p. 99). 
Similar to Munoz-Erikson et al. (2010), Cutts et al. (2010) focused mainly on the 
initial VRBP and found that value differences were responsible for conflict among VRBP 
members. I build on Cutts et al.’s (2010) study by examining a variety of other 
stakeholders within the Central Highlands, specifically with respect to Prescott AMA’s 
water governance. In the present study, I aim to provide understanding of not only 
information sharing but also other types of interaction and coordination for water 
sustainability among a diverse group of governance actors. 
 Power and Politics in Yavapai County’s Water Conflicts. In her dissertation, 
Whitmire (2013) used a case study methodology involving interviews and document 
analysis to investigate the factors responsible for unresolved water conflicts in Yavapai 
County. By applying theories of deliberative democracy, network analysis, and power 
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relationships, Whitmire (2013) found evidence for the study’s hypotheses that first, water 
conflicts persist in Yavapai County because the processes used to inform and engage 
citizens have been ineffective. Second, different aspects of power are contributing to 
persistent water conflicts in the county.  
Regarding the study’s first hypothesis, Whitmire (2013) concluded that there is no 
ongoing deliberative democratic process in Yavapai County. Instead, “there are those 
who are presenting information and others who are advocating positions" (p. 97). The 
political consciousness of residents is shaped by institutional and social forces such that 
they are not aware of water conflicts in the county or are complacent about its resolution. 
Thus, most residents of the county are not aware of the region’s water management 
problems due to being uninformed or misinformed. According to Whitmire (2013), this 
state of affairs reveals that power is not co-shared (that is, ‘power over’ rather than 
‘power with’) by citizens and decision-makers. Instead, the construction and development 
industry are powerful and influence the county’s political agenda. Meanwhile, those who 
are aware of the county’s water management problems are frustrated by political 
dynamics and the protracted nature of discussions without substantive change in current 
water governance practices.  
Furthermore, Whitmire (2013) argued that there is no administrative mechanism 
for communication, trust building, and collaboration between diverse interests in the 
county. Collaborative efforts that span the county have been unsuccessful, such as the 
Verde River Basin Partnership (VRBP). Moreover, distrust among elected officials, for 
example, in the Yavapai County Water Advisory Committee (YCWAC) is an 
impediment to consensus-based decision making. This challenge is important to 
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acknowledge because the YCWAC structure requires consensus among members for 
decisions to be made. Overall, elected officials in the Prescott area and Verde Valley 
disagree with each other’s ideas and projects, thereby impeding county-wide water 
governance and the resolution of the ongoing water conflicts.  
Regarding the study’s second hypothesis, Whitmire (2013) found that 
collaboration among government actors, and likewise non-government actors, was 
limited. Specifically, local, state, and federal agencies are limited in their ability to work 
collaboratively (either internally or across agencies) due to diverging institutional 
structures at each level. For example, the Yavapai County Water Advisory Council 
structure required consensus for every decision, which was often difficult to achieve and 
often created conflict among members rather than ameliorating it. Whitmire (2013) 
referred to this situation as the structural constraints of power. Meanwhile, she found few 
cooperative efforts between water-related NGOs in the Prescott area and Verde Valley. 
Thus, the power of non-government water-related organizations are dispersed because 
they currently do not collaborate as much as they should especially across Prescott area 
and Verde Valley communities.  
Whitmire (2013) further observed that Arizona water laws give significant 
authority to the state legislature and do not recognize the link between surface water and 
groundwater, thereby impeding local and regional water governance efforts.  In addition, 
the AMA structure gives Prescott AMA communities authority that other communities in 
Yavapai County lack. This statutory legitimacy contributes to the lack of cooperation 
between Prescott AMA and non-AMA communities in developing effective county-wide 
water management strategies, thereby further hindering sustainability at broader scales.  
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Although Whitmire (2013) established the link between Prescott municipalities’ 
AMA designation and their legitimacy with the state legislature, it is unclear to what 
extent this AMA designation or ‘legitimacy’ promotes water sustainability in the Central 
Highlands. To build on Whitmire’s (2013) findings, in this dissertation, I investigated this 
question of the relationship between legitimacy and water sustainability with respect to 
Prescott AMA. Specifically, I assess how interactions among diverse actors and the 
exercise of power in the Prescott area affects sustainable water governance in the study 
area. 
 
Positioning the Current Study  
Improving knowledge on the relationship between governance institutions and 
water sustainability requires studies that investigate how institutions created for water 
governance contribute (or not) to water sustainability. Thus, with focus on Arizona’s 
Central Highlands, I assess the conditions for and barriers to water sustainability within 
the statutory Prescott Active Management Area (AMA) by assessing coordination among 
water governance actors and their exercise of power. I accomplish this purpose by 
drawing on propositions of vertical governance, horizontal governance, and power 
(Figure 3) in answering the following research questions: 
1. What interactions exist among governance actors involved in water management 
across local to state levels?  
2. In what ways do actors at the local level coordinate (or not) in governing water 
resources?  
3. How is power exercised among a variety of water governance actors across 
levels? 
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In the rest of this chapter, I review the theoretical propositions and concepts that frame 
this dissertation, namely: vertical governance, horizontal governance, and power.  
 
Figure 3. Conceptual Framework for Water Governance Coordination 
 
Vertical Governance  
Vertical governance involves interactions between actors, across different scalar 
levels (Cash et al., 2006; Van der Brugge and Van Raak, 2007, p. 35). In this study, I 
draw on propositions of vertical governance from theories of scale and multilevel 
governance (Figure 4), which I discuss in this section.  
Geographical scale is a heavily debated concept in human geography (Brown and 
Purcell, 2005; Jones et al., 2011; Jones et al., 2007; Marston et al., 2005; Moore, 2008; 
Neumann, 2009). This debate has centered around the utility of scale as ontology versus 
epistemology since Marston et al.’s (2005) call to eliminate scale from human geography. 
Scholars within political ecology generally reject the conceptualization of scale as an 
ontological category but concede its epistemological status (Bolin et al., 2008; Brown and 
Purcell, 2005). Following the political ecology tradition, I draw on epistemological 
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conceptualizations of scale. In other words, I view scale not as an object of inquiry but as 
a tool for ‘making sense’ of the physical and human landscape (Smith, 2000, p. 725). In 
the context of this research’s vertical governance, the three levels (or scales) in focus are 
the state, regional, and local levels (Figure 4). Also, I draw on the propositions of scale as 
a socially constructed trope, that is complicated in governance due to scale mismatches, 
and that is relational. I discuss these framings below. 
  
Figure 4. Key Actors involved in Vertical Governance 
Within human geography, scale is recognized as a trope, a representation tool that 
encourages certain meaning while constraining others because “‘true’ meaning can never 
simply pass through a trope, it is always shaped” (Jones, 1998, p. 27). Though this 
understanding holds whether scale is viewed ontologically or epistemologically, I apply 
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scale epistemologically within this research. Jones (1998) argues that scale influences 
how reality is understood, for example,  
The creation of scale as a trope for understanding the city did not merely shift 
politics from one level to another. Rather, it recast what was true or knowable 
about the city within the frame of scale. Certain questions about the city simply 
became un-askable. The truth of an ‘ordinary gaze’ became less ‘true’, while 
other questions about zones, for example, became more readily askable. This is 
not simply a jump in scales, it is a fundamental change in the way the city was 
known and apprehended” (Jones, 1998, p. 28). 
Since resource governance scales are created for specific management purposes, the 
choice of scale or the extent of scale created determines what is known about the resource 
and could hide or reveal the state of resource sustainability. Thus, the choice of scale 
could promote either the exploitation of natural resources or sustainable governance.   
Geographic (and governance) scales are socially produced, that is, they are 
socially constructed (Marston, 2000). The social construction of scale refutes the notion 
that it is ontologically given. Although watersheds and groundwater basins are 
recognized as physical units based on their hydrological functions, research shows that 
even physical scales can be socially constructed. For example, Cohen and Bakker (2014) 
in their study of Alberta’s water governance found that the creation of watershed 
governance ‘subordinated’ environmental governance to the government’s political and 
economic goals rather than promoting sustainable resource governance. The authors 
argue that the choice of watershed boundary was more politically driven, than by a desire 
to govern water within ‘natural scales’. Their finding in many ways reinforce Brown and 
Purcell’s (2005) assertion that “there is nothing inherent about any scale… rather the 
social and ecological outcomes of any particular scalar arrangement are the result of the 
political strategies of particular actors, not the inherent qualities of particular scales” (p. 
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607, 609). This social construction of scale means that governance scales can be created 
or they could cease to exist at the will of governance actors. 
In practice, water management and governance scales rarely match ecological 
ones, which results in scale mismatches (Zimmerer and Bassett, 2003). Sayre (2005, p. 
277, emphasis mine), quotes Lee (1993) as proposing that “when human responsibility 
does not match the spatial, temporal, or functional scale of natural phenomena, 
unsustainable use of resources is likely, and it will persist until the mismatch of scales is 
cured.” The finding of Cohen and Bakker (2014) previously presented suggest that 
politically driven attempts to cure scale mismatches could mask political agendas that do 
not promote sustainable resource governance. Thus, it is possible for unsustainable use of 
resources to continue even though scale mismatches are ‘cured’. 
Within Arizona, Active Management Areas (AMAs) are areas delineated for their 
historic groundwater overdraft. In the current study, Prescott AMA boundaries do not 
match either watershed boundaries or groundwater basins. Instead, Prescott AMA is an 
administrative region that merges two sub-basins from two different watersheds.  With 
respect to the study area, AMA boundaries were instituted by Arizona’s 1980 
Groundwater Management Act. The AMA did not exist prior to this legislation. 
Integrating the findings of Collins and Bolin (2007) and Bolin et al. (2008) show that 
Prescott AMA’s proposed water import from a neighboring groundwater basin to achieve 
safe yield would transfer vulnerability to other people, places and times. However, 
groundwater transfers, irrespective of its effects on surface water flows is possible due to 
Arizona’s (incorrect) legal separation of surface water and groundwater (Bolin et al., 
2008; Whitmire, 2013).  
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Another idea about scale important to this study is relation across scales. Brenner 
(2001) in proposing the ‘plural connotation of scale’ argues for analyzing the relations 
among scales rather than focusing on only one scale. Due to the focus on barriers to water 
sustainability in Prescott AMA, rather than assessing the broader social interactions 
among scales, I focus on water governance strategies across local, regional, and state 
levels. Thus, drawing from Brenner’s (2001) “plural connotation of scale” (Brown and 
Purcell, p. 610), in research question one, I focus not only on the study area i.e. Prescott 
AMA but on the interactions among actors at different scales (referred to as levels in SES 
literature), plus the water governance outcome(s) produced by these interactions. In other 
words, I analyze how relations across levels (specifically, water management strategies) 
result in the water governance outcomes at one level (in this case, Prescott AMA).    
With regards to sustainability, coordinated interaction between actors at different 
levels of governance is needed to sustain efforts at the local level, especially when such 
efforts need to be scaled-up to a higher (e.g. regional) level. Berkes’ (2006) review of 
marine governance in Koh Sralao coastal village in Cambodia presents an example of 
how a lack of vertical governance interaction between the local and regional levels could 
limit sustainable governance efforts. In the Koh Sralao case, the village’s management 
committee had been successful in making local fishermen switch to large mesh sized 
nets, which allowed crabs to grow before being harvested, thereby reducing the risk of 
overharvesting. However, the lack of enforcement of a similar policy due to lack of 
support from the regional level on neighboring fishing communities led Koh Sralao 
fishers to switch back to small mesh sized nets, which relegated attempts at sustainable 
fishing.  
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Vertical interactions when coordinated can also mitigate conflicts in resource 
governance. Marshall (2008, p. 77) has argued that the higher level of a multilevel 
governance could potentially foster the trust needed among local level actors (as long as 
the local level actors currently trust the higher levels of leadership). In addition to trust 
among actors, which can help conflict resolution, Knüppe and Pahl-Wostl (2011) show 
that a lack of integration in vertical governance can lead to conflict. In their case study of 
groundwater governance in the Upper Guadiana Basin (Spain), the authors found that 
poor integration of local and regional level actors in formulating the Special Plan for the 
Upper Guadiana Basin led to conflict among stakeholders.  
With focus on Prescott AMA as a case study, I assess spatial and temporal scales 
similar to Bolin et al. (2008). However, my analytic emphasis is on water management 
strategies and governance actor relations across state, regional, and local levels. Overall, I 
posit that AMA level governance outcomes are not only influenced by local or regional 
level activities but those at the state level as well. In analyzing the barriers to water 
sustainability in Prescott AMA, I assess the conditions for and barriers to water 
sustainability with a focus on the coordination of governance actors across levels (Figure 
4).  
 
Horizontal Governance  
Defined simply, horizontal governance involves governance actor interactions at a 
particular level aimed at resolving issues at that governance level (Termeer, 2009). In 
broader terms, Emerson et al. (2012) define this type of governance, which they refer to 
as collaborative governance, as:  
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the processes and structures of public policy decision making and management 
that engage people constructively across the boundaries of public agencies, levels 
of government, and/or the public, private and civic spheres in order to carry out a 
public purpose that could not otherwise be accomplished (p. 2) 
Horizontal (or collaborative) governance in this dissertation include actors outside the 
local level (such as the public-private Salt River Project with senior rights to Verde River 
water). However, key actors involved in this study’s horizontal governance are the 
municipalities and other communities that comprise Prescott AMA (Figure 5).  
  
Figure 5. Key Actors involved in Local Level Horizontal Governance 
   Scholars generally agree that coordination and collaboration among actors are 
essential for governance that achieves its goals (Trein, 2016). Phillips (2004) presents the 
case of horizontal governance in Canada at the national level, which involved the national 
government and non-government actors. The case study was focused on Canada’s 
Voluntary Sector Initiative (VSI), which involved a twenty-month process of joint work 
between the national government and non-government actors. The Trein (2016) study 
shows that collaboration among governance actors was an important criterion in the 
initiative’s overall success. In particular, some elements of this collaborative relationship 
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involved face-to-face meetings, which allowed time to build trust and mutual 
understanding among actors.  
Thus, coordination and collaboration are important components of sustainable 
water governance. For example, even though Keeler et al. (2015) developed scenarios to 
guide sustainability transitions in the Phoenix metropolitan area, the researchers 
concluded that any choice on those scenarios would require the coordinated efforts of 
actors within the water system. The eight characteristics identified across international 
literature as necessary for good governance also include elements of coordination. These 
characteristics are participation of different actors, consensus-driven governance, 
adherence to set standards, governance that is transparent, responsive to change, effective 
and efficient, equitable and fair, and follows the rule of law (McKay, 2007, p. 150). In 
support of the need for coordination and collaboration in governance, one of the 
recommendations presented by Larson et al. (2013) in their sustainability appraisal of 
water governance in Phoenix pertained to building capacity through collaborations 
among diverse interest groups such as scientists, policymakers, and the public.   
Research reveal that weak coordination (through, for example, proper role 
definition) in water governance result in ineffective water governance regimes. Lebel et 
al.’s (2013) comparative analysis of 28 river basins shows that poorly defined roles and 
relationships can lead to a poor institutional fit in water resource management. 
Institutional fit refers to the correct matching of the scale at which natural resources occur 
and interact within biophysical systems and the scale at which they are governed by 
people. Thus integrated, coordinated and collaborative governance does not just happen; 
instead, it requires intentional planning, allocation of resources, and implementation 
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across multiple actors (Mitchell, 2006). 
 
Power in Water Governance 
Power is a foundational concept within social theory and is theorized beyond the 
boundaries of sustainability or political ecology research. For the purposes of this 
dissertation, I define power as the mobilization of resources by actors to achieve a goal 
(Avelino, 2011; Paulson et al., 2003). Avelino and Rotmans (2011) define resources as 
follows:  
“Human resources refer to ‘man power’ or human leverage, i.e. personnel, 
members, voters, clients, supporters, fans, etc. Mental resources include 
information, concepts, ideas and beliefs. Monetary resources are funds, 
cash and financial stock. Artefactual resources comprise apparatuses, 
products, construction and infrastructure, but artefactual resources can also 
include a song, a dance, a painting, a photography or a movie. Natural 
resources refer to raw materials, the four elements, physical space, time 
and organic life.” (p. 798, emphasis mine)  
This conceptualization of power shows that governance is power-laden mainly because 
governance involves the mobilization of one or more resources by various actors. Thus, 
given that governance actors are always interacting, one goal of power research is to 
better understand how resources are mobilized, who mobilizes resources and thus 
exercises power (Corbridge, 2009; Markard et al., 2012).  
Within this research, power is not conceptualized as external to an individual or 
fundamentally negative. Instead, I view power as what constitutes both individuals and 
their interactions with others (Paulson et al. 2003). In this sense, power is not an object to 
be had or found somewhere but is wielded by actors in mobilizing resources. Corbridge 
(2009) provides the following example of the ubiquity of power: 
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it is trite to think of power only in negative terms. The possibility of having a 
conversation with someone, of running a class or seminar in which people can 
learn, of playing a football match, depends upon the deployment of power: of 
people taking turns to speak and listen, of students and teachers doing work as 
agreed, of players deferring to a referee. People both exercise power and are on 
the receiving end of power at different times every day, in all realms of life. (p. 
575) 
Thus, power embodies the social relations that exist between actors in relationships and 
as resources are mobilized. Yet, though power is not a negative characteristic that should 
be eliminated, asymmetric power leads to conflicts in environmental governance 
(Paulson et al., 2003). Power asymmetry is an area of concern that leads to not only 
conflicts but unsustainable resource governance as well. 
 Power is spatialized (Corbridge, 2009) and the choice of scale empowers or 
disempowers different actors (Jones, 1998). In their study of water conflicts in Arizona’s 
Central Highlands, Bolin et al. (2008) show that groups marginalized at one scale ‘jump 
scales’ to turn the balance of power in their favor through their analysis of water 
governance in the Central Highlands. For example, civil society in the region invoked 
federal laws to contest the statutory water importation plans of municipalities. In another 
study of water governance in Alberta, Cohen and Bakker (2014) show that the choice of 
watershed boundary (ecological scale) by decision makers actually “reconfigures power 
structures and prioritizes some resources over others in ways that can entrench, rather 
than resolve, the crises it was designed to address” (p. 128). The two studies cited provide 
examples of how the spatiality and asymmetry of power perpetuate conflicts and promote 
unsustainable resource governance. 
 The exercise of power is often linked to decision-making and in that sense, could 
pose a methodological challenge. In providing conceptual clarity, Avelino and Rotmans 
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(2011) suggest that in terms of how power is exercised, power could either be innovative, 
reinforcive, transformative, or destructive. Innovative power refers to the capacity of 
actors to create new resources, reinforcive power is exercised when actors make and 
enforce the operating rules, transformative power is their capacity to transform the 
distribution of resources, and destructive power is the capacity of actors to annihilate or 
destroy existing resources. For instance, in mobilizing monetary resources, innovative 
power is exercised when governance actors provide new funding that influence decisions 
or actions. Reinforcive power is exercised when actors perpetuate the current allocation 
of funds. Transformative power is exercised when actors change how funds are allocated 
among actors or initiatives, while destructive power is exercised when actors stop 
funding for the current project. Moreover, Avelino (2011) suggests that these forms of 
power (innovative, reinforcive, transformative, and destructive) can also be applied to 
situations that do not involve (goal-oriented) decision-making. In this regard, the author 
argues that:  
… in order to keep an issue of the agenda, one must either get completely 
rid of this issue (destructive power), or claim that other issues are more 
urgent, either by emphasizing existing issues on the agenda (reinforcive 
power), by inventing a completely new issue (innovative power), or by 
developing a new paradigm (transformative power). (p. 81)  
Using the case of Prescott AMA, I assess how these different forms of power support or 
oppose decision-making in sustainable water governance.  
Although power is not an object that can be isolated and studied, some methods in 
political ecology that have been used to study power include participant observation, 
qualitative interviewing, discourse analysis, and sociological analysis of complex 
institutions (Mackenzie, 1995; Paulson et al., 2003). For example, in a study of the 
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relationship between farmers and the environment in Kenya, Mackenzie (1995) used a 
combination of oral histories through ethnographic interviewing and archival records to 
understand gendered struggles to control land. In this study, Mackenzie (1995) found that 
the sustainable management of soils in the region is dependent on the level of wealth of 
households, and the extent to which women have rights to land ownership. Interviewing 
generally provides a means to interact with respondents and gives access not only to their 
words but non-verbal expressions as well. However, despite the strides that have been 
made in the empirical analysis of social relations (and power), continual methodological 
refinement is necessary due to the role of power in promoting or inhibiting sustainable 
resource governance.  
I develop and present a deductive process for analyzing power in water 
governance research by drawing on content analysis methods and building on Avelino 
and Rotmans’ (2011) power framework (presented in Chapter 3). For the analysis that 
proceeds from this deductive process, I rely mainly on data from the interviews 
conducted. However, in addition to interview data, I narratively integrate interview 
findings with direct observation (field) notes, archival records, and document review in 
the results presented (Chapter 4). 
 Overall, previous research on water resources in the Central Highland region 
show that power is exercised not only by government but also non-government actors8. 
Bolin et al. (2008) shows that in resisting groundwater importation into Prescott AMA, 
civil society groups invoked the federal Endangered Species Act to give legitimacy to 
their claims. Yet, the need to legitimize their stance raise questions about how much 
                                                        
8 These government and non-government actors include political economic interests working through the 
government as well as outside government. 
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‘governance’ actually exist in the study area. In addition, Whitmire (2013) argues that the 
Prescott AMA structure gives Prescott AMA communities political power within the 
state legislature that civil society and neighboring communities lack, and “which 
substantially thwarts the ability of communities to collaboratively develop and implement 
timely and appropriate regional water management policies” (p. 126). These findings on 
power in the study area raises questions about the extent to which an AMA designation or 
‘legitimacy’ promotes water sustainability in the Central Highlands. These questions 
though seemingly local, reflect the constraints of water governance in many urban areas 
where water resources are impacted by climate variability and change and rapid 
population growth (Vorosmarty et al., 2000). In research question three, I address these 
knowledge gaps by assessing how power is exercised by different actors related to the 
AMA’s water governance. I contribute to the field of water governance by improving 
understanding of the relationship between governance structures and water sustainability. 
 
Conclusion  
Governance − which involves the increased participation of non-government 
actors in decision-making − is a fairly nascent theme in water resource research. This 
development, alongside stressors of climate variability/change and population growth, 
has created higher standards for water resource planning and sustainability. Within 
Prescott AMA, different values of government and non-government actors on water 
issues and the absence of deliberative democratic processes fuels the region’s persistent 
conflict. Meanwhile, research and stakeholder publications from the Central Highlands 
suggest that Prescott AMA is not achieving its management goal of safe yield – a partial 
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metric for water sustainability that does not consider natural discharge through baseflow 
and evapotranspiration. In the rest of this dissertation, I utilize a novel framework that 
integrates propositions of vertical governance, horizontal governance, and power to 
investigate (1) water governance across state, regional, and local levels; (2) collaborative 
governance at the local level; (3) the effects of AMA ‘legitimacy’ and other exercises of 
power on the region’s water sustainability. In the next chapter (Chapter 3), I discuss the 
qualitative methodology used in this research. 
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CHAPTER 3 
METHODOLOGY 
A qualitative methodology was adopted for this research. Such a methodology is 
appropriate because of the descriptive and investigative nature of the research questions 
posed. According to Gay and Airasian (2000), research that uses the qualitative 
methodology “seeks to probe deeply into the research setting in order to obtain 
understandings about the way things are, why they are that way, and how the participants 
in the context perceive them” (p. 16, emphasis in original). Among the different 
approaches to qualitative research available, this study was completed using the case 
study approach (Creswell, 2013). A qualitative case study methodology was adopted 
because of this research’s in-depth focus on a delineable geographic and social arena − 
Prescott Active Management Area (AMA) (Yin, 2013).  
In line with features of the qualitative methodology, I used narrative data of 
primary and secondary origin (Gay and Airasian, 2000; Gay, 1996). Primary data were 
gathered through interviews and fieldwork, while secondary data were obtained from 
archival sources and documents. Furthermore (as characteristic of the qualitative 
methodology), I use quotes of people’s experiences gathered through in-depth interviews 
and from other textual sources (Taylor and Bogdan, 1998). Inductive and deductive 
analyses were conducted using text-analysis methods from grounded theory and content 
analysis, thus, covering the spectrum from systematic coding to qualitative interpretation. 
In the remaining sections within this chapter, first, I present the methods of data 
collection, preparation and analysis employed. Second, I present the specific analysis 
conducted for the three research questions analyzed in this dissertation. 
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Data Collection 
The four data collection instruments used in this research are in-depth interviews, 
fieldwork (direct observation), archival sources, and document reviews. I discuss each 
data collection instrument below.   
Semi-structured Interviews. I adopted a semi-structured interview style in this 
research to allow the comparability of responses across different groups. A semi-
structured interview involves the use of an interview protocol to guide questions asked, 
where the interviewer can ask further questions if needed (Bryman, 2012). Unlike a 
structured interview, this interview style allows respondents to answer questions with as 
much detail as they can provide. The use of semi-structured interviews also allowed for 
subjective responses, especially in regard to questions that interrogated relations and 
interactions among governance actors in the study area. Interviews for this dissertation 
were conducted through summer 2015 to spring 2016. 
Two sets of interview guides were initially developed for this research. The first 
guide was tailored to interview government actors at different levels of governance (i.e., 
local municipalities and regional-state agencies) while the second was designed to 
interview non-government actors. The questions within these two interview guides were 
divided into four topics: water management, vertical governance, horizontal governance 
and water sustainability. Each section had main questions that were generally asked of all 
governance actors interviewed, and probe questions that were only asked as needed. For 
example, a main question could be: what programs do you implement in order to achieve 
safe yield? Meanwhile, a probe question would be: who provides oversight for these 
programs? 
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The interview guide topic of water management was aimed at getting background 
information about the respondents’ entry into, and role in water governance within the 
region. Also, water management questions interrogated the area’s water management 
goal(s). Questions asked included: How did you get involved in water issues? What are 
the main water management goals in this area? These questions and others generally 
provided data on interviewee’s perspective of the area’s water governance. The second 
interview guide topic (vertical governance) focused on interaction between state level 
governance actors, regional level, and local level actors. An example of the questions 
asked includes, how do you interact with the ADWR office? This second topic 
specifically examined the first research question of this study, which is what interactions 
exist between government actors involved in water management across regional to state 
levels, and how do these interactions contribute (or not) towards sustainable water 
governance? Meanwhile, the third interview guide topic (horizontal governance) focused 
on interaction between governance actors at the same level and included questions such 
as: what relationship exists between your department and local water groups? This 
interview topic was aimed at interrogating this study’s second research question, which is 
in what ways do diverse actors in the study area coordinate in governing water 
resources, and how do these interactions contribute (or not) towards sustainable water 
governance? Finally, the fourth topic of the interview guide had questions interrogating 
water sustainability in the study area with questions such as: what are the impacts of the 
Groundwater Management Act and the goal of safe yield in this area?  
There were no direct questions about power in the interview guide. Instead, the 
aim of this research’s methodology was to investigate power through deductive analysis 
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of governance actor responses to questions on water management, actor interactions and 
the area’s water sustainability and safe yield management goal. This approach was taken 
to reduce the bias that could be introduced when governance actors are asked directly 
about power. Notwithstanding, many governance actors referred to power specifically, or 
issues of power without being prompted. All responses were triangulated with other data 
sources to arrive at the results presented in Chapter 4. The deductive process applied in 
analyzing power is explained later in this chapter. 
After the first couple of interviews in the summer of 2015, a third interview guide 
was designed with additional questions specifically for state level actors. These questions 
were a result of insights gained during the initial interviews. The additional questions 
were targeted at assessing the role of state level actors in Prescott AMA’s water 
governance. A sample question from this interview guide is: what are the responsibilities 
of your office in ensuring that Prescott AMA achieves safe yield? The questions in this 
guide provided data specifically for research question one. All the interview guides are 
included as Appendix A. 
Interview respondents were identified purposefully. This purposive sampling 
strategy is different from the notion of sampling in quantitative research. Purposive 
sampling in qualitative research involves approaching respondents based on the goal of 
research (Bernard and Ryan, 2010). This approach is useful in the study of special 
populations – in this case, key actors and stakeholders in the study area’s water 
governance. Hence, the respondents interviewed are considered key actors and 
informants regarding Prescott AMA’s water governance.  
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Another distinctive feature of this research’s purposive method for selecting 
respondents is that, eventually, the research involved interviewing (most of) a population 
as opposed to a sample (Trochim and Donnelly, 2009). Specifically, the key persons that 
could speak about water resources in each of the municipalities within the AMA were 
interviewed. Out of the fifteen people contacted, a total of thirteen people were 
interviewed. One person declined to participate while the other person was not available 
throughout the course of the research. These interviews involved both government and 
non-government actors at different jurisdictional levels (Table 2). In all, representatives 
from two local civil society groups within the broader region of the study area were 
interviewed. Also, out of a five-member Groundwater Users Advisory Council (GUAC), 
four people were interviewed, three of whom are current members. Finally, two ADWR 
staff members were interviewed. Some interviews had more than one person at a session 
and one person was interviewed twice.  Overall, I conducted twelve in-depth interviews 
with thirteen respondents.  
Table 2.  
Government and Non-Government Actors Interviewed for this Study 
   Government actors Non-government actors 
State (ADWR) level 2 - 
Regional (AMA) level - 6 
Local (municipal) level 4 1 
All the interviews conducted in Prescott AMA and Phoenix were in-person with 
ADWR staff. Each interview lasted an average of sixty minutes and each was recorded. 
Consent was obtained for all interviews and a consent letter served as the instrument of 
recruitment (see Appendix B and C for this research’s Institutional Review Board (IRB) 
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exemption, and consent letter). Respondents’ contact information was obtained from 
public sources such as organization websites and phone books.  
Water stakeholders in the study area belong to multiple groups, each with a 
different mission and these distinctions in each group’s focus are reflected in the 
interviews conducted (see Table 3 for the different groups the interviewees represent). 
One possible advantage of this method was that during the interviews, I was able to get a 
more comprehensive view of water governance in the study area. However, one problem 
with this multiplicity of roles was the challenge in defining who was a government actor 
and who was not, based on their roles in different contexts. For example, one respondent 
was a municipal staff and a member of the Groundwater Users Advisory Council 
(GUAC), should they be considered a government actor on the GUAC or a non-
government actor? I tackled this challenge by grouping respondents by whether their 
participation in a category was linked to their elected, appointed, or civil service 
position9. In the foregoing example, the municipal staff is a government actor based on 
their civil service position. However, I identify them as a non-government actor on the 
GUAC because they are putatively representing a particular water use sector. 
As a result of the overlapping roles performed by water stakeholders in the study 
area, during fieldwork I sought out individuals who could respond to the same questions I 
already had responses to. This helped me validate the information received from different 
actors within the same actor group. Table 3, below, is not a comprehensive deduction of 
all the categories of my thirteen respondents. However, Table 3 presents a summary of 
the groups represented by the interviewees based on the specific responses I received 
                                                        
9 For example, the mayor is an elected government actor, director of the Arizona Department of Water 
Resources is appointed, while municipal staff are civil service government actors. 
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from them regarding their affiliate roles. Thus, a government actor could be an exempt 
well owner but if they did not offer responses related to being an exempt well owner, 
then (in Table 3) I did not include them in the category of being an exempt well owner. 
Essentially, the goal of the interviews, to gain perspectives from government and non-
government actors in different categories on the interactions that occur between actors in 
achieving water governance goals, was achieved. 
An important governance change that occurred in Prescott AMA since Bolin et 
al.’s (2008) study is the closure of the local Arizona Department of Water Resources 
(ADWR) office. While designing this research, using information from published 
research (Bolin et al., 2008), I intended to interview the local ADWR AMA director. 
However, during my fieldwork, I found that the local ADWR office had closed in 2010. 
In its place, Arizona has one AMA director for all five AMAs in the state where there had 
been one for each AMA. As discussed in the next chapter, the closure of this office (due 
to budget cuts as a result of the state’s economic downturn in 2008) significantly reduced 
water governance capacity in Prescott AMA. Nevertheless, I interviewed the AMA 
director who provides oversight to all the AMAs, including Prescott AMA. 
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Table 3.  
Affiliations of the Governance Actors that Participated in Study  
Arizona Department of Water 
Resources (ADWR) 
 
 
 
Government Actors 
Northern Arizona Municipal Water 
Users Association (NAMWUA) 
Upper Verde River Watershed 
Protection Coalition (UVRWPC) 
Municipal Staff and Official 
Verde River Basin Partnership (VRBP)  
 
Non-Government Actors 
Prescott AMA Groundwater Users 
Advisory Council, GUAC (current and 
former) 
Citizens Water Advocacy Group 
(CWAG) 
Exempt well owners 
Unlike quantitative research, qualitative research does not require a large pool of 
respondents due to the in-depth nature of interviews and the emphasis on other data 
collection instruments (Gay and Airasian, 2000). In fact, there are no precise upper or 
lower limits to the number of respondents to be interviewed in a qualitative study as these 
limits depend on the purpose of the research (Baker et al., 2012, p. 42). The purpose of 
this research was to assess water governance in the study area. Therefore, the respondents 
interviewed are key actors that cover the spectrum of government and non-government 
perspectives for governing water in the area. In addition to the foregoing reason, the 
interviews with thirteen respondents are adequate for this research because of the central 
role also played by other data sources (fieldwork, archives, and documents). The process 
for selecting respondents is further explained in the section, theoretical sampling for 
interviews. 
Fieldwork (Direct Observation). Observation as a qualitative data collection 
instrument allows a “real-world” setting for case study research (Yin, 2013). Specifically, 
  58 
direct observation is a non-participant form of observation. This means that I did not 
participate in any public activities. Instead, through everyday conversations, I learned 
what life in the communities was like and how the local culture and character of the four 
study area municipalities affect how water was viewed and used. Some of the 
observations I made confirmed what has been documented in literature, such as the role 
of Homeowner Associations (HOAs) in influencing water use (Turner and Ibes, 2011). 
However, making this observation myself was important because I saw − specific to the 
study area – how the requirements of HOAs such as landscaping preferences, could 
promote or discourage, for example, water conservation or conversations of water 
sustainability.  
Fieldwork helped in triangulating my interview findings. For example, in 
discussing how connecting municipal residents to a central sewer system could contribute 
to water sustainability, respondents identified the sprawling layout and low density of 
certain parts of the AMA as a possible constraint. By personally observing the 
municipalities in Prescott AMA, I was able to better understand the context for these 
interviewee comments. Specifically, the City of Prescott’s development is considerably 
compact, but the city delivers water to areas within the county that are dispersed and far 
from the city center. However, without sewer lines already extended to those areas, it is 
expensive for the municipality or those residents to have their wastewater transported to 
the city’s wastewater treatment facilities for possible underground storage. Meanwhile, 
this dispersion is the norm in Dewey-Humboldt, where the town does not have a central 
water or sewer system and does not have plans to develop these services for reasons I will 
discuss extensively in the Chapter 4. Overall, field notes were useful in triangulating and 
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understanding the themes on power derived from other data collection instruments. The 
ability to triangulate findings is important because power cannot necessarily be isolated 
and studied.  
Archival records. Archival records used include historical water demand and 
supply data for Prescott AMA, legal records (of water litigation), and hydrology maps. 
Sources of these archival records were Arizona Department of Water Resources, Lexis 
Nexis, and Arizona State University GIS repository. This instrument was essential in 
triangulating my findings from interviews and fieldwork. For example, interviews 
revealed that the Chino Valley-Prescott case is one of the longest-running Arizona 
Supreme Court cases over water. By reviewing archived legal records, I found that Chino 
Valley legally challenged Prescott in 1972 and the case continued till 1981 before it was 
dismissed by the Supreme Court of Arizona. The availability of supplemental information 
such as this was essential in completing this dissertation. 
In addition, hydrology and municipal Geographic Information System data and 
maps were important for situating the municipalities, and the different water resources 
that were identified during interviews and fieldwork. These maps also gave context for 
references to features such as the ‘Mingus Mountain’, which is the dividing or boundary 
line between the Prescott area and Verde Valley. Also, maps helped in triangulating 
interview findings on the interaction of governance actors that share the same 
groundwater basin and those who do not.  
Document Review. Published literature and other documents provided important 
historical perspective on the process that created Prescott AMA. Even though documents 
are secondary data with varying levels of reliability, three potential strengths are that (1) 
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they are ‘unobtrusive’; (2) they are not created from the ongoing study making them a 
useful source for validating research (3) they are able to cover a wider span of time 
regarding the research (Yin, 2013). The documents collected and reviewed for this study 
include peer-reviewed articles, publications by the Arizona Department of Water 
Resources and other groups, for example, municipal government and non-government 
actors. The Verde River Basin Partnership, Upper Verde River Watershed Protection 
Coalition, and Citizen Water Advocacy Group, for instance, have publications that are 
either scientific studies, informational about the entire region, or specific to the group’s 
activities.   
Documents were used before fieldwork to gain an understanding of water issues 
in the study area, and the main actors involved in governance. The documents used at 
early stages of this research were peer-review articles that focused on Central and 
Northern Arizona water governance (Abraham, 2007; Bolin et al., 2008; Collins and 
Bolin, 2007).  Documents such as news articles were used during the process of semi-
structured interviewing for up-to-date developments on recent activities, and to focus 
interview questions. Documents were further used during the analysis of semi-structured 
interviews to triangulate findings. For example, respondents made reference to a Central 
Yavapai Highlands Water Resource Management Study (CYHWRMS). I obtained this 
report to ascertain contents of the publication and understand its role in the area’s 
governance. 
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Theoretical Sampling for Interviews 
The method for interviewing that I employed was not only purposive but also 
involved theoretical sampling, that is, subsequent data collection was influenced by the 
results of ongoing data analysis (Bernard and Ryan, 2009; Corbin and Strauss, 2014). The 
research plan at the beginning of this study was to interview governance actors from 
seven different groups: Prescott AMA ADWR office, municipal water departments, 
Upper Verde River Watershed Protection Coalition, non-government actors, water use 
sectors (agricultural, industrial and municipal), private water companies, and exempt well 
owners. These groups were identified through literature reviews. 
However, fieldwork revealed that a local Prescott AMA ADWR office no longer 
existed. Second, only three of the municipalities had a municipal water system, though it 
was possible to get actors knowledgeable on the water resources of each respective 
municipality. Third, fieldwork revealed the Citizens Water Advocacy Group (CWAG) to 
be an important non-government actor in the Quad-City Area. Fourth, fieldwork and 
interviews showed that irrigated agriculture and industrial water use was minimal in the 
AMA. In validating this finding, archival data of reported water demand in the AMA that 
was published by ADWR showed that in 2010, irrigated agricultural water usage was 
11.4% while industrial was 5.6% of total demand. Finally, initial interviews revealed 
Prescott AMA Groundwater Users Advisory Council (GUAC) to be an important AMA 
governance actor in the area. These combinations of factors resulted in an evolving plan 
where industrial and agricultural water sector users were not interviewed while GUAC 
members were interviewed as regional level governance actors. To get further 
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perspectives from non-government actors, I interviewed a representative of the Verde 
River Basin Partnership.  
Overall, water governance in the study area involves actors belonging to more 
than one governance category. Actors from the following groups were eventually 
interviewed: Arizona Department of Water Resources (Phoenix), Northern Arizona 
Municipal Water Users Association, Prescott AMA Groundwater Users Advisory 
Council, Citizens Water Advocacy Group, Verde River Basin Partnership, Upper Verde 
River Watershed Protection Coalition, municipal water departments and exempt well 
owners (Table 3).  
 
Data Preparation 
Data analysis is a multi-stepped process that involves many activities that often 
have to happen in tandem. Interview transcription occurred at different periods depending 
on which interviews had been completed per time. Interviews with all thirteen 
governance actors that participated in this study were transcribed, formatted and saved as 
rtf for upload into MAXQDA, a qualitative analysis management program. In order to 
ensure the anonymity of respondents, pseudonyms were used in the transcripts wherever 
individual names were mentioned. The rapport building part of the interviews where the 
respondents described their background was also excluded to preserve respondent 
anonymity. This is in line with research ethic procedures at Arizona State University. 
As part of the data preparation stage, long passages of text in the transcript were 
divided into smaller segments. This is because I used text segment as my unit of analysis 
(that is, paragraph). Segments were determined mainly by turns in conversation. 
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Segmenting the text passages was an iterative process that also involved making 
judgment calls on punctuations.  
 
Methods and Analysis  
While methodology is “a way of thinking about and studying social phenomena”, 
methods generally are the “techniques and procedures for gathering and analyzing data” 
(Corbin et al., 2014, p. 3). I adopted grounded theory and content analysis methodologies 
in this research. Specifically, I used the inductive process developed in grounded theory 
for analyzing research questions one and two. This is because of this study’s aim to 
understand the specific water governance interactions within the study area. Meanwhile, 
content analysis methods were used in the deductive analysis conducted for research 
question three. This is because content analysis methods are particularly appropriate for 
deductive analysis (Bernard and Ryan, 2009). In the rest of this chapter, I explain the 
coding and pile sort techniques employed in this research, and the specific analysis 
conducted for each research question.  
Coding. Coding is the process of tagging segments of data with a word or words 
while a code is the tag (word/s) given to the data segment (Charmaz, 2014). In this 
research, the analysis for each research question included both first cycle and second 
cycle coding (Saldaña, 2012). The first coding cycle involved all initial code generation 
attempts. During the second coding cycle, codes generated in the first cycle were 
iteratively reorganized and combined to form more specialized categories (Saldaña, 2012, 
p. 58).  
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Coding can either follow an inductive or deductive approach. Inductive analyses 
were carried out in answering research questions one and two (using grounded theory 
methods), while a deductive approach was used for the analysis of research question three 
(using content analysis methods). The adopted grounded theory methods are initial 
coding, focused coding, and the grounded theory codebook development process 
(Charmaz, 2014; Corbin et al., 2014). Grounded theory methods were appropriate for 
research questions one and two because these methods support induction (Bernard and 
Ryan, 2009). In terms of content analysis methods, thematic coding was adopted for 
research question three. Also, the content analysis method for developing codebooks was 
employed. These content analysis methods are appropriate for research question three 
because they support deductive analysis (Bernard and Ryan, 2009). 
Codebooks are developed at different stages of a qualitative research, depending 
on if the approach is inductive or deductive. Consistent with inductive analysis, I 
developed the codebooks for research questions one and two during the coding process. 
However, because of the deductive approach to research question three, I developed the 
codebook before my analysis. Further details are provided in the analysis description for 
each research question. 
For inductive analysis, invivo, descriptive, and versus codes were generated from 
the interview transcripts while theme codes from literature were used in this research’s 
deductive analysis. An invivo code is a verbatim quote from text that also serves as a 
code (Saldaña, 2012). Invivo codes were used to capture phrases used by respondents that 
are significant to this research. For example, one of the invivo codes generated in 
analyzing research question one is good faith effort. This phrase was used by one 
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respondent in describing the Groundwater Management Act, management plans, and 
AMA management goal. Interestingly, the same theme (although not exact words) was 
found in other documents reviewed for this study.  
A descriptive code tags a passage of text by a code to summarize the current event 
or experience (Saldaña, 2012). This code typically describes the event in a way that the 
code makes sense to a research team member who does not see the tagged text segment. 
An example from this research is litigation is normal in the water world, which describes 
those exact sentiments. A versus (vs.) code reveals the conflict between two ideas that 
occur in a data segment (Saldaña, 2012). An example from this research is unhindered 
private property rights vs. regulated property rights. This sample code was applied to 
text segments where respondents discussed conflicts between the need to protect property 
rights and the need for certain regulations if water sustainability is to be achieved.  
Finally, a theme code is the word or phrase derived deductively (for example, 
from literature) that serves as a code for textual data (Bernard and Ryan, 2009). In this 
research, theme codes were applied in analyzing research question three. To understand 
how power is exercised by actors, human resource, artefactual resource, mental 
resource, monetary resource and natural resource as defined in the literature section, 
were applied as theme codes to the interview transcripts.  The theme codes were derived 
from Avelino and Rotmans (2011) power framework. In summary, inductive codes were 
derived from analyzing interview transcripts while deductive codes were derived from 
literature.  
Three coding techniques were used for analysis: initial coding, focused coding, 
and theme coding. Initial coding is a micro-level coding technique that analyzes words, 
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phrases, and sentences (Saldaña, 2012). In this research, initial coding was used to 
generate invivo, descriptive, and versus codes. Focused coding involves the abstraction 
of categories from initial codes (Saldaña, 2012). I used focused coding during the second 
coding cycle to group codes derived in the first cycle. Theme coding is a technique for 
marking instances of a particular code in the text (Bernard and Ryan, 2009). Theme 
coding is a deductive coding technique.  
Pile Sorts. Pile sort is a technique for manipulating textual data. This technique 
involves sorting (typed and printed) data based on some defined criteria (Bernard and 
Ryan, 2009). It is a method generally applied across most qualitative methodologies 
including grounded theory and content analysis.  In this research, I mostly used the pile 
sort technique to sort codes derived from first cycle coding as I progressed into second 
cycle coding. I describe my use of pile sorts in the upcoming sections. 
 
Research Question 1  
What interactions exist among governance actors involved in water management across 
local to state levels, and how do these interactions affect sustainable water governance?  
This research question was analyzed inductively. The governance levels in focus 
were the state (ADWR), the regional (AMA), and the local (municipal). The analytic goal 
for this research question was to discover interactions across these three levels that 
contribute (or not) to the region’s safe yield goal and overall water sustainability. 
Transcripts of in-depth interviews conducted both in Phoenix and the study area 
municipalities (Prescott, Prescott Valley, Chino-Valley, and Dewey-Humboldt) were 
used.  
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In the first coding cycle for this research question, I used initial coding to generate 
293 invivo, versus and descriptive codes. Coding at this point was aimed at investigating 
the interactions among actors across state, regional, and local levels as found in the 
transcripts. Next, I grouped these codes by the three forms of interaction that could be 
present in the AMA’s three levels of governance. These forms are interactions between 
the state level (ADWR) and the regional level (AMA), interactions between the regional 
level (AMA) and the local level (municipalities), and interactions between the state level 
(ADWR) and local level (municipalities). In a second coding cycle, I used focused 
coding to recode the initial codes I had generated. The purpose of this was to derive 
higher-level categories of governance actor interactions that affect the region’s safe yield 
goal and overall water sustainability. These higher-level categories are the basis for the 
inductive codebook developed (Appendix D.1).  
 
Research Question 2  
In what ways do actors at the local level coordinate (or not) in governing water 
resources, and how do these interactions affect sustainable water governance?  
Similar to research question one, this question was analyzed using inductive 
methods with the goal of identifying avenues of interactions (among local level 
governance actors) that affect the region’s safe yield management goal and water 
sustainability. I used the initial codes generated in research question one but with a focus 
on only those pertaining to municipal actors within the AMA. A total of sixty-two invivo, 
versus and descriptive codes were transferred from the initial coding conducted for 
research question one.  
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I started this research question’s second cycle with focused coding, using pile 
sorts to group the sixty-two codes into categories. After an iterative process of sorting 
and resorting the codes, the two themes that emerged are interactions around shared 
interest goals and interactions around shared groundwater (see Appendix D.2 for 
codebook). The codebook developed includes codes of a specific shared interest goal 
(Big Chino Water Ranch project), and shared groundwater issues (such as intra-basin 
water transfer, groundwater recharge etc.) at the local level. The discussions of these 
interactions are presented in Chapter 4.  
 
Research Question 3  
How is power exercised among a variety of water governance actors across levels, and 
what are the implications for sustainable water governance? 
Power cannot be seen and could pose a methodological challenge. Thus, using 
content analysis methods, I developed a deductive process for interrogating power in 
water governance research. Building on Avelino and Rotmans (2011) power framework, 
I developed code definitions to guide power analysis that can be adopted for other water 
governance research (Appendices E – G).  
All primary interview transcripts were used in analyzing this research question. 
The analytic goal was to reveal the various forms of power exercised by different 
governance actors, and how the actions of governance actors influence safe yield and 
overall water sustainability. Analysis for research question three involved three phases 
discussed below.  
  69 
Phase 1: Analyzing Resources. The first coding cycle for this research question 
was primarily focused on tagging interview transcripts with the five theme codes derived 
from literature (that is, human, mental, monetary, artefactual, and natural resources). 
These theme codes are important to the analysis of power because they reveal what 
resources have been and are being mobilized in the study area to address its safe yield 
management goal and overall water sustainability.  The deductive codebooks (Appendix 
E) were developed using definitions from published literature, specifically Avelino and 
Rotmans’ (2011) power framework. This framework distinguishes between actor 
mobilization of different resources and how resource mobilization leads to the exercise of 
different forms of power. I adopted Bernard and Ryan’s (2009) deductive codebook 
format. I updated and refined my initial deductive codebooks as coding progressed. The 
Tables in Appendix E are the final deductive codebooks developed. 
The first cycle coding process for this third research question involved going 
through all the transcripts with one code, then another until all the codes had been 
applied. In the second coding cycle, the coded segments for each of the five theme codes 
were retrieved for further analysis in a spreadsheet. My goal in using the spreadsheet was 
to analyze coded segments further with the following guiding questions: (1) What are 
specific examples of the current resource identified in this text segment? (2) Who is 
mobilizing this example of the current resource? Thus, in the second coding cycle, I 
analyzed coded segments from the first cycle for specific examples of each resource. 
During the first coding cycle of interview transcripts, 223 text segment references 
to the AMA’s water governance were coded. In the second coding cycle, 110 actors/actor 
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groups were identified (Table 4). A comprehensive list of the actors/actor groups derived 
from the second cycle coding is presented in Appendix F. 
Table 4.  
Frequency of Resource Coding from Data Analysis 
 Codes 
(resources) 
First cycle coding 
(resource types) 
Second cycle coding 
(specific resource examples) 
Human 223 110 
Artefactual 86 34 
Mental 177 78 
Monetary 80 22 
Natural 165 66 
Phase 2: Analyzing Power. Using the pile sort method, I grouped the specific 
examples of each resource derived from the second coding cycle into the different actor 
classes (Appendix G). I adapted the definitions of power and resources provided in 
Avelino and Rotmans (2011) and Avelino (2011) to create tables of definition for 
different forms of power based on how actors mobilize different resources. The guiding 
question for creating this table of definitions was: how can each form of power 
(innovative, transformative, destructive and reinforcive) be demonstrated with each 
resource (artefactual, mental, monetary and natural) within a water governance 
framework? The result of this process is presented in Appendix H, which contains the 
definitions of power that were used in interpreting what form of power was wielded by 
actors in mobilizing resources. Specifically, it presents how each type of power is defined 
based on the mobilization of each resource. Human resources are not included in 
Appendix H because the seven actors/actor groups presented in Appendix G are the 
human resources that wield power and mobilize resources. 
Finally, I queried each class of governance actors using these tables of power 
definition, and the analytic questions I developed. The analytic questions were essentially 
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culled from the tables of power definition. For example, “Innovative Power is the 
capacity of actors to create or discover new resources” (Avelino and Rotmans, 2011, p. 
799). Thus, the analytic question I developed for assessing innovative power among the 
governance actors was: how has a particular actor created, for example, mental resources 
in the study area’s water governance? Below, I present a summary of the analytic 
questions developed. These power-specific questions were applied to Prescott AMA’s 
past and present water governance activities: 
• How has group x invented, created or introduced y-resource into study area 
governance? (Innovative Power) 
• How does group x sustain current institutions such that the distribution of y-
resource remains the way it is? (Reinforcive Power) 
• How has group x changed/is changing the way in which y-resource is distributed? 
(Transformative Power) 
• How has group x excluded, prevented, discredited or delayed use of y-resource 
within the study area’s water governance? (Destructive Power) 
The results presented in Chapter 4 are a product of all four data sources employed in this 
research, not only interview data. 
Phase 3: Investigating power in water governance. In this dissertation, I define 
power as being wielded when actors mobilize resources (Avelino and Rotmans, 2011). 
Through this mobilization of resources, the type of power wielded could be innovative, 
reinforcive, transformative or destructive. To recap Chapter 2, innovative power is the 
power to create resources. Reinforcive power is the power to maintain the current 
distribution of resources. Transformative power is power to move resources from one 
place to another, and destructive power is power to annihilate existing resources or 
resource mobilization that keeps issues off the agenda (Avelino, 2011; Avelino and 
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Rotmans, 2011). I conceptualize power to be wielded by actors, not something that exists 
independently.  
The guiding sub-question for research question three was: based on resource 
mobilization, who is exercising power?  I discuss research question three in terms of who 
(the human resource) is wielding what type of power based on how they (the human 
resource) mobilize each of the remaining four resources: artefactual, mental, monetary 
and natural (Table 5). Thus, in the results presented in Chapter 4, I discuss how the 
different forms of power exercised by governance actors across the state, AMA, and local 
levels influence Prescott AMA’s safe yield management goal and overall water 
sustainability. 
Table 5.  
Summary Description of Resources 
Human resources are the people involved in water governance. 
Mental resources include tangible and intangible mental products that have to do with 
water governance in the study area specifically. 
Monetary resources include funds and other cash or financial products. 
Artefactual resources include man-made objects that are needed in extracting, 
transporting, or using water. 
Natural resources refer to the different liquid forms of water. 
Adapted from Avelino and Rotmans (2011, 798)  
 
Conclusion 
 In this research, I adopted a qualitative case study methodology which involved 
the triangulation of in-depth semi-structured interviews, direct observation, archival 
records, and document review. Textual data obtained from these data sources were 
analyzed using initial and focused coding from grounded theory (inductive analysis) for 
research questions one and two, and theme coding from content analysis (deductive 
analysis) for research question three. Codebooks were developed for all three research 
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questions depending on if an inductive or deductive approach was being applied. The 
analytic codes derived for research questions one and two comprise avenues for water 
governance interactions across jurisdictional levels (such as management plans, technical 
resource, funding, among others), and at the local level (such as Big Chino Water Ranch 
project, intra-basin water transfer, groundwater recharge, among others). Deductive codes 
for research question three were derived from literature and include human, mental, 
monetary, artefactual, and natural resources. In the following chapter (Chapter 4), I 
present the results obtained from analyzing the three research questions framing this 
dissertation.  
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CHAPTER 4 
RESULTS 
This chapter presents the results of addressing the research questions posed in 
Chapter 1. With focus on how interactions among governance actors and their 
mobilization of resources affect water sustainability, these questions are:  
• What interactions exist among governance actors involved in water management 
across local to state levels?  
• In what ways do actors at the local level coordinate (or not) in governing water 
resources?  
• How is power exercised among a variety of water governance actors across 
levels? 
The focus of this dissertation (and this chapter, especially) is not to present an exhaustive 
list of governance achievements in the study area. Instead, this chapter focuses on 
different avenues through which governance actors in the study area interact, how those 
interactions influence the management goal of safe yield, and how different forms of 
power exercised affect the region’s safe yield goal and overall sustainable water 
governance.  
In the following sections, I present the results to the research questions detailed 
above. The research questions are essentially sequential in nature. The first question 
assesses vertical interaction between governance actors, the second assesses horizontal 
interaction between governance actors, and the third assesses the wielding of power 
across vertical and horizontal levels of governance. However, I start by discussing the 
mandated water sustainability goal for Prescott AMA – that is, safe yield. 
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Prescott AMA’s Water Sustainability Goal: Safe Yield 
  Safe yield was identified as the management goal of the Prescott Active 
Management Area (AMA) in 1980 when the Groundwater Management Act was enacted. 
According to the Act, “The management goal… is safe-yield by January 1, 2025, or such 
earlier date as may be determined by the director” (ARS 45-562). The Groundwater 
Management Act defines safe yield as a “groundwater management goal which attempts 
to achieve and thereafter maintain a long-term balance between the annual amount of 
groundwater withdrawn in an active management area and the annual amount of natural 
and artificial groundwater recharge in the active management area” (Groundwater 
Management Act, 1980, p. 1437). 
Historically, overdraft data for Prescott AMA shows high year-to-year variability 
with a steady increase in groundwater overdraft between 1985 and 2010 (the most recent 
year for which data is available). Water governance actors, such as the Groundwater 
Users Advisory Council, municipalities, and interested residents, use annual groundwater 
overdraft data to evaluate the status of safe yield within the AMA. This data is computed 
and made available by the Arizona Department of Water Resources. The groundwater 
overdraft data presented below (Figure 6) shows that the region is not currently at safe 
yield.  
  76 
 
Figure 6. Prescott AMA Groundwater Overdraft 
Note: According to ADWR’s groundwater model, 1993 and 2005 are years of high net 
natural recharge.  
The results provided in this chapter present ways that governance actors interact 
across levels (vertical governance) and at the local level (horizontal governance), and 
what these interactions mean for sustainable water governance. Details of how power is 
wielded in water governance are presented within the results of vertical and horizontal 
governance, but these are cumulatively presented in a separate section for power.  A 
discussion of the findings of all three research questions is provided in Chapter 5. 
 
Research Question One: Vertical interactions in governance 
This section presents results for the research question: What interactions exist among 
governance actors involved in water management across local to state levels, and how do 
these interactions affect sustainable water governance?  
In order to achieve this, I examined interactions between governance actors at 
different levels of the jurisdictional scale. The jurisdictional scale of this study consists of 
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the state level, AMA level, and local level. The Arizona Department of Water Resources 
(ADWR) is the governance actor at the state level and is a government actor. ADWR is 
an institutional body created by the 1980 Groundwater Management Act (GMA) to 
administer water resources in Arizona. There are two governance actors at the AMA level 
namely, Groundwater User Advisory Council (GUAC) and Citizens Water Advocacy 
Group (CWAG). GUAC was created by the GMA to advise the Prescott AMA director, 
make recommendations on groundwater plans, and comment on proposed management 
plans. The GUAC is made up of members that are appointed by the Governor 
(Groundwater Management Act, 1980, p. 1401-1402). In contrast, CWAG was formed by 
citizens and is a non-government actor within the study area that aims to promote a 
“sustainable water future in the Upper Verde River basin and the Prescott Active 
Management Area. [They] educate the public, encourage citizen action, and advocate for 
responsible governmental decision-making” (Citizens Water Advocacy Group, n.d., p. 1). 
At the local level, I focus on the four municipalities in the region, which are City of 
Prescott, Town of Prescott Valley, Town of Chino Valley, and Town of Dewey-
Humboldt.  
In the following sections, I first present vertical interactions between the state 
level (ADWR) and the regional level (GUAC, CWAG); second between the regional 
level (GUAC, CWAG) and the local level (municipalities); and third between the state 
level (ADWR) and the local level (municipalities). Through the presentation of 
interactions in the following sections, I detail ways through which AMA governance 
actors interact in the region’s water governance and, specifically regarding the AMA’s 
management goal of safe yield.  
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Interactions between State and Regional Levels. The qualitative analysis of in-
depth interview transcripts conducted for this study identified four primary means of 
interaction between ADWR, GUAC, and CWAG. These are meetings, management 
plans, technical resources, and funding.  
Meetings. The bulk of interaction between ADWR and GUAC occurs during 
GUAC meetings. Prior to 2011, the meetings took place mostly on a monthly schedule. 
However, according to ADWR records, meetings have taken place about three times a 
year between 2012 and 2016, since the regional ADWR office within Prescott AMA was 
closed due to state budget cuts10. Hence, the frequency of meetings is impacted by 
ADWR’s small Active Management Area section staff and the fact that ADWR staff 
have to commute to the Prescott Area from Phoenix.  
GUAC meetings are open to the public and are attended by CWAG members. A 
typical agenda for each meeting involves a specific presentation by ADWR staff (that 
often has a discussion component), a report from ADWR’s State-wide AMA director, a 
call to council, and a call to the public. One previous presentation given by ADWR staff 
focused on the use of ADWR’s groundwater flow model for water management in the 
AMA. Most meetings have an update discussion on potential conservation, augmentation, 
and monitoring projects meant to help achieve the AMA’s safe yield goal. Overall, the 
GUAC meetings are an avenue for all attendees (council members and the public) to ask 
questions of ADWR staff, and thus serve a very informational function between water 
                                                        
10 Instead of having a local office in each AMA, as of February 2017, ADWR has one Statewide AMA 
Director and three staff members in its Active Management Areas section, who are responsible for all five 
AMAs in the state.  
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governance actors at the state and local levels. The following interview excerpts illustrate 
the goal of and attendance at GUAC meetings: 
The GUAC meetings, part of the function of them is to provide 
information; like, we might have an update of hydrologic conditions in the 
AMA or for some of the AMAs, we've had someone from out hydrology 
section talk about land subsidence and monitoring of land subsidence. We 
might have an update on AMA water budget, supply, and demand, that 
type of thing. (ADWR, October 2015) 
The meetings were all public and they were well advertised. We always 
had ten or twelve interested individuals. (GUAC, March 2016) 
The effectiveness of GUAC meetings in supporting any form of sustainable water 
governance or safe yield management goal within Prescott AMA is hindered partly due to 
the infrequency of meetings and lack of a local ADWR office. The infrequent meetings 
are a result of the closure of ADWR’s Prescott AMA office and the administration of the 
state’s five AMAs by one AMA director where there had been five AMA directors. 
The closure of ADWR’s Prescott AMA office followed the state’s economic 
downturn and subsequent cuts to the Agency’s budget by the state government. This 
AMA office closure not only constrains ADWR’s work with GUAC but also ADWR’s 
enforcement of groundwater rules at the AMA level. For instance, past records from the 
AMA show that despite being aware of legal allocations, users go over their groundwater 
allocations (Arizona Department of Water Resources Prescott AMA, 2007). However, 
situations like this can no longer be directly monitored by ADWR with the closure of its 
Prescott office. Thus, limited GUAC capacity and the closure of ADWR’s Prescott AMA 
office limits interactions between ADWR and regional water governance actors. 
In addition to GUAC meetings, CWAG organizes its own monthly meetings. 
These are not typically attended by ADWR staff unless there is a need, but by inviting 
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ADWR to address attendees, CWAG meetings serve as a forum for interaction between 
ADWR and the group. These meetings are informational in nature. An example of one of 
such informational interactions is presented in the excerpt below:  
We [ADWR] have been requested by CWAG in the past to speak at some 
of their meetings. Our Director, Tom Buschatzke, has on a couple of 
occasions spoken to them, I think I have once or twice. I remember one 
that comes to mind, CWAG had a question about salinity issues, what's 
going on with that… I think some other things that have been talked about 
are: what are some of the water budget issues within the Prescott AMA... 
It's been kind of general informational. (ADWR, October 2015) 
Thus, in-person meetings provide a platform for information exchange and discussions 
between governance actors at the state and AMA levels on the region’s safe yield 
mandate. These interactions (especially in recent years11) revolve around water 
augmentation pursuits and components of the AMA’s Fourth Management Plan12 (2010-
2020) which was completed in 2014 and went into effect in 2017. 
Management Plans. Development of the AMA’s management plan is another 
avenue for interaction between ADWR, GUAC, and CWAG. ADWR develops the water 
management plans for Prescott AMA, as required by the Groundwater Management Act 
(GMA) while both GUAC and CWAG provide comments to ADWR on drafted plans 
before they are adopted. GUAC is statutorily required to advise the AMA director and 
comment on management plans before they are adopted by ADWR’s director 
(Groundwater Management Act, 1980), while CWAG provides its comments voluntarily. 
The procedure set forth in the GMA requires ADWR to formulate the management plan, 
                                                        
11 I obtained GUAC meeting recordings for 2013-2016 from ADWR. I was informed by ADWR staff that 
these recordings were the only GUAC meeting records available.  
 
12 The significance of this pursuit with respect to Prescott AMA can be seen in the fact that at the time of 
this writing (2017), Prescott is the only AMA with a Fourth Management Plan (4MP) arguably because it is 
the only one of the safe yield AMAs without access to external water supplies. A goal for which power is 
being coordinated across governance levels to accomplish. 
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hold public hearings to receive comments on its content, and adopt the plan after 
comments have been received and addressed in some fashion. 
Interviewees held varying degrees of convictions about how much advising 
GUAC provides to ADWR, both generally and regarding the management plans. These 
variations in opinion are possibly due to how each actor views the state of water 
governance in the AMA, and the varied opinions correlate with their impressions of 
achieving safe yield. Below are two exemplar quotes from GUAC members: 
We also monitored the management plans for the AMA, and that sort of 
thing is advisory, but we didn’t do a whole lot of advising. We monitored 
what was going on mostly… [Safe yield is] a goal that just kind of floats 
around in the air because there are things that should happen that aren’t. 
(GUAC, March 2016) 
We are advisors to, like, the Third Management Plan, the Fourth 
Management Plan. Going forward, if we have some issue that is raised or 
something that we don't like or something that we do like, we give 
feedback through our AMA coordinator who goes directly to ADWR's 
director. So, we have a very direct line of communication… We firmly 
believe that reaching safe yield by the year 2025 is very important… 
(GUAC, March 2016) 
Development of the Fourth Management Plan was delayed due to ADWR’s staff cuts in 
2010. To date, three 10-year management periods have occurred, and the AMA is in the 
middle of its fourth period (2010-2020). ADWR completed the Fourth Management Plan 
for Prescott AMA in 2014, but its conservation requirements do not become effective 
until 2017 due to a reduction in the Agency’s staffing.  
The two main strategies within Prescott AMA’s management plans for reaching 
safe yield are conservation requirements (for municipal, agricultural and industrial) and 
water augmentation measures, both of which are stipulated by the GMA. The 
conservation requirements of the Act do not apply to exempt well owners in the region, 
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who are estimated to withdraw 14% of the AMA’s groundwater annually (Groundwater 
Users Advisory Council, 2006) due to exemptions provided in the Groundwater 
Management Act (GMA). According to the Act, the intent of the management plans is to 
progressively reduce groundwater withdrawals (Arizona Department of Water Resources, 
2008). However, due to population growth, overall groundwater withdrawals have mostly 
remained constant despite reductions in agricultural withdrawals (Figure 7). 
 
Figure 7. Prescott AMA Demand 
The interaction between ADWR, GUAC, and CWAG regarding the management 
plans is limited to the period of their development and not their implementation. ADWR 
is responsible for monitoring water provider compliance to the management plans’ 
conservation requirements. However, in the Fourth Management Plan, possibly due to its 
reduced staff capacity and insufficient political will (Larson et al., 2009), ADWR plans to 
approach enforcement of the management plan’s conservation requirement with 
voluntary compliance. GUAC and CWAG provide feedback during GUAC meetings and 
through emails and/or letters to ADWR. Overall, ADWR’s limited capacity as a result of 
limited budget, staff, and insufficient political will hinders the Agency’s contribution 
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towards the region’s safe yield goal and water sustainability through on-time 
development of management plans and enforcement of plan requirements. 
Technical Resources. Another avenue for interaction between ADWR and 
regional level actors is ADWR’s provision of scientific expertise, which the Agency 
provides only within the stipulations of the GMA. Specifically, the GMA requires that 
the ADWR AMA director provide “technical and clerical and such other assistance to the 
groundwater users advisory council as is needed” (Groundwater Management Act, 1980, 
p. 1401). This requirement is fulfilled through ADWR’s attendance at GUAC meetings 
and provision of, for example, groundwater modeling presentations. In its interactions 
with other governance levels, ADWR does not oversee or implement any programs that 
are not directly related to one of its specific statutory responsibilities.   
As part of the technical expertise that ADWR provides to AMA municipalities, 
the Agency computes annual groundwater overdraft, which is used to determine if the 
region is at safe yield or not. In the final decision and order published after ADWR’s 
director declared Prescott AMA out of safe yield in 1999, the director explained that 
calculating safe yield without considering base flow would be at odds with the intent of 
the GMA:  
The Department cannot accept the proposition that the legislature adopted a 
comprehensive Groundwater Management Act to protect the state from depleting 
its groundwater supplies, but adopted a management goal for the majority of the 
population of the state which allows those groundwater supplies to be drained. 
The long-term balance between groundwater withdrawals and recharge, specified 
by A.R.S. § 45-561(12), cannot be obtained without considering the significant 
loss of groundwater from the aquifers caused by natural discharge. (Arizona 
Department of Water Resources, 1999, p. 29) 
The above quote is an example of how ADWR uses its technical expertise to interpret the 
GMA’s safe yield mandate. As will be discussed in research question three, ADWR does 
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not always pursue scientific positions in its enforcement of the GMA. However, in this 
section, it is sufficient to note that ADWR’s technical expertise is a major factor that 
promotes interaction across state to regional levels with respect to Prescott AMA’s water 
governance. 
In the mid-level governance role occupied by GUAC and CWAG, access to 
groundwater flow modeling information (MODFLOW) is provided by ADWR. For 
GUAC, MODFLOW data provided by ADWR helps keep GUAC members up-to-date on 
the technical aspects of the region’s safe yield management goal. According to one of the 
GUAC members interviewed: 
What we don't know about the aquifer is huge, all right. I think that 
fellow’s name is Abram, the one who comes up and talks to us in GUAC 
and shows us the underground hydrology. Apparently, there are currents 
like underground rivers down there. (GUAC, March 2016, pseudonym 
used) 
CWAG, on the other hand, has members who are scientists but request information from 
ADWR from time to time. In this way, they stay current on technical aspects of the 
region’s safe yield management goal. In addition, CWAG has access to ADWR’s 
technical expertise through their attendance at GUAC meetings. The technical 
information that CWAG obtains from ADWR is part of the information that the group 
provides to AMA residents about the region’s water resources through its website, 
meetings, and other outreach events. 
Funding. Another source of interaction between state and regional actors is 
funding, specifically Water Management Assistance Program (WMAP) funds from the 
groundwater withdrawal fees instituted by the GMA. The idea for WMAP originated 
during the Second Management Plan (1990-2000) as a “Conservation and Augmentation 
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Fund” but became known as the “Water Management Assistance Program” during the 
Third Management Plan (2000-2010). As included in the Fourth Management Plan: 
The Water Management Assistance Program (WMAP) is intended to 
provide financial and technical resources to assist water users in the 
development and implementation of conservation programs, facilitate 
augmentation and renewable water supply utilization, and obtain 
information on hydrologic conditions and water availability in the 
PRAMA. A.R.S. § § 45-567(A)(5) and (A)(7). (Arizona Department of 
Water Resources, 2014a, p. 9-1)  
Currently, the sources of WMAP are (1) groundwater withdrawal fees collected from 
operators of non-exempt wells; (2) one-half of the annual surcharge paid by persons 
holding an interim groundwater use permit in the AMA (Arizona Department of Water 
Resources, 2014a, p. 9-2); and, (3) application fees for water storage and recovery 
permits. Groundwater withdrawal fees are the main source of the fund. Thus, the WMAP 
is a funding mechanism for conservation assistance, supply augmentation, and hydrologic 
monitoring within the AMA.  
The GMA makes provision for non-exempt groundwater users in the AMA to be 
levied a withdrawal fee determined by ADWR’s director, which should not exceed five 
dollars per acre-foot of water withdrawn and used beneficially. The GMA does not 
specifically state that GUAC be involved in the administration of these funds. However, 
in the Fourth Management Plan for the AMA, ADWR reiterates that GUAC’s role is to 
advise and make recommendations to the AMA director on water management programs, 
which makes GUAC responsible for being involved with administration of the 
groundwater withdrawal fees. In any case, ADWR is statutorily responsible for ensuring 
that the funds are used for only those expenses allowed in the state’s statutes, as shown in 
the quotes below from both ADWR staff and GUAC member: 
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…One thing I'll mention is groundwater right holders within the Prescott AMA 
that measure and report their water use and they pay a pump tax, a withdrawal fee 
based on how much water they withdraw annually. Part of that withdrawal fee 
goes into a conservation or augmentation fund. Those funds can be used for 
projects within the Prescott AMA for either conservation, augmentation, 
monitoring or accessing water availability. So, if there are projects that would fit 
into one of those categories that could make use of some of those funds and 
would benefit users within the Prescott AMA, we do have some money available 
for that. (ADWR, October 2015) 
…we had some funds that were used for certain purposes that had do with what 
the AMA was doing... The funds came from the charge to mainly the 
municipalities. (GUAC, March 2016)   
Interactions between Regional and Local Levels. The AMA is the middle level 
of governance in the study area and comprises only GUAC and CWAG since closure of 
the local ADWR office. The local level comprises of the four municipal governments in 
the study area, that is City of Prescott, Town of Prescott Valley, Town of Chino Valley, 
and Town of Dewey-Humboldt.  
At the time of this study, the majority of Prescott AMA GUAC members were 
government actors in some capacity, for example, municipal staff. The only member of 
the GUAC who was not a government actor was a recently retired municipal staff. As a 
result of the GUAC’s composition, regional level actors are the same people at local level 
water governance. The GUAC members interviewed identified the monitoring of 
municipal efforts towards safe yield as one of their responsibility on the Council. 
However, this arrangement where GUAC members are also directly involved in water 
management means that local municipalities are essentially monitoring themselves 
through their involvement in the regional GUAC. Even though this strategy might be 
viewed as participatory governance, it does not necessarily provide objective and 
effective governance assessments. Notwithstanding, this governance structure is 
  87 
maintained possibly because GUAC members know that there are no legal consequences 
to failing to reach safe yield. Thus, efficiency of water governance ‘man-power’ is valued 
over effective water governance.  
GUAC does not have a statutory enforcement authority in ensuring that 
municipalities fulfill requirements of the AMA management plans. Municipal water 
managers perform the same activities they would have under the GMA, in the absence of 
a GUAC. With respect to vertical governance, the GUAC in Prescott AMA exists mainly 
to advise the AMA Director during preparation of the AMA management plans and on 
items such as conservation activities within the AMA. Except for their input regarding 
the AMA management plans, the presence or absence of the GUAC does not increase 
Prescott AMA’s likelihood of achieving safe yield.  
Even though CWAG at the regional level and municipal actors at the local level 
provide another avenue for vertical governance, there is more tension between both 
groups than cooperation. CWAG members are AMA residents, many of whom are 
retirees that moved into the region in recent decades. The strained relationship between 
CWAG and municipal actors stems mainly from disagreements on how growth should 
occur with the region’s limited water supplies. Specifically, CWAG advocates for 
moderate growth based on the principle that the region’s water resources should 
determine its growth projections. This view is built on the idea of carrying capacity. The 
following quotes are from two members of CWAG on growth and carrying capacity: 
…Don’t get the idea that I am anti-growth. I think growth should occur, 
but I think it should occur at a rate that is consistent with the water that’s 
indigenous to the area. The carrying capacity – if you have X amount of 
water, then you can have X amount of growth and no more. We know that 
one of the challenges in communicating that opinion, based on 
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experiences that I’ve had for many years with powerful people, is pick 
your fights. One of the fights that we did not want to pick when we first 
started this thing was the growth fight. We’re too little to fight the 
developers and the monolithic things that are going on to make growth 
happen. (CWAG, June 2015) 
I just think carrying capacity is fundamental in any analysis of growth. In 
Arizona back in the 1970s, it was one of the leaders in the country as far 
as looking at carrying capacity as a fundamental part of the whole growth 
equation. Unfortunately, the legislature decided that they really shouldn’t 
be spending any money looking at carrying capacity, so they cut that 
program, which was too bad... I think it’s really unfortunate to see the 
results in Phoenix, which just followed Los Angeles. The Los Angeles 
growth paradigm – growing, growing, growing, bringing water from the 
Colorado, looking for other water sources… You know, chaotic. (CWAG, 
June 2015) 
This CWAG position is not popular with Prescott, Prescott Valley, and Chino Valley 
actors who are promoting unrestrained growth. The three municipalities generally see 
population growth as inevitable and economically beneficial to their municipalities. The 
differing positions between CWAG and the municipalities weaken water governance 
cooperation across regional to local levels. 
Despite the principles of socio-ecological system integrity and resource 
maintenance being advocated by CWAG members and the contrary opinions of 
municipal actors, Prescott AMA water resources exceeded its carrying-capacity decades 
ago. The pursuit of growth by municipalities and the claim of managing water resources 
for safe yield at the same time are thus contradictory. Whether growth slows down in 
Prescott AMA or not, safe yield cannot be achieved with the region’s current water 
demand and supplies (Figures 6 and 7).  
Related to the conflict around growth is the issue of protecting property rights, 
which some municipal actors claim the CWAG position on growth violates. According to 
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proponents of private property rights, landowners have the right to do whatever they want 
with their land and its water, for example: 
Arizona as a state at the constitutional level, at the foundational level, is 
adamantly opposed to limiting private property rights. It will never happen 
in Arizona… CWAG doesn’t understand how their notion of population 
growth relates back to denying somebody a right to do something with 
their land… The whole thing is ridiculous. Arizona will never limit 
population growths like that. We will look at desalination plants, we will 
look at water resources. Arizona as a whole, we will look at how to bring 
water in for increased population growth. Which is why I do not agree 
with CWAG. (Chino Valley, June 2015) 
Another dimension to the conflict between CWAG members and municipal actors is the 
argument that many CWAG members are part of the ‘growth’ that happened. In the 
interviews conducted, there was a recurring theme of “new arrivals closing the door on 
those behind them” as seen in the following interview excerpts:  
CWAG and I do not see eye-to-eye on virtually anything. I’ve met with 
them a dozen and a half times in my career here with this town. And, no, I 
don’t have any doings with CWAG…when you meet most of the people in 
CWAG, they are not from Arizona. They are from California, they are 
from New York, they are from Wisconsin, they are from Michigan. They 
are from all over the country, out of Arizona. I’m a fourth-generation 
Arizona boy... CWAG is populated by people from other worlds, moved 
here, who take the attitude I’ve come here now. We have to close the door 
so that no one else can come here. (Chino Valley, June 2015) 
The argument above suggests that first generation Arizonans have different viewpoints 
on water sustainability than multi-generational Arizonans. This finding is interesting 
because even among the government actors interviewed, first generation Arizonans were 
more open to stricter water management measures than multi-generational residents. 
Overall, given that CWAG is an active non-government actor group indigenous to the 
AMA, the conflicts between CWAG and municipal governments put a strain on 
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cooperative interactions between CWAG, GUAC, and municipal governments with 
regards to working concertedly towards sustainable water governance. 
Interactions between State and Local Levels. In this sub-section, I discuss the 
interactions between ADWR (state level) and municipal governments and residents (local 
level). Interactions between state and local level actors in the AMA occur around water-
related permits and reports.  
Many aspects of water resource governance in Prescott AMA require permits 
before water can be appropriated. There are different types of permits required by water 
governance actors at the local level. For example, municipal water providers obtain 
permits from ADWR to operate wastewater treatment plants, store water underground, 
and recover the stored water. Moreover, individual residents also relate directly with the 
ADWR state office on issues of exempt wells within any of the communities in Prescott 
AMA. According to an ADWR staff, “if someone wants to drill a well within the active 
management area, then they would need to go to our agency for the permitting on that.” 
(ADWR, October 2015). These permits give a sense that efforts are being made at the 
state level in getting the region towards safe yield. While these practices are important 
because they provide records of who is using water and for what purposes, they are 
inadequate in promoting water sustainability. 
In addition to the permitting process that occurs directly between ADWR and 
individual residents, there is direct reporting required of municipal staff to ADWR that 
does not go through GUAC. This direct reporting relationship is mandated by state law. 
According to a municipal staff, “We couldn’t not [sic] work with them [ADWR]. There 
are state laws, so we are required to work with them” (Municipal staff, June 2015). 
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Specifically, municipalities that provide water (in this case, City of Prescott, Prescott 
Valley and Chino Valley) have to report their water withdrawals and use annually.  
Overall, interactions between the state and local levels in the receipt of permits 
and submissions of reports are mandated by state statutes. These elements (permitting 
and reporting) are important because they provide records to help evaluate progress on 
water sustainability goals but they are not enough for promoting sustainable water 
governance.  
Summary. Water governance interactions occur between state and regional level 
actors through GUAC meetings and around management plans, WMAP funds, and 
ADWR’s scientific expertise. These interactions are mostly informational, with actors at 
both levels obtaining and transmitting information. The outcome of these informational 
interactions is that the region’s safe yield management goal is supposedly pursued 
through conservation and water augmentation. Yet, the region is not achieving safe yield, 
for instance, annual overdraft more than doubled between 1985 and 2010 (Figure 6). 
Meanwhile, the perpetual search for more water and the current pursuit of water 
augmentation with non-renewable groundwater are problematic as “spatial fixes” (Bolin 
et al. 2008) that will delay long-term sustainability.  
Interactions between regional non-government actors and local level actors are 
mostly contentious. The informational interactions summarized above are not 
contentious. Instead, contentious interactions exist due to disagreements on how growth 
should occur with respect to the region’s limited renewable water. This contentious 
relationship (for example, between CWAG and the municipalities) contributes to ongoing 
conflicts in the study area and limits the extent to which water resource cooperation 
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occurs between regional non-government actors and the municipalities. Finally, 
interaction between state and local level actors regarding water governance and 
sustainability revolve around water permitting and reporting. Water permits provide a 
record of who is using water, although not all permit holders report their water use.13  
Conversely, Water reports provide a record of water demand by users such as municipal 
and private water providers. Water permits and records are not making the region’s water 
resources sustainable because, as implemented, they maintain — and in some years, 
increase — historic water withdrawal levels from groundwater resources that are 
essentially non-renewable.  
Overall, the avenues for interaction across state, regional, and local levels all 
relate to the GMA either in how the Act is interpreted or from its specific mandates. For 
instance, in the Groundwater Code overview published by ADWR, the agency notes that 
one of the goals of the Groundwater Code is to help the state allocate groundwater based 
on its changing demand (ADWR, 2008). Although not identified in this document, in 
most urban areas, and in Prescott AMA specifically, water demand is moving from an 
agriculturally-intensive economy to a residential one. In Prescott AMA, this ‘re-
allocation’ of groundwater helps maintain groundwater overdraft without sufficiently 
improving the area’s water sustainability. 
 
                                                        
13 According to the GMA, exempt well owners are exempt from reporting requirements. Instead, exempt 
well owners file a Notice of Intent (NOI) to drill with ADWR. In addition, ADWR keeps a database of 
registered wells and their location (Arizona, State Senate, 2015).  
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Research Question Two: Horizontal interactions in governance 
In this section, I present results for the question: In what ways do actors at the local level 
coordinate (or not) in governing water resources, and how do these interactions affect 
sustainable water governance?  
The qualitative analysis of in-depth interviews conducted for this study shows that 
interactions at the local level occur around shared-interest and due to shared groundwater 
basins. The Big Chino Water Ranch project is the major shared-interest that exists 
between Prescott and Prescott Valley. Meanwhile, bilateral interactions occur between 
municipalities that share the same groundwater basin. 
Beyond the local level, broad regional collaborations exist between Prescott, 
Prescott Valley, and Chino Valley. These three municipalities are currently members of 
the Northern Arizona Municipal Water Users Association (NAMWUA) and Upper Verde 
River Watershed Protection Coalition (UVRWPC). However, interaction among the 
municipalities within these groups involves water resource issues beyond the governance 
jurisdiction of the AMA.  
 Focusing on the aim of assessing the coordination of local level governance 
actors, this section is divided into two parts. In the first part, I discuss the shared interest 
pursuit (Big Chino Water Ranch) advancing collaborations between Prescott and Prescott 
Valley. In the second part, I discuss contentious interactions due to shared groundwater 
basins prevalent between pairs of municipalities located in the same groundwater basin. 
Prescott and Chino Valley make up one pair, while Prescott Valley and Dewey-Humboldt 
make up the other. 
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Shared-Interest Pursuit: Big Chino Water Ranch Project. The City of Prescott 
and Prescott Valley are currently in partnership to bring in water from the Big Chino 
basin, which is outside the AMA. Chino Valley voluntarily withdrew their participation 
in the project, while Dewey-Humboldt never showed an interest in participating. The Big 
Chino Water Ranch (BCWR) project is a supply augmentation strategy for both 
communities (which is supported by the GMA). The water transfer is made possible 
because the Arizona Revised Statutes, Section 45-555 allows a designated water provider 
in Prescott AMA to transport water from a neighboring basin. This legal permission is an 
exception included in the Groundwater Transportation Act of 1991, as the Act otherwise 
restricts inter-basin water transfer. The City of Prescott is the only municipal water 
provider in the AMA with a designation of Assured Water Supply (AWS), and thus is the 
only municipality legally capable of conducting such transfer. The AWS designation is 
granted to water providers that are able to provide ADWR with proof of availability and 
access to a 100-year amount of water supplies to meet current and projected demand.  
In order to access water in the Big Chino basin, Prescott purchased 10.2 square 
miles of land within the Big Chino basin where it intends to drill its wells (City of 
Prescott, n.d.). This property has been named the Big Chino Water Ranch. Prescott 
Valley is sharing costs of the entire water supply project in exchange for part of the 
imported water. According to an official from the City of Prescott, 
Big Chino Ranch was bought by the city [Prescott]... Prescott Valley pays 
whatever we need to do: repair fences, things like that but the city owns 
the ranch. They [Prescott Valley] contribute the percentage almost half the 
cost to kind of own it but not to purchase it. We [Prescott] will be the 
ultimate owners of it, because in state law, you had to meet certain 
requirements to even go into the Big Chino because it was a neighboring 
groundwater basin. The city was the only one, Prescott Valley didn’t have 
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the standing to do it. The best they could do was partner with us so they 
could get water through us over to them. (Prescott, 15 June 2015) 
The BCWR is actually a compromise solution to securing alternate supplies for 
communities in Prescott AMA. This is because when the State’s imported Colorado 
River water (that is, CAP) was allocated, the City of Prescott got an allocation but was 
never able to bring it into its service area. The allocation “was intended to be realized 
through exchange, with Prescott taking water from the Verde River, presumably, and 
giving CAP water to SRP. All such exchanges proved impossible to complete due to 
environmental concerns” (Crystal Thompson, Personal communication, May 05, 2016). 
The environmental concern cited here is the effect of upstream Verde River withdrawals 
on the endangered spikedace fish population (U.S. Department of Interior, 1990). This 
environmental concern is the reason why Prescott could not trade their CAP allocation 
with a downstream Verde River rights holder. 
The decision for Prescott to realize its allocation through exchange was made due 
to the prohibitive cost of constructing the CAP canal to the city. The CAP canal 
alignment had been chosen by the U.S Bureau of Reclamation and represents the most 
efficient route for transferring CAP water to Arizona’s AMAs. According to a 
representative from CAP: 
The canal did not go through Prescott primarily because the elevation of 
that city is 5,367 feet.  The Phoenix area elevation is approximately 1,000 
feet (and Tucson higher than 2,000 feet).  Elevation matters because the 
water has to be lifted by pumping, which requires energy (which is costly). 
The canal follows the most efficient route from both economic and 
engineering perspectives. (Crystal Thompson, Personal communication, 
May 05, 2016) 
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Eventually, Prescott’s CAP allocation was sold to Scottsdale with funds from the sale 
kept in a trust fund for the development of alternate supplies such as BCWR (Arizona 
Department of Water Resources, 2014a).  
As part of the joint efforts on BCWR, the City of Prescott and Prescott Valley 
entered into an agreement with Salt River Project (SRP) and are undertaking monitoring 
of flows in the Verde River to identify if pumping in the Big Chino basin would affect 
those flows. The agreement was made after several court proceedings when SRP, in 
efforts to protect its downstream rights to the Verde River, sued Prescott and Prescott 
Valley. After repeated court proceedings, City of Prescott, Prescott Valley, and SRP 
made a decision to negotiate outside of the courts. This led to the creation of 
Comprehensive Agreement Number One (CA-1) in 2012, a forum formalizing the 
commitment of all three parties to carry out monitoring on the Verde River before both 
City of Prescott and Prescott Valley start pumping groundwater from BCWR. 
BCWR water is important to the City of Prescott and Prescott Valley communities 
because it supposedly represents a way for them to reach safe yield (Arizona Department 
of Water Resources, 2014a) and provides supplies for new growth in both municipalities. 
The joint efforts between both municipalities ahead of the construction of any pipeline 
from BCWR is ongoing and planned to continue until at least 2019 (Town of Prescott 
Valley, n.d.a). The excerpt below provides further details on CA-1, from the perspective 
of Prescott Valley: 
So SRP sued us. We went in and we negotiated a settlement. Part of that 
settlement is what we call Comprehensive Agreement Number One. 
Within that agreement, we’re monitoring hydrologic conditions within the 
basin. We’re developing groundwater models, and this is so that we can 
lead to a plan for mitigating impacts… So, we have $5.5 million 
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committed to this program between three parties…  We do the modeling. 
We do the mitigation plan. And we’re supposed to collect five years of 
data from all of these points before we’re allowed to pump from the Big 
Chino. So, at the earliest, we could pump water from the Big Chino in 
about 2022. (Prescott Valley, June 2015)  
In terms of coordination at the local level, BCWR represents a shared-interest pursuit 
around which the City of Prescott and Prescott Valley are having positive interactions 
and are in cooperation. 
This water import that helps Prescott AMA reduce its dependence on local 
groundwater can eventually lead to groundwater overdraft in the Big Chino basin as that 
region grows. Prescott’s current Decision and Order (which documents the city’s water 
portfolio) signifies that withdrawing water for 100-years from the Big Chino basin will 
not lead to overdraft, based on the depth-to-static water level of the basin’s wells.  What 
the Decision and Order does not incorporate is the effect of development that occurs in 
the Big Chino and unregulated use of groundwater on overall water sustainability in that 
area. Thus, regarding water sustainability, a successful BCWR project might lead to safe 
yield being achieved temporarily (possibly post-2025) but not sustained in Prescott 
AMA, at a cost to communities in the neighboring groundwater basin. The geographic 
scale of impact is critical here, as importing water into the AMA from the Big Chino 
basin is not sustainable from a broader perspective inclusive of Big Chino. In fact, the 
water governance conflict discussed by Bolin et al. (2008) is tied to this project which 
civil society groups claim would eventually impact Verde River flows (one of Arizona’s 
last flowing perennial rivers).  
The effects of Big Chino pumping on Verde River flows have been a subject of 
debate since BCWR was purchased. By jumping scales in order to obtain some form of 
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legitimacy in an issue supported by state statutes, civil society groups argue for the 
effects of the BCWR pumping on endangered species by invoking federal ESA laws, 
while BCWR proponents counter those claims, as shown by the following quotes from 
Bolin et al. (2008):  
… we’re the voice for wildlife and places that can’t speak up themselves. So, 
knowing that there are endangered species in the river, knowing that you know, 
hydrologic reports by USGS and retired USGS geologists up in that area assure 
me that there will be impacts to the river. We don’t know...if it will be months, 
years, five years, ten years, twenty, fifty...a hundred years before the full impacts. 
But any loss of water to the river is going to impact the endangered species, is 
going to impact the Middle Verde communities and the water supply throughout. 
So, our suit is based on Endangered Species Act violation because the cities will 
be guilty of future[violations], as the water draws down the species will be 
impacted. (Center for Biological Diversity, Verde Project Leader quoted in Bolin 
et al. (2008, p. 1505) 
The first twenty-five miles. The first twenty-five miles? Well, are you going to dry 
up the first twenty-five miles? That is what everybody is focused on. And that is 
what we are all working on, you know, is there any federal nexus with the 
Endangered Species Act on those first twenty-five miles? We don’t think there is. 
There are no endangered species along that first twenty-five. (Prescott Water 
Manager quoted in Bolin et al., 2008, p. 1505) 
These quotes show how proponents of the BCWR project focus on scales that advance 
the project. Moreover, environmental groups invoke the federal level Endangered Species 
Act to validate their claims of the BCWR project’s harm to the Verde River and 
watershed. 
Another issue relating to this project is the problem of arsenic in the water which 
would cost the municipalities approximately $23 million in building treatment facilities 
(Bolin et al., 2008). The City of Prescott’s 2009 Decision and Order from ADWR 
requires the City to show evidence of pipeline construction approval from the Arizona 
Department of Environmental Quality on or before December 31, 2019, in order to have 
Big Chino water count in the city’s water portfolio. However, the contract entered into by 
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Prescott, Prescott Valley, and Salt River Project require an eight-year monitoring and 
modeling program to determine the impacts of Big Chino pumping on Verde River flows. 
Thus, water quality and surface water impacts are two of different challenges to the 
importation project. 
In what could be considered a concession of the hydrologic connection between 
the Little Chino (Prescott’s sub-basin), the Big Chino (basin of water import), and the 
Verde River (one of the last flowing perennial rivers in Arizona), a published report that 
involves Prescott and Prescott Valley actors acknowledges that about 14% of Verde 
River’s base flow comes from the Little Chino basin (Upper Verde River Watershed 
Protection Coalition (2010) citing Wirt (2005)). This acknowledgment is important 
because Prescott and Prescott Valley had previously denied any such connections and 
avoided discussions of mitigation. For instance, in Bolin et al.’s (2008) study, the then-
current City of Prescott’s BCP manager, while referring to civil society claims about 
adverse impacts, had commented that, “They don’t have scientific evidence to suggest 
that there will be impacts, nor do we have scientific evidence to conclude that there won’t 
be impacts” (p. 1504). Bolin et al. (2008) had concluded the following: 
Most of the PrAMA interests interviewed for this study recognized that the BCP 
is, at best, a temporary palliative to the AMA’s overdraft problem; they also 
tended to minimize likely effects or favored postponing the development of 
mitigation plans for the socio-ecological impacts of pumping. (p. 1505) 
Shared Groundwater Basin Interactions. Shared groundwater has created 
contentious interactions bilaterally between municipalities that share the same 
groundwater basin. As noted by Collins and Bolin (2007) and confirmed in this study, 
many residents of Dewey-Humboldt, for example, haul water to their homes. Also, legal 
tussles between Prescott and Chino-Valley dating to the late 1970s reveal Chino Valley’s 
  100 
desire to control its water resources by ensuring that the majority of water obtained 
within its borders is used within the municipality (Town of Chino Valley v. City of 
Prescott, 1981). Meanwhile, the need to control water is fed both by the fear of water 
scarcity and libertarian values. Conflicts around shared groundwater between bilateral 
municipalities result from the physical evidence of water scarcity, desire to maintain 
municipal control of water, and the fear of increased water scarcity. 
Hydrologically, Prescott AMA straddles two neighboring groundwater basins that 
are located within Verde River and Agua Fria River watersheds. The groundwater basins 
are the Little Chino and the Upper Agua Fria (see Figure 8). The City of Prescott shares 
groundwater with Chino Valley in the Little Chino basin, while Prescott Valley shares 
groundwater with Dewey-Humboldt in the Upper Agua Fria basin. In this sub-section, I 
present intra-basin water transfer interactions between City of Prescott and Chino 
Valley, groundwater recharge interactions between the pairs of municipalities, as well as 
interactions around growth and/or exempt wells between the pairs of municipalities. 
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Figure 8. Prescott AMA Groundwater Basins 
Intra-basin Water Transfer. The City of Prescott and Chino Valley have not 
always worked cooperatively regarding water resources. The two municipalities are 
neighbours that share the Little Chino basin. However, due to the mountainous terrain of 
the City of Prescott, its municipal wells are not drilled in Prescott but are located in 
Chino Valley. Prescott drilled wells on its Chino Valley property in 1948 and has since 
transported water through a seventeen-mile pipeline to its service areas. Chino Valley, 
incorporated in 1970, filed a court injunction against Prescott two years later to restrict 
the City’s groundwater pumping and water export. In 1981, the case was dismissed in 
Prescott’s favor because the court adjured that percolating water is not owned until it is 
withdrawn. According to the court, “like wild animals free to roam as they please, they 
[percolating waters, in this case] are the property of no one” (Town of Chino Valley v. 
City of Prescott, 1981). In 1985, the City of Prescott initiated legal action against Chino 
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Valley due to the latter’s transaction privilege tax on Prescott’s water pipeline. In 1989, 
this case was decided in Chino Valley’s favor as the court upheld Chino Valley’s tax on 
Prescott’s water pipeline (City of Prescott v. Town of Chino Valley, 1989). A summary 
description of interactions between both municipalities regarding intra-basin water 
transfer is provided in the following Chino Valley interview excerpt: 
Chino Valley and Prescott have not played well together on water. Chino 
Valley and Prescott got involved on a lawsuit back in the ‘70s that did not 
get resolved until the ‘90s. It’s Arizona’s longest Supreme Court case over 
water. It’s funny, because the U.S. Supreme Court, the longest case is 
between Arizona and California over water. The Arizona case is between 
Chino Valley and Prescott over water. So, it is truly that water is for 
fighting things. The town [of Chino Valley] and the town of Prescott in the 
last two years have gone to great lengths to bury hatchets. This town has 
been in lawsuits with Prescott ad nauseam. As a result of it, we’ve gotten 
nowhere but made lawyers very wealthy. So, we are trying now, Chino 
Valley is trying to bury old hatchets with Prescott. The last two to three 
years we have tried to bury these hatchets. But Chino Valley and Prescott 
do not play well when it comes to water. (Chino Valley, June 2015) 
One way that Prescott and Chino Valley appear to be “burying hatchets” is by pursuing 
conversations about water issues rather than employing legal confrontation. For example, 
in 2015, Chino Valley approached Prescott to purchase the portion of Prescott’s water 
distribution system in Chino Valley, with which the Prescott served some Chino Valley 
residents. While the purchase was unsuccessful, Chino Valley views this attempt at 
negotiation as one way to overcome past negative interactions between both 
municipalities around water.  
Prescott’s intra-basin water transfer is not a strategy for achieving safe yield but is 
seen as necessary for water provision. This is because the city’s terrain makes it 
prohibitively expensive to withdraw water from many areas within its boundaries. 
However, these intra-basin transfers have led to conflicts between Prescott and Chino 
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Valley that have put coordination in achieving safe yield or regional water sustainability 
on the backburner. In summary, intra-basin water transfer is a contentious subject that has 
affected water governance interactions between Prescott and Chino Valley. 
Groundwater Recharge. Disagreements, that are not being actively deliberated, 
exist between municipalities that share the same groundwater basin on the subject of 
groundwater recharge. Hence, groundwater recharge serves as another avenue for 
interactions, albeit contentious ones, among Prescott AMA municipalities.  
Recharge and recovery is one of the water management strategies overseen by 
ADWR in Prescott AMA. Recharge and Recovery was included in the state’s statutes 
through enactment of the Underground Water Storage, Savings, and Replenishment Act 
in 1994, but the program had been established by state legislature since 1986 (Arizona 
Department of Water Resources, 2014a; Arizona Department of Water Resources, 
2014b). Generally, Arizona’s statutes allow some flexibility around where water is stored 
underground and where it is withdrawn. This storage, despite being earmarked for near-
term withdrawal, is referred to as groundwater recharge and conflates the idea of water 
recharged to boost the groundwater system versus water temporarily stored for use. 
Typically, water retains the legal classification it is stored as. Effluent recharged at a 
recharge facility can later be recovered from nearby wells not as groundwater, but as 
effluent (Pearce, 2007). Within the state’s system of recharge and recovery, water 
providers gain credits for the water they recharge. 
Within Prescott AMA, all the municipalities except Dewey-Humboldt have Waste 
Water Treatment Facilities (WWTF) and Underground Storage Facility (USF) permits 
from ADWR. The lack of participation by Dewey-Humboldt could be due to the current 
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lack of a central water or sewer system; therefore, the municipality has no wastewater to 
treat and no treated wastewater to recharge. Recharge by the three municipalities with 
permits for recovery is done with treated effluent. The water treatment and recharge 
facilities operated by each municipality are located within their specific municipal 
boundaries. 
The location of recharge facilities within each municipality’s boundary, combined 
with the flexibility allowed in the state’s recharge and recovery program, has influenced 
how municipalities within the same basin interact on issues of groundwater recharge, 
storage, and recovery. The City of Prescott pumps its water from Chino Valley wells but 
recharges within its city boundaries. Prescott Valley recharges effluent, gains credits for 
this recharge from ADWR, and is able to sell the stored water rights to new development 
coming into the Town. Such a move would appear to support safe yield in the near-term. 
However, this strategy ultimately contributes to groundwater overdraft when the stored 
water is accessed for development as the current level of overdraft from current residents 
continues. 
Against this background, responses by Chino Valley and Dewey-Humboldt 
officials showed skepticism about the efficacy of groundwater recharge within their 
respective basins due to the practices of their partner municipalities. The City of Prescott 
has a recovery permit from ADWR, and nearly all the water recovered within the AMA 
has been withdrawn by the city independently and through its ownership of Chino Valley 
Irrigation District (CVID) (Arizona Department of Water Resources, 2014a). Meanwhile, 
Prescott Valley has only recovered a small portion of its stored groundwater. Instead of 
giving water away to subdivisions or projects (such as a new factory), Prescott Valley 
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sold the rights of its remaining stored water to Water Management Assets LLC, a New-
York investment company. 
In addition to the skepticism about groundwater recharge efficacy that was 
revealed during interviews, Chino Valley and Dewey-Humboldt officials showed concern 
about how water use by the bigger communities potentially reduces the water available to 
the smaller ones, especially with regard to the municipality which shared their 
groundwater. According to officials from these two municipalities: 
We get along fine with Prescott Valley because we don't have any water 
problems with them, but Prescott, right across the street is where Prescott 
takes water out of the ground and pumps it into Prescott. About seven out 
of every ten gallons that leaves the little Chino aquifer goes to Prescott 
and they say “well, we are recharging it back into the ground”. Well … we 
will see all right. At any rate, the aquifer continues to drop. (Chino Valley, 
March 2016) 
I’m sure you heard what they do. They recharge effluent back to the 
aquifer so that they can get points. If you asked the Prescott Valley people, 
they’re going to tell you “Safe use, no problem because we produce 
effluent. We recharge back. We are very responsible. We capture all the 
water. We don’t want to waste water on anything. We charge it back. And 
through the cycle, you’re going to produce drinkable water, potable 
water.” That’s what they’re going to tell you… On paper you have rights, 
but in reality, do you really have wet water there? You have dry water, 
which is your rights – water rights. You have points, but that doesn’t 
correlate still, which means you have overburdened whatever the supplies 
are because they are upstream. They pump water, and we don’t have any. 
(Dewey-Humboldt, June 2015)  
This finding is consistent with previous research where BCWR proponents argued that it 
would help the region achieve safe yield but only a few governance actors were 
forthcoming with the information that this is not the case, as seen in the following quote 
from Bolin et al. (2008), 
The idea was to bring in Big Chino water to stabilize [the PrAMA] water supply 
and to allow for growth. The fact is that bringing in Big Chino water will not 
stabilize the water situation because that water is going to be used for growth. So 
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how the hell can it stabilize when we are already over-pumping? The other fact is 
that we are over-pumping our existing supply so much that if we brought all the 
Big Chino water in and put it into our source, it wouldn’t be enough. So, we’re 
still behind. (Former YCWAC member quoted in Bolin et al. (2008, p. 1503) 
Thus, despite groundwater recharge being a strategy to increase the region’s water 
sustainability, there are conflicting views among municipalities on how current practices 
affect long-term water availability. 
 With regards to safe yield, the current flexibilities around groundwater recharge 
and recovery are not necessarily contributing to the goal. This is because groundwater 
recharge is more storage for later use than actual recharge. The only groundwater that 
actually contributes towards safe yield in the current system are cuts to the aquifer that 
are required for all long-term storage. To date, less than 1,000 acre-feet have been 
accounted for as cuts to the aquifer within the AMA, compared with over 200,000 acre-
feet of groundwater overdraft recorded since 1985. Groundwater recharge contentions 
between municipalities in the same basin suggests the lack of coordination that still exists 
in joint efforts within the region towards achieving safe yield. 
Disputes over Growth and/or Exempt Wells. Apart from the differing opinions 
and desire for growth among different actors within the study area, there are also 
differing desires and pathways for growth among the municipalities. With regard to 
municipalities sharing the same groundwater basin, both Prescott and Chino Valley 
support growth. The difference between both municipalities’ growth visions is that 
Prescott’s municipal government generally does not think exempt wells are a sustainable 
system for growth, while Chino Valley residents want to grow on exempt wells. 
Currently, the Chino Valley water system serves a small portion of its residents unlike the 
City of Prescott. One of the reasons given for Chino Valley’s small water system is the 
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low-density development within the municipality, especially on the outskirts of town. 
The other is that Chino Valley residents would rather grow their town by keeping exempt 
wells free of regulation than developing the town’s water system. The interview excerpt 
below from an official in Chino Valley details the town’s growth vision and choice to 
grow on exempt wells: 
Chino Valley has a very limited water and sewer system. The town went 
out in 2014 to see if the citizens wanted to bond to put water and sewer up 
and down the highway to spark economic development and the vote went 
down – the vote did not pass, 68% were against it, 32% were in favor of it. 
So as a community, Chino Valley isn’t interested in the engineering side 
of water resources, i.e. getting water and sewer into areas to spread 
economic growth. As a result of that, Chino Valley is very anemic in what 
they are able to do on the water resource side beyond DWR water 
conservation programs, those kinds of things… They are okay with the 
growth; they just don’t want a central water system. They want to do it 
through exempt wells. (Chino Valley, June 2015)  
Hydrologically, groundwater flows northwards in the Little Chino basin; that is, from 
Prescott to Chino Valley (Figure 8) and further north to contribute about 14% of Verde 
River’s base flow (Wirt, 2005). However, since Prescott serves most of its customers by 
pumping groundwater from the Prescott’s Chino Valley wells, both municipalities are 
impacted by lower water tables in Chino Valley. 
Within the Agua Fria basin, Prescott Valley wants growth (Bolin et al., 2008) 
while Dewey-Humboldt does not. Prescott Valley sees exempt wells as the problem to 
water sustainability while Dewey-Humboldt sees growth as the problem. Generally, 
Prescott Valley’s municipal government sees exempt wells as a hindrance to water 
sustainability. The town does not have as many exempt wells as Dewey-Humboldt, 
possibly due to its more compact development and minimal irrigated agriculture (Arizona 
Department of Water Resources, 2014a). On the other hand, Dewey-Humboldt does not 
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want growth, nor does it want its water resource affected by the growing Prescott Valley. 
In not wanting growth, the community decided not to develop a central system, which 
also supports its decision to remain rural. However, there are parts of the town with dry 
wells, whose residents have to haul water to their homes (Collins and Bolin, 2007). The 
interview excerpt below reveals the town’s stance on growth and how AMA neighbors 
who are promoting growth are generally viewed: 
We are not…like Prescott and Prescott Valley. They have to do something 
to guide their growth, how they want to grow and then have these 
programs to be put in place to encourage growth or one or the other. But 
we don’t...  Also, our growth policy here - the town in general, the town 
council are divided, but in general you probably have four 
councilmembers on the council that will tell you that they want to keep it 
the way it is. So, they don’t want to encourage growth. That is kind of 
suitable with our situation because we don’t have water or sewer 
[services]. Utility services - where you have that, you invite growth. There 
are many reasons we don’t have that. Right now, it’s a good balance 
because they [Dewey-Humboldt residents] don’t want more growth. 
(Dewey-Humboldt, June 2015)  
In terms of the hydrologic connection between both municipalities, groundwater flows 
southwards from Prescott Valley to Dewey-Humboldt (Figure 8) to eventually contribute 
some of Agua Fria River’s base flow. Thus, groundwater pumping in Prescott Valley 
could affect the groundwater available to both Dewey-Humboldt and the Agua Fria 
River, due to the hydrologic connection described. 
Overall, the differing visions of what constrains water sustainability, whether 
growth, growth on exempt wells, or just the presence of exempt wells plays an important 
role in how the municipalities work together towards a common vision of water 
sustainability for the AMA. The differing perspectives on growth and exempt wells are a 
disincentive to collaboration between all four municipalities. It is important to note, 
however, that there have been discussions towards achieving safe yield between three of 
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the four municipalities (Prescott, Prescott Valley, and Chino Valley) who are part of a 
regional government coalition (Upper Verde River Watershed Protection Coalition, 
2010). However, the issue of dealing with exempt wells is a major touch point identified 
in those discussions and which the municipal governments have lacked adequate political 
will in addressing.  
Summary. Local-level water stakeholders in the study area do not coordinate 
unless coordination supports municipal visions, and the municipalities differ in their 
visions. Within the study area, Prescott and Prescott Valley municipalities—which are in 
different groundwater basins—cooperate over a local water development project due to 
shared interests in supply augmentation that is being mutually sought to support 
continued growth. In other words, shared water interests have encouraged cooperation. 
However, contentious interactions exist between municipalities in the same hydrologic 
basin with respect to shared groundwater. These contentious interactions coalesce around 
dissatisfaction over volumes of groundwater withdrawal versus recharge, differing urban 
and rural visions, and the proliferation of exempt wells. These issues stymy cooperative 
efforts among all four municipalities toward regional water sustainability.  
Overall, the region’s safe yield management goal is not a priority for any of the 
municipalities except to the extent that safe yield supports their larger priorities, which 
are economic growth for Prescott and Prescott Valley, individual control over water for 
Chino Valley, and remaining rural for Dewey-Humboldt. The inability to work together 
to achieve the region’s goal of safe yield is mostly due to insufficient political will in the 
face of more dominant interests (economic growth, individual water control, remaining 
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rural). Consequently, the inability to work together means that sustainable water 
governance is not being pursued with innovation and leadership at the local level.  
 
Research Question Three: Power in Water Governance 
This section addresses the research question: How is power exercised among a variety of 
water governance actors across levels, and what are the implications for sustainable 
water governance? 
In this section, I focus on the different ways in which the various actors involved 
in Prescott AMA’s water governance have exercised power and the implication of these 
activities on the region’s safe yield management goal and water sustainability. 
Narratively, I present the results of how artefactual, mental, monetary, and natural 
resources are mobilized by governance actors thereby leading to the exercise of 
innovative, reinforcive, transformative, and destructive power. Table 8 in the summary of 
this section presents how the different activities discussed in this section align with 
resource mobilization and different forms of power. In the following sub-sections, I 
discuss resource mobilization and the exercise of power in Prescott AMA’s water 
governance under the following headings: Big Chino groundwater importation; rescaling 
of governance boundaries; water supply development; citizen power, growth narratives, 
and libertarianism; the Groundwater Users Advisory Council’s regional governance; and 
Prescott AMA’s safe yield management goal. 
Big Chino Groundwater Importation. The City of Prescott largely follows the 
state’s model of seeking external supplies (which, in the case of Big Chino water, is a 
non-renewable resource) as a way to ensure the city’s water future. As detailed in the 
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previous section, Prescott received Central Arizona Project (CAP) water allocations 
along with municipal applicants such as Phoenix, Tucson, Glendale, among others 
(Department of Water Resources, 1982). Prescott allocations were meant to be exchanged 
with Salt River Project (SRP) for Verde River water (Arizona Water Commission, 1978, 
p. VI-6). However, this exchange proved impossible due to environmental concerns, one 
of which was the predicted harm to the Spikedace fish population − an endangered 
species found in the Verde River.  
The water exchange with SRP was a preferable option because SRP, a 
downstream water provider, has senior rights to about 85% of Verde River flows (Bolin 
et al., 2008). This water right proceeds from the prior appropriation doctrine that governs 
surface water in Arizona – a rule also known as ‘first in time, first in right’. Farmers in 
the Phoenix region started using Verde River water as early as the 1860s (Autobee, 2011) 
and have priority over Upper Verde Watershed communities on use of the River’s water. 
In other words, Upper Verde communities are legally restricted in their ability to use 
Verde River water despite their proximity to its headwaters. 
By 1990, the City of Prescott, though with CAP allocation, could not exchange 
their allocation with a Verde River downstream water rights holder due in large part to 
the effect of such exchange on the endangered Spikedace fish population. Legislative 
intervention was sought, leading to the inclusion of ARS §45-555 in state statutes. This 
statute adds an exemption to the GMA’s restriction on groundwater transfer into AMAs 
that would legally allow the City of Prescott to import water from the neighboring Big 
Chino basin. Unlike Phoenix-Tucson’s water import which is surface water, Prescott’s 
water import would be non-renewable groundwater – a plan that will increase 
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groundwater overdraft in the Big Chino basin. The Big Chino basin is not part of any of 
the Active Management Areas (AMAs) and thus lacks any statutory groundwater 
governance rules. The legislation that authorized Prescott AMA’s water project was SB 
1055 sponsored by Gus Arzberger (first signer) and nineteen other state senators in 1991. 
Within the Senate, vote on the legislation was somewhat bipartisan (Table 6). 
Table 6.  
Final Vote by State Senate Members on Water Bills 
 
According to the GMA, ADWR is given authority to execute the Act while the 
agency’s director has decision-making authority (ARS §45-103, 45-105, 45-106). So far, 
ADWR has limited its activities to the express dictates of the GMA. In concluding the 
AMA’s Fourth Management Plan, the agency states that, “[i]n order for ADWR to close 
these ‘holes in the bucket,’- uses of groundwater that can persist or increase without 
replenishing the aquifer - additional statutory authority and rule changes are required” 
(Arizona Department of Water Resources, 2014a, p. 12-11). In adherence to the GMA, 
ADWR provides oversight to the mandatory conservation requirements of selected water 
providers and users and provides technical support for water augmentation in the AMA. 
The GMA’s emphasis on water augmentation somewhat explains why ADWR 
acknowledges on its website that the Big Chino supplies base flows to the Verde River 
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but still includes water import from the Big Chino basin as an essential way for the AMA 
to reach safe yield in its Fourth Management Plan. Thus, the GMA’s emphasis on water 
conservation for selected water providers and users, and water augmentation, guides 
ADWR’s activities within the AMA but does not promote comprehensive water 
sustainability.  
Whenever questions of regulation arise, ADWR publications often deny the 
agency’s ability to either make or enforce rules (Hirt et al., 2008). The Prescott AMA 
Fourth Management Plan provides an example that applies to this study: in comments to 
ADWR ahead of the drafting of the AMA’s Fourth Management Plan, CWAG suggested 
that ADWR use existing authorities and request new authorities as needed to minimize 
the effects of exempt wells on the aquifer, as well as to ensure the accomplishment of 
safe yield by 2025. In what could be considered a reply, the agency explicitly states in the 
management plan that “ADWR has no regulatory authority over exempt wells" (Arizona 
Department of Water Resources, 2014a, p. 3-2). However, the GMA provides the agency 
director with the authority to issue regulations if they help protect the state’s water 
resources. 
Despite claims of not having authority on many issues, in 1995, ADWR laid the 
groundwork for Prescott AMA’s out-of-safe yield declaration through its rulemaking. 
According to rules proposed and adopted by the Agency, data would be collected for 
three years to determine empirically if Prescott AMA was out of safe yield. Afterwards, 
an initial determination would be made and the Agency would accept comments from the 
public and Prescott AMA communities before a final determination was made. According 
to schedule, after the initial safe yield determination was made in 1998, comments were 
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submitted by various parties, some protesting the determination and others supporting it. 
Plats for 32,000 new residences were approved in the AMA between the hearings and the 
agency’s final out-of-safe yield declaration (Bolin et al., 2008). The number of 
applications received for new residences in two months was more than that of 
applications received in the preceding 17 years (Bolin et al., 2008). Given that Prescott’s 
population according to the 2010 US Census was 39,843, these plat approvals guarantee 
that Prescott’s (future) doubled population are legally allowed to use mined 
groundwater14. 
At the same time, SB 1124 was approved by the state legislature during the 
second regular session of the 43rd legislature. Support for this bill was bipartisan (Table 
6). SB 1124 adjusted AAC R12-15-705(F) to provide Prescott AMA with a “groundwater 
allowance,” which is the amount of (overdrafted) groundwater the City can pump but 
which is considered to be consistent with the AMA’s safe yield management goal. This 
groundwater allowance would increase as approved plats are recorded and submitted to 
ADWR. For example, Prescott’s groundwater allowance increased from 8,090 acre-feet 
per year in 1999 to 9,371.53 acre-feet per year in 2008. As a result, despite using 
overdrafted or mined groundwater, Prescott will not be considered out of compliance 
with the AMA’s safe yield management goal. 
The agency successfully declared Prescott AMA out of safe yield in 1999. The 
out-of-safe yield declaration resulted in two main outcomes in Prescott AMA. First, it 
provided justification for the urgent need to import water from the Big Chino basin in 
                                                        
14 Mined groundwater is the same as overdrafted groundwater and refers to groundwater used in excess of 
recharge. This is a situation that the safe yield management goal should ideally address by bringing 
groundwater withdrawal and recharge (natural and artificial) into balance. 
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order to achieve safe yield and ensure a sound economy15. Prescott purchased its Big 
Chino property in 2004. Second, the declaration allowed Prescott to receive a 
groundwater allowance. In 1999, Prescott received a Designation of Assured Water 
Supplies despite the AMA’s annual overdraft, which will continue to increase as 
preliminary and approved plats are developed. Yet, the region will legally be considered 
as ‘consistent or compliant’ with the AMA management goal due to this groundwater 
allowance. 
The City of Prescott applied to ADWR to update its Assured Water Supply 
portfolio to include BCWR water in 2008; early the following year, SRP filed a legal 
complaint against Prescott and Prescott Valley. The legal complaint was regarding claims 
that pumping from BCWR would affect flows in the Verde River, to which SRP had 
senior downstream water rights. Also, SRP provided support to environmental groups 
who were also against the BCWR project. During this period, SRP was a “politically 
powerful ‘ally’ of local environmental groups” (Bolin et al., 2008, p. 1506). After a 
number of legal proceedings, the courts decided the filed cases in the Prescott’s favor 
without resolving the contention with SRP. Another victory for the municipalities was 
that ADWR approved the City of Prescott’s application to update the water portfolio of 
their Designation of Assured Water Supply.  
After losing its legal challenge against AMA municipalities, SRP, Prescott, and 
Prescott Valley agreed to settle outside the courts. The result of the parties’ deliberation 
is that work on the BCWR would be delayed while monitoring and modeling of the 
effects of pumping in the BCWR on Verde River flows are carried out. This monitoring 
                                                        
15 ADWR’s recent publications continue to point to the AMA’s need for BCWR water (Arizona Department 
of Water Resources, 2014a, 2014c). 
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and modeling is ongoing and expected to continue till 2019, after which construction of 
the BCWR pipeline can start if the completed studies showed that Verde River flows will 
not be affected by pumping in BCWR. However, if the agreed upon studies reveal impact 
on Verde River flows, then the municipalities would mitigate those effects in proportion 
to the extent that withdrawals by other water users also affect Verde River flows leading 
to first, an Agreement in Principle, then later, the Comprehensive Agreement Number 
One. As part of the new partnership, SRP agreed to support the AMA municipalities with 
changes that AMA communities wanted in ARS 45-555. One of the main modifications 
made to ARS 45-555 in 2010 was adding language that clarified Prescott Valley’s right to 
use part of BCWR water as this type of right was not granted in the initial legislation. 
Overall, Prescott’s Big Chino water importation pursuits continue to progress due 
to coordination among the different governance actors involved. The state legislature has 
made rules, ADWR has made its own rules where necessary and enforced statutory ones, 
and SRP is working with the municipalities to ensure that everyone (Prescott, Prescott 
Valley, and SRP) receives the water they want. In terms of water sustainability, 
preservation of Verde River’s perennial flow is important. SRP, with its downstream 
water rights and as a party to the agreements with Prescott AMA municipalities, has an 
opportunity to ensure that the River continues to flow year-round. It remains to be seen 
whether the Verde River will be protected in the midst of current negotiations and 
compromises. The foregoing presents a situation where state legislators, ADWR, and 
Prescott AMA municipalities are coordinating and exercising power to make BCWR a 
reality, within the enabling institutional environment provided by the GMA and 
maintained by subsequent legislation.  
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Rescaling of Governance Boundaries. At the request of Governor Brewer, 
ADWR developed the Strategic Vision for Water Supply Sustainability in 2014. This 
vision divided the state into 22 planning areas. Prescott AMA was grouped with other 
communities within Verde Watershed and termed the Verde Planning Area (Figure 9). 
Based on historical precedence, boundaries of the Verde Planning Area suggest an 
attempt to resolve conflicts in the Upper Verde and expand the water frontier of Prescott 
AMA communities by having Prescott AMA communities and those in the Big Chino 
basin within the same planning area. This strategy finds precedence in previous state-
wide rescaling activities. Prior to 1980, Chino Valley (by its own election) was part of the 
Granite Creek Critical Groundwater Area, but Prescott was not. However, both were 
brought under the same rules with the passage of the Groundwater Management Act. 
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Figure 9. Rescaling of AMA Boundaries – Verde Planning Area 
 The Critical Groundwater Areas (CGAs) were a result of Arizona’s 1948 
Groundwater Management Code. However, the code was weak with no regulation of 
groundwater (Connall, 1982). The Code had been passed amidst calls to regulate 
Arizona’s groundwater due to the overdraft occurring in many parts of the state (Connall, 
1982). Chino Valley incorporated in 1970 and mounted a legal challenge against Prescott 
two years later for exporting more than its entitled allocation from the Granite Creek 
CGA (Arizona Water Commission, 1978, p. V1-5). This matter was dismissed in 
Prescott’s favor in 1981. Having both Prescott and Chino Valley in the newly created 
Prescott AMA provided statutory support for Prescott’s groundwater import from Chino 
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Valley. Prescott Valley, another rapidly growing Central Highlands community (located 
in the Agua Fria Watershed) was included in the Prescott Active Management Area under 
the premise of governance by groundwater basins. This scaling effort promoted a 
mismatch of ecological and management scales that is being repeated with the creation of 
the Verde Planning Area. 
The Verde Planning Area, though with a form of governing within the watershed, 
does not fully match watershed boundaries; therefore, scalar mismatches exist. If 
implemented at the sunset of the Groundwater Management Act, governance at the level 
of the Verde Planning Area could have detrimental effects on the region’s water 
resources and sustainable governance. 
Supply Development in Prescott AMA. In this sub-section, I discuss how 
Prescott Valley, ADWR, and the AMA municipalities have mobilized resources to 
promote water supply development. By water supply development, I refer to the ways 
through which governance actors manage current supplies and seek to increase water 
supplies. 
According to Prescott Valley’s General Plan 2025, service privatization is one of 
the core strategies to be employed in managing development. This strategy is being 
applied to water governance and affects the region’s safe yield goal, due in no small part 
to its promotion of market forces for a scarce but crucial resource. Specifically, in 2007, 
an auction was held for recharged effluents that the town had credits for future with 
ADWR. Out of the three parties qualified to bid, Water Property Investors16 won based 
                                                        
16 Water Property Investors is one of the investment vehicles of Water Assets Management, an investment 
company with offices in New York and California. 
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on a bid of $24,650 per acre-foot for 2,724 feet of effluent water17 which “(1) will be 
physically available for 100 years, (2) will satisfy applicable water quality criteria [sic], 
and (3) can be used to support CAWS applications”18 (Town of Prescott Valley, 2014, p. 
4). The money obtained from this transaction is expected to contribute towards the town’s 
BCWR costs. 
In gaining public support for the municipality’s goal to auction its effluents, the 
town’s mayor mobilized mental resources (in this case, information) to garner support for 
the sale by linking it directly with the AMA’s goal of safe yield. According to the 
following newspaper announcement by the town’s mayor: 
In essence, it [Prescott Valley] can use 2,700 acre-feet of reclaimed water to 
obtain 4,000 acre-feet of Big Chino water and better reach the goal of safe-yield. 
An auction helps ensure that the town will receive high value for this resource. 
Even in the thirsty West, people historically have considered water a free 
commodity  with users paying just the cost to pump and deliver it but not for the 
water itself. To our knowledge, an auction is unique and may establish a whole 
new approach to water allocation and use. It certainly will help move water from 
being just a regulatory tool to being an actual commodity in the free enterprise 
system. (Skoog, 2006, p. 1) 
Apart from the fact that Prescott Valley’s share of BCWR water will not be used 
directly to achieve safe yield, the contract with Water Property Investments inhibits the 
progress of Prescott AMA, and other AMAs with the management goal of safe yield. 
Specifically, the asset management company (with rights to 2,724 acre-feet of water for 
100-years) lies beyond the reach of the GMA and any requirements towards safe yield. 
The following example illustrates this disadvantage: ADWR in 2013 proposed ways of 
                                                        
17 This water is currently stored underground and supposedly helping in reaching safe yield but was also 
recharged for credit, which is why it can be later withdrawn through pumping not as groundwater but as 
effluent. 
 
18 CAWS is the Certificate of Assured Water Supply issued by ADWR to non-designated municipal water 
providers, private water providers, or developers that are adjudged to be able to provide 100-years water 
supply.  
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increasing water that actually go towards safe yield through the existing ‘recharge and 
recovery’ program by creating a staggered requirement between 0% to 20%, such that 
cuts to the aquifer are lower, based on how close recovery wells are to recharge facilities. 
This proposal was partly to encourage credit holders to recover their water closer to the 
point of recharge while potentially benefitting the aquifer at the same time. Many 
governance actors, including Prescott Valley, resisted this move. A key objection of the 
town was the impact of any policy changes on their contract with Water Property 
Investments. 
In the Strategic Vision developed by ADWR at the request of Governor Brewer, 
ADWR suggested the following ways for ensuring water for future demand in the Verde 
Planning Area: resolution of water rights claims, watershed management, weather 
modification, reclaimed water reuse, enhanced stormwater recharge and water 
importation (temporarily from Harquahala INA or desalinated water from the Pacific 
Ocean on a long-term basis19). These supply augmentation options feature prominently in 
ADWR’s recommendations, arguably due to its execution of the GMA’s stipulations.  
Water importation from either Harquahala INA or the Pacific Ocean (which were 
popular options during Bolin et al.’s (2008) study) are options that Prescott AMA 
municipalities could not afford financially. Arizona’s large water projects have 
historically been funded mainly by the federal government. For instance, the first project 
authorized under the federal government’s 1902 Reclamation Act was the Theodore 
Roosevelt Dam, which was initially valued at $13 million in 1915 but bargained to a 
$10,279,191 repayment amount between the Bureau of Reclamation and Salt River 
                                                        
19 I discuss the problems with the AMA’s emphasis on supply augmentation in Chapter 5. 
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Valley Water Users' Association (Autobee, 2011). Moreover, in the late twentieth 
century, CAP cost approximately $4 billion to construct and delivers an average of 1.5 
million acre-feet of water/year. Arizona’s repayment share of the construction cost was 
hinged at $1.65 billion over a 50-year period starting 1993 (Central Arizona Project, 
2016b). The Yuma Desalination plant for agricultural wastewater that was completed in 
1993, sponsored by federal tax dollars, cost approximately $245 million dollars to build. 
The plant has a capacity to treat agricultural runoff from the Wellton-Mohawk Irrigation 
and Drainage District before delivery to Mexico. This water delivery was to fulfill the US 
government’s obligation to deliver 1.5 million acre-feet of Colorado River water to 
Mexico (Central Arizona Project, 2016a).  
Due to higher costs of desalting the runoff and relatively normal Colorado River 
supplies in the early 1990s, Mexico’s obligation was fulfilled with water from Lake Mead 
rather than the desalination plant (Ferris, 2014; United States Bureau of Reclamation, 
2015). The San Diego desalination plant completed in 2016 cost approximately $922 
million despite its proximity to the Ocean and power generating plant (Water 
Technology, 2017). Due to distance and other operational logistics, water importation 
from Harquahala INA and desalinated water from the Pacific Ocean are options that 
Prescott AMA municipalities would likely not be able to finance without external funds. 
Non-government actors interviewed in this study showed high skepticism for successful 
desalinated water imports, while government actors showed high optimism. For example: 
… they talk about desalination plants in Mexico and California, but the citizens of 
Yavapai county could never afford even if that happened. Could never afford the 
pipeline from the Pacific coast to Yavapai County. It’s not a reasonable prospect. 
(VRBP, June 2015) 
When I first heard of desalinization, I thought, “you got to be kidding me.” You 
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know, talk about expensive water, that makes CAP water look like a joke. But we 
don't have to do the transportation of it… we would help fund the D-sal plants and 
provide the power because they use a lot of power. We would provide the power 
and then as they [California] got water from the D-sal plants for their cities, we 
would get their water allotment off of the Colorado River. That way you don't 
have the transportation cost and that's still gaining along. (Chino Valley, March 
2016) 
The temporary option of water importation from Harquahala INA that is proposed by 
ADWR is currently not on the radar of local communities like the BCWR, though with a 
price tag of over $175 million, it is the cheapest water augmentation option currently 
available to Prescott AMA communities. 
Recently, rainwater harvesting gained interest in Prescott AMA as a means for 
increasing water supplies. A coalition of governments in the region estimate that 
capturing 1% of precipitation within the AMA would contribute about 4,500 acre-feet of 
water per year. This harvested water is expected to reduce the region’s estimated annual 
overdraft of 11,00 acre-feet/year by more than a third (Upper Verde River Watershed 
Protection Coalition, 2010). One way to formalize rainwater as a water source is through 
legislative action. Thus, in 2012, Karen Fann – a representative of Prescott (and former 
mayor of Chino Valley), sponsored HB-2363, which approved a joint legislative study 
committee on macro-harvested water. If successful, macro-harvested water was to allow 
Prescott AMA governance actors to augment the region’s water supply through rainwater 
harvesting − an increase that AMA actors argued would help the region attain safe yield. 
The bill was passed by the state’s legislature and signed by the governor in 2012. 
However, the committee designated to study the potentials of rainwater as a new legal 
water source filed an empty report arguably due to concerns about SRP’s downstream 
surface water rights. 
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Whether proponents acknowledge it or not, under Arizona’s existing rules supply, 
development increases water demand. Historical data from Phoenix, Pinal, and Tucson 
show that between 1995-2010, increased supplies of CAP water allowed demand to 
increase without substantially reducing groundwater dependence. The other challenge 
with non-renewable supplies is that if there is ever a shortage or inability to export water 
from Big Chino (due to growth in that area), demand on Prescott AMA aquifers would 
have increased by 8,067.4 acre-feet per year. 
Prescott AMA does not need 8,067.4 acre-feet/year for 100 years (or 806,740 
acre-feet) of Big Chino water given that they still have 3,527 registered plats that are yet 
to be built out and which would (unsustainably) be allocated overdrafted groundwater. 
Prescott Valley also has 2,724 acre-feet/year for 100 years (or 272,400 acre-feet) of water 
from effluents to allocate to new residents. However, CAP availability to Phoenix metro 
and Prescott wanting to receive its share appears to be part of the conundrum driving 
cries for water importation. In the next chapter, I offer recommendations to deal with this 
conundrum. 
Citizen Power, Growth Narratives, and Libertarianism. Although state level 
actors, especially the state’s legislators, exercise a lot of power over water resources, 
citizens have also exercised power that has either contributed to water sustainability in 
the region or been detrimental. Specifically, three narratives driving local and regional 
water governance activities involving residents are growth, libertarian, and sustainability 
narratives. In this sub-section, I discuss how the resources (monetary, artefactual, natural, 
mental) available to residents influence the power they exercise and how different 
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narratives (growth, libertarianism, sustainability) influence water governance activities 
that affect the AMA’s water sustainability. 
Citizens Water Advocacy Group (CWAG). One of the ways in which CWAG is 
involved in water sustainability discussions is by participating in GUAC meetings, which 
are a forum for conversations between GUAC members, the public, and ADWR. In 2012, 
CWAG provided comments to ADWR ahead of the drafting of the AMA’s Fourth 
Management Plan. Among its comments, CWAG suggested public education on safe 
yield, increasing effluent cuts to the aquifer, among others as ways of ensuring that safe 
yield is achieved. Specifically, one of the group’s suggestions was for ADWR to use 
existing authorities and request new authorities as needed to minimize the effects of 
exempt wells on the aquifer, as well as to ensure the accomplishment of safe yield by 
2025.  
CWAG uses editorials, letters, and similar communication channels in addition to 
GUAC meeting attendance to communicate with ADWR, municipal governments, and 
AMA residents. Through these communication mediums, CWAG advocates that the 
municipalities develop actionable steps in achieving safe yield. Another subject the group 
has been vocal about is mitigating the impacts of BCWR pumping on the Verde River 
and calling parties to actively protect the river’s flows. Regarding the goal of safe yield, 
the group has criticized municipal governments for inaction despite the reports of two 
separate regional safe yield workgroups that recommended establishing a water 
conservation/replenishment district that comprises of all water users in the AMA. In 
terms of the group’s particular conservation efforts, CWAG, along with its partners, 
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installed a rainwater harvesting system at a downtown Prescott location in 2015 to 
sensitize residents on the use and benefits of rainwater harvesting. 
CWAG is funded by member dues. This state of financial independence gives 
CWAG full control of its advocacy agenda. CWAG programs include monthly meetings 
with local or invited speakers, community outreaches, and participation at events 
organized by order groups to educate citizens on the region’s water issues. As a non-
profit, CWAG’s organizational structure does not allow it to lobby. However, many 
CWAG members are residents of Prescott and can influence water discussions in their 
neighborhoods. 
Prescott. In 2005, a group of residents concerned about the region’s safe yield 
goal worked together to develop the Reasonable Growth Initiative (Prop 400) which 
requires that effluents from the City’s annexed development of 250 acres or more be used 
for permanent recharge as opposed to the current system of recharge and recovery, which 
does not benefit the region’s safe yield goal. The initiative was successfully passed and 
represents an example of citizen power wielded through the political process. 
In 2009, residents pushed for a Taxpayer Protection Initiative (Prop 401) which 
requires a public vote for municipal project expenditures over $40 million. Proponents of 
the initiative pointed to the Big Chino Water Ranch (BCWR) as a major incentive for the 
proposal. At that time, the BCWR project was estimated to cost around $175 million, 
with Prescott’s share of the bill going well over $40 million. The initiative was approved 
by voters in the November 2009 elections. However, since then, ambiguities have been 
pointed out in the initiative that possibly make it inapplicable to the BCWR project. One 
criticism is the lack of a ‘retroactivity provision’. Specifically, opponents argue that the 
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2009 initiative cannot retroactively apply to the BCWR because the ranch was bought in 
2004. However, there is still a possibility that Prop 401 would be relevant in future 
discussion regarding BCWR. 
Chino Valley. Chino Valley government sees growth as inevitable, and many 
Chino Valley residents would like the town to grow economically but want to retain 
individual control of water resources. More than 50% of housing units in Chino Valley 
have an exempt well (approximately 1642 wells), making up 23.6% of exempt wells in 
the AMA (Collins and Bolin, 2007). In 2014, Chino Valley residents voted down the 
development of its water system, which could have encouraged or mandated residents to 
abandon exempt wells and connect to the municipal water system. Thus, through 
combined citizen action and despite their support of growth, residents resisted any 
interference to the continuous usage of exempt wells.  
Even though most government actors in the town agree that conservation, water 
and sewer system expansion, and increased recharge (from rain, stormwater, or treated 
wastewater) are ways through which the town could contribute to safe yield; residents 
have only supported strategies in line with the prevalent water sustainability narrative of 
maintaining individual control of water. Efforts to control exempt well proliferation have 
been strongly opposed by residents, as was the case in 2009 when the town’s water 
manager proposed a ‘water sustainability and conservation code’.  
One of the points contested in the proposed ordinance was paragraph B-5 in 
section 60.07 (Town of Chino Valley, 2010, p. 13), which would prohibit new multi-
family residential developments from using potable water from the town’s supply or an 
existing well for irrigation. These new residences would also be prohibited from drilling 
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new exempt wells if located in the town’s water service area. Overall, the ordinance 
would require most new developments to connect to the town’s water supply rather than 
drill new exempt wells, and encouraged existing residences to connect to the town’s 
supply. Also, recurring within the proposed ordinance, and sometimes phrased differently 
but with similar intent, was the statement that “as a condition of Town water service no 
new wells may be drilled upon property being served. Any existing well(s) that were 
providing water supplies prior to the connection shall be allowed in accordance with 
ADWR well usage rules” (Town of Chino Valley, 2010, p. 15). Opponents of the 
ordinance found fault with this language that prohibits the drilling of new wells within 
the town’s service area. Another argument against the ordinance was that it deprived 
landowners of their statutory rights. State statutes within the AMA allow landowners to 
drill up to two exempt wells on their property, but the proposed ordinance would take 
away that right. Even though proponents maintained that the ordinance would protect 
exempt well owners by ensuring there was water in their wells, the ordinance was 
permanently tabled and arguably cost the incumbent mayor re-election. In this instance, 
power was exercised through political process. 
Those who opposed the ordinance further argued that exempt wells do not hinder 
safe yield; instead, maintaining the status quo protects an individual’s control over water, 
and keeps water costs down. An interviewee stated the following: 
The big cry among the political folks is it’s these darn water wells that's 
the problem. We will know that's not the problem because if you are using 
municipal water and take a fifteen-minute shower or you are using a well 
and taking a fifteen-minute shower, it is the same amount of water out of 
the aquifer. A lot of that is the ability to control the water… if I have my 
private well, number one, the city cannot shut my water off, which is very 
important. So, it is a freedom issue. Number two, my cost of living is 
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much lower. I don’t have to pay for all the infrastructure that’s required − 
the pumps and the tanks and all that − because I have my own well pump. 
(Exempt well owner, March 2016) 
However, citizen action in this case, though successful, actually increases the 
vulnerability of exempt well owners to water scarcity due to drawdown resulting from 
increased density of exempt wells in the municipality (Collins and Bolin, 2007; Table 7). 
Table 7.  
Exempt wells and estimated drawdown in Prescott AMA municipalities 
Municipality Housing Units 
% Housing units 
with Exempt wells  
Estimated annual 
exempt well 
drawdown* (acre-
feet) 
Prescott 17,431 3.2 184 
Chino Valley 3,251 50.5 821 
Prescott Valley 9,481 0.3 12 
Dewey-Humboldt 3,400 82.3 1,399 
Source: Collins and Bolin (2007) 
*ADWR estimates exempt well water use at 0.5 acre-feet/year in basin-fill areas and 0.33 
acre-feet/year in hard rock areas (Arizona Department of Water Resources, 2005). 
Prescott Valley. Similar to government actors in Prescott, Prescott Valley’s 
government views water sustainability as having water for current population as well as 
anticipated population and economic growth. However, unlike Prescott, Prescott Valley 
requires new residents to pay a one-time fee for each new home built to cover water 
capacity and water resource acquisition costs. As of 2011, this fee was $1,526. The main 
water acquisition project to be funded by this fee is BCWR. In effect, water from BCWR 
has been crucial to support new residents from at least 1999 when the AMA was declared 
out of safe yield. Given the claim that water from BCWR is required to take the AMA to 
safe yield and the knowledge that it is also meant to serve growth, the town has stated on 
its website that effluents from using BCWR is what would be used to achieve safe yield 
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(Town of Prescott Valley, n.d.b, p. 1). However, this strategy is questionable if the town 
would eventually receive credits to withdraw that water for future growth.   
Meanwhile, Prescott Valley officials and staff often claim that BCWR is needed 
to achieve safe yield when, in fact, they plan to use BCWR water to support the Town’s 
new population. The Town’s government actors influence resident perception by 
presenting often-misleading information about the region’s water resources. The Town 
Mayor’s an announcement published in a regional paper stated the following:  
Prescott Valley needs to reach safe-yield by 2025… However, all of the current 
sources of recharge put together (including the reclaimed water Prescott Valley 
will produce in the near term) are inadequate to reach safe-yield. In fact, the 
Arizona Department of Water Resources (ADWR) concluded some time ago that 
Yavapai County can't reach safe-yield without importing water from other 
areas… The project will be expensive; perhaps the most expensive public works 
project either community [Prescott and Prescott Valley] has undertaken. But it 
mutually ensures our long-term future and is our best chance to meet safe-yield. 
(Skoog, 2006, p. 1)  
In the above statement, the Prescott Valley Mayor suggests that BCWR will bring 
Prescott Valley and Yavapai County into safe yield. However, BCWR is within Yavapai 
County, and this attempt to legitimize the project by incorrectly invoking ADWR and the 
vertical scale of the County is misleading. Official documents submitted by the City of 
Prescott and approved by ADWR show that the 8,067.4 acre-feet/year (for 100 years, or 
806,740 acre-feet) of imported Big Chino water will serve expected new demand in 
Prescott and Prescott Valley. Overall, the information being communicated by Prescott 
Valley officials and staff lead to a misinformed public who are unaware of the true state 
of the region’s water resources and complacent in their water governance participation.  
In Bolin et al.’s (2008) study, the municipal official interviewed argued that new 
residents were needed (who would pay for BCWR) to achieve safe yield. Meanwhile, 
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during this study, municipal interviewees expressed optimism about reaching safe yield, 
but noted that this required Big Chino water; the comparative quotes below illustrate this: 
So, what we have to do is import more water to get us to safe-yield. So, it is a 
simple concept. And would all these people that now live in the Town of Prescott 
Valley or the City of Prescott go ahead and be willing to pay a great deal of 
money to...reach safe-yield all by itself [via the BCP]? The answer is no. Okay? 
So, what you do is put it on the backs of new people that are going to come and 
they build the appropriate infrastructure and then they use the water, they dedicate 
the water that they recover from their use [effluent reuse] and add it to safe-yield. 
It is very simple. But it means that we have to build more houses. (quoted in Bolin 
et al., 2008, p. 1504). 
The steps to reach that [safe yield] are that we have to bring in the Big Chino 
water. That’s the primary source to reach safe yield and to do that we have to 
complete the various steps that are outlined in that Comprehensive Agreement 
Number One with SRP. (Municipal staff, June 2015) 
Generally, the town uses various communication outlets in assuring the public of 
long-term water availability and progress towards safe yield despite the actual water 
demand-supply (im)balance in the region. Through its publications, Prescott Valley 
government projects an image of ‘we have adequate water resources for the future’. One 
such messaging culled from their website is quoted below: 
 A huge body of water is less than 500 feet of you just about anywhere you go  
in Prescott Valley. Beneath the ground is an aquifer that contains enough  
water to last hundreds of years at the current level of use. The current rate of  
use (2014) is about 0.2% of the volume in storage per year. However, the  
Town of Prescott Valley and other water users are working hard to reduce this  
overall use to zero – a level that means the aquifer will be sustainable for an  
indefinite time (Town of Prescott Valley, n.d.b, p.1) 
The above statement presents a vision of water supplies that ignores the region’s 
increasing overdraft. Bolin et al. (2008) suggested that the Little Chino basin at current 
and projected use rates had, at the time of their writing, about 130 years of water. 
However, scientific data on the Upper Agua Fria basin – where Prescott Valley is located 
– are limited. Despite the numbers and amount of stored water that scientific studies 
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provide, sustainable water governance requires maintaining a measure of groundwater 
underground and not exhausting aquifer storage. Maintaining groundwater underground 
is important to prevent land subsidence, ground fissures, and resulting economic losses 
resulting from long-term increased overdraft. 
Even though one interviewee from Prescott Valley complained that residents are 
not interested in water resources, the foregoing suggest that this is most likely a false 
notion since the public will not participate in water governance when they are given an 
impression that ‘everything is alright’. Whitmire (2013) notes that progress is not made in 
resolving Yavapai County water conflicts because residents are either uninformed or 
misinformed. The foregoing illustrates how misinformation prevents citizen involvement 
in the region’s water governance. 
Dewey-Humboldt. Dewey-Humboldt, comprised of two previously 
unincorporated communities, incorporated in 2004. Historically, Dewey was an 
agricultural community while Humboldt was a mining community. One of the reasons 
given for the town’s incorporation was to avoid absorption into Prescott Valley through 
the latter’s annexation (Town of Dewey-Humboldt, n.d). Residents of Dewey and 
Humboldt did not want urbanization, and incorporating both communities into one 
provided a means to retain the town’s rural character.  
However, in recent times, only 1.5% of the town’s workforce are employed by 
agriculture, forestry, fishing, hunting, and mining. Construction, retail/wholesale trade, 
manufacturing, finance, insurance and real estate employs 40%; education, healthcare 
and social assistance employs 27.4%; and service industries employ the rest of the 
workforce (Arizona Commerce Authority, 2015).  In spite of its goal at incorporation, the 
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town’s ‘Vision 2028’ acknowledges that growth would occur in the municipality but that 
the town desires to maintain its rural character. According to the Vision, the local 
government expects population growth to occur due to the “predicted megalopolis that 
will extend from Prescott to Nogales,” but they know (and expect) that water supply 
would be a limiting factor in the Town’s growth (Town of Dewey Humboldt, 2009, p. 2).  
The prevailing water narrative in the Town is ‘keep them from using our water so 
that we can have adequate water’. The “them” in this instance being the neighboring 
Town of Prescott Valley with whom Dewey-Humboldt shares the Agua Fria sub-basin. 
Dewey-Humboldt is not doing anything specifically towards safe yield. About 80% of 
residents have individual (exempt) wells, while other residents are either served by one of 
two private water companies (Humboldt Water and Wilhoit Water Company) or haul 
water from a standpipe maintained by Wilhoit Water Company. The town itself does not 
have a central water system, and residents do not want one because it would supposedly 
spark growth, which they do not want. An interviewee stated the following:  
The town council are divided, but in general you probably have four 
councilmembers on the council that will tell you that they want to keep it 
the way it is, so they don’t want to encourage growth, which is kind of 
suitable with our situation because we don’t have water or sewer - utility 
services. Where you have that, you invite growth, …and they don’t want 
more growth. (Municipal staff, June 2015)    
Thus, residents would rather keep exempt wells and not have a central water system in 
order to avoid population/economic growth. The following excerpt summarizes the 
town’s position/overall role in the region’s safe yield goal: 
Safe yield to us is more a volunteer. As a town, we don’t really do much to 
promote safe yield, even though everybody knows… everybody has their 
own private well or go to a private company. To us, it’s really not much. 
(Municipal staff, June 2015)   
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This volunteer position is only tenable because the GMA restricts municipal 
contributions towards safe yield to public and private water providers.  
Meanwhile, the water narrative of Dewey Humboldt government and residents is 
generally that low-density development makes more water available (that remain unused) 
and thus supports safe yield. Unlike other AMA municipalities, the town acknowledges 
in its community vision that limited water resources would limit growth but is not making 
any efforts to augment water supply. One could argue, however, that this is because it is 
important to the town to remain rural, and this preference influences the town’s water 
narrative and water governance contributions (or lack thereof) to safe yield.  Even though 
the town sees its low-density residential development as creating a sustainable water 
future within the greater region (Town of Dewey-Humboldt, 2009), this claim is difficult 
to evaluate as there are no records of water use vis-à-vis the people served. 
Similar to Chino Valley, Dewey-Humboldt residents are more vulnerable to water 
scarcity than Prescott and Prescott Valley residents due to their high dependence on 
exempt wells (Table 7). This vulnerability is also impacted by the inadequate capacity of 
residents to address issues of contaminated water supplies, unlike municipal providers 
(Collins and Bolin, 2007). As noted by Bolin et al. (2008), naturally occurring arsenic in 
groundwater is a water quality threat to which groundwater users in the AMA are 
susceptible. In addition, ADWR reports that naturally occurring radon is also a water 
quality threat, especially for dry lots in the region (Arizona Department of Water 
Resources, 2014a). These water quality issues are financially and medically expensive. 
Radon in water can be released into the air, and radon is the second highest cause of lung 
cancer (World Health Organization, 2016). Promoting water sustainability by ensuring 
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residents are not unnecessarily exposed to health hazards would require a better 
understanding by residents of the upsides and downsides of exempt well dependence. 
Regional Water Governance – The Groundwater Users’ Advisory Council. 
As noted in previous sections, the Groundwater Users Advisory Council is a statutory 
five-member council whose members are appointed by the governor and expected to be 
from different sectors within the AMA. By state statutes, GUAC has no independent 
decision-making authority within the region’s water governance, but it appears that such 
is desired among GUAC members, as shown in the excerpt below: 
If you really want to come right down to it, the GUAC was just, in my 
mind, a gesture to give the impression that there’s some public control 
over what goes on in the AMA, but it really doesn’t do much. We didn’t 
have any authority to do anything except make recommendations [to 
ADWR] ... and most of the time they didn’t listen to you easily.  (GUAC, 
March 2016)   
In 2006, Prescott AMA’s GUAC safe yield sub-committee published a report 
titled “Safe-Yield Impediments, Opportunities, and Strategic Directive.” According to the 
report, groundwater in the AMA is legally over-allocated, as groundwater demand was 
estimated to be 24,00 acre-feet/year with an annual overdraft of approximately 11,000 
acre-feet/year (Groundwater Users Advisory Council, 2006). The report concluded that 
voluntary reductions in water demand, participation of exempt well owners in reaching 
safe yield, securing alternate water supplies, and development of enforcement provisions 
were needed to achieve safe yield (Groundwater Users Advisory Council, 2006). This 
report by GUAC has been cited widely in the region and beyond by governance actors, 
including CWAG and ADWR. Part of the recommendations from the report that was 
presented in the Fourth Management Plan developed by ADWR for the AMA is the 
suggestion of a water conservation/replenishment district involving all water users within 
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the AMA. However, most recommendations have not been acted upon despite their 
validity. This state of affairs is due to an absence of political will to act and a lack of 
authority by GUAC to initiate coordination among local level actors. The first 
recommendation made by the report is ‘stakeholder engagement’ alongside highlights of 
GUAC’s lack of statutory authority, as seen in the following excerpt: 
The GUAC, and by extension the Safe-Yield Subcommittee, are limited by statute 
to a role as a local advisor to ADWR on PrAMA issues. As such, the GUAC can 
provide recommendations to the Governor or ADWR, but does not have the legal 
authority to act on many of the recommendations listed in this section. An action 
team comprised of the affected stakeholders may be required to continue with the 
required work on the other recommended next steps and opportunities. The 
stakeholders could then develop a best management strategy, agree to promote or 
implement specific actions and lobby the state legislature if deemed necessary. A 
stakeholder process should include representatives of all affected water users and 
providers in the PrAMA. (Groundwater Users Advisory Council, 2006, p. 11) 
GUAC advises ADWR in the use of the Water Management Assistance Program 
(WMAP) fund. This fund is made up of contributions by groundwater right holders in the 
AMA such as municipal and private company water providers. Exempt well owners do 
not contribute to this fund. The fund was instituted by the GMA to finance water 
conservation and supply augmentation projects within the AMA. Due to having 
municipal water systems, Prescott, Chino Valley, and Prescott Valley are contributors to 
the fund, but Dewey-Humboldt is not. Given this situation, WMAP inadvertently tilts the 
power structure regarding conservation and water augmentation projects away from 
Dewey-Humboldt, thereby expanding the gulf of no direct contribution by Dewey-
Humboldt in decisions on achieving safe yield or more comprehensive sustainable water 
governance. 
In recent years, the Council has not been involved in outreach to its communities, 
but its members typically provide input to ADWR (through the AMA director) during the 
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drafting of AMA’s management plans. According to the GMA, GUAC has an advisory 
role to the AMA director and is not institutionally given authority to do much more. Even 
though there are members that would like to play more active role in the region’s water 
governance, the GMA has no such provisions and inadvertently limits the decision-
making ability of regional water governance actors.  
Prescott AMA’s safe yield management goal - Is Safe Yield a Placeholder? 
One common conclusion drawn by both government and non-government actors in 
Prescott AMA is that, despite being mandated by the Groundwater Management Act 
(GMA), safe yield is simply a goal – a voluntary one, too – not a requirement, as shown 
in the quotes below: 
Citizen involvement is particularly important for this issue [safe yield] because 
achieving safe yield is merely a goal and not a requirement. There are no legal 
penalties. Citizens’ demand for a sustainable water supply is critical. (Citizens 
Water Advocacy Group, 2007, emphasis in original) 
The AGMA [Arizona Groundwater Management Act] defines safe yield as a goal 
and not as a requirement. The ADWR (Arizona Department of Water Resources) 
has confirmed that there are no regulatory penalties for not meeting safe yield. As 
such, the residents of the PrAMA [Prescott AMA] must voluntarily reach safe 
yield or suffer the eventual physical and economic penalties of a depleting 
aquifer. (Upper Verde River Watershed Protection Coalition, 2010, p. 5)  
Consequently, current governance for safe yield is ineffective for the following reasons: 
(1) Insufficient commitment and coordination exists at the local level to 
collectively pursue safe yield;  
(2) State law creates loopholes that circumvent efforts to achieve safe yield, such 
as the unlimited and protected development of unregulated (exempt) wells;  
(3) There are no consequences for not reaching it; and  
(4) The incorporation of non-government actors (such as GUAC) and devolution 
of responsibility to the regional level of governance is not accompanied by 
commensurate authority.  
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In recent times, especially, ADWR's strategy for enforcing stipulations of the GMA has 
been voluntary compliance. One possible explanation for this policy’s focus on voluntary 
compliance could be the reduction in ADWR’s staff strength and capacity since 2008, 
when the state experienced economic downturn. Another possible explanation is that after 
the GMA was enacted but Prescott could not utilize its CAP allocation through exchange, 
state level officials and ADWR realized achieving safe yield in the AMA by 2025 would 
be near impossible and thus have promoted the idea that achieving safe yield is voluntary. 
Alongside this message about safe yield being voluntary is the message about damages 
that would occur if safe yield was not accomplished, in order to galvanize regional actors 
to act. In the AMA’s Fourth Management Plan, the following consequences of non-safe 
yield conditions are identified: 
Groundwater storage capacity is reduced; Future reliability of water supplies is 
less certain; Water levels decline; Wells may require deepening; Water quality 
problems may increase; Wells may go dry; Pumping and drilling costs increase; 
Natural discharge to springs and streams diminish; Land subsidence and earth 
fissuring may occur. (Arizona Department of Water Resources, 2014a)  
So far, expectations of voluntary action by regional and local governance actors in 
achieving safe yield have not resulted in substantial progress towards the goal. 
The argument that imported water would move the AMA out of overdraft to safe 
yield is questionable; water planned for the study area’s safe yield is the same water 
reserved for future growth. One probable approach is for Prescott and Prescott Valley to 
store Big Chino water underground within the AMA in order to move out of overdraft 
status to safe yield if water importation can be started ahead of 2025. Since recovery 
credits are granted for water stored this way, perpetual safe yield would probably not be 
achieved in the AMA; instead, water supplies would simply have been increased to 
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accommodate future growth, while current levels of overdraft would continue with the 
potential to increase if there are any reductions in the amount of Big Chino water 
available for importation. 
The arid geo-climate, ongoing drought (now in its twenty-third year), and effects 
of global climate change on Arizona as a whole and Prescott AMA in particular make it 
imperative for the study region to re-examine and change its current ways of governing 
water. As the foregoing paragraph shows, sustainable water governance is needed before 
water augmentation is considered, not the pursuit of water augmentation to achieve 
sustainable water governance. Generally, sunbelt states have experienced increasing 
periods of droughts and reductions in annual precipitation, both of which are attributed to 
the effects of a warming climate (Bates et al., 2008). Meanwhile, climate projections 
suggest that annual precipitation may continue to decrease in the Sunbelt region until 
2100 (Bates et al., 2008). Given the predicted climate variability and change, both surface 
water and groundwater storages across the western United States are dwindling rapidly, 
thereby making dependence on imported water an unreliable option. 
There seems to be an unspoken acknowledgment that safe yield is impossible to 
achieve in Prescott AMA, with or without imported water. However, this knowledge is 
not acknowledged verbally by most governance (especially government) actors in the 
region. Instead, it appears that an emphasis on ‘attempts’20 in the statutory definition of 
safe yield is how the GMA and safe yield’s success will be adjudged in Prescott AMA 
(see Jacobs and Megdal (2004) for more on this argument regarding all safe yield 
                                                        
20 Safe yield is a “groundwater management goal which attempts to achieve and thereafter maintain a long-
term balance between the annual amount of groundwater withdrawn in an active management area and the 
annual amount of natural and artificial groundwater recharge in the active management area” (Groundwater 
Management Act, 1980, p. 1437, emphasis mine). 
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AMAs). According to an ADWR staff member, the GMA requires a date on or before 
January 1, 2025, when safe yield is declared accomplished, even if it is only for that 
snapshot in history (Anonymous, personal communication, 2017). 
 Overall, the GMA’s emphasis on water conservation and supply augmentation for 
selected parts of the state does not promote comprehensive water sustainability and is a 
major barrier in the study area achieving sustainable water governance. Specifically, 
governance actors across levels have focused on water conservation (for all water users 
except exempt well owners) and supply augmentation as the strategies for achieving safe 
yield. Given the region’s high overdraft, conservation is inadequate. Meanwhile, the 
AMA’s source of supply augmentation is non-renewable groundwater, which is 
earmarked for growth (as earlier noted). Thus, the guiding policy for water governance in 
the AMA, the Groundwater Management Act, is insufficient as a tool for moving the 
AMA towards sustainable water governance. 
 Given this chapter’s results, the GMA’s application in Prescott AMA provides an 
appearance of water stewardship while being incapable of accomplishing a sustainable 
balance between water demand and supplies. This ineffectiveness is due to a watering 
down and lack of enforcement for positive water management strategies (Hirt et al., 
2008). Thus, Arizona’s GMA and related water management strategies are ineffective in 
ensuring Prescott AMA’s water sustainability.  
Summary. Regarding the study area’s water resources, power is exercised by 
both government and non-government actors across state, regional, and local levels 
through litigation, legislation, and the political process. Deliberation among parties 
usually occurs after litigation regarding current water issues. For example, SRP issued a 
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legal challenge to Prescott and Prescott Valley, aimed at protecting SRP’s Verde River 
water rights, before the parties pursued deliberation. Interviewees suggested that in 
Arizona’s water politics, disagreements or grievances are often first taken to the courts 
before other avenues of relief are sought.  
Yet my triangulation of interview data with documents reveal that litigation is not 
always the first step in resolving conflict. Instead, governance actors pursue whatever 
means (litigation or the legislative or other political processes) that gives them the most 
advantage based on the resources (legal, financial, etc.) available to them. For instance, 
municipalities will not pursue litigation if it is possible to obtain relief through legislative 
intervention such as ARS 45-555, which was passed to allow Prescott’s import of 
groundwater from the Big Chino basin. Also, governance actors generally pursue 
litigation first if they can financially afford the process and foresee good chances of 
obtaining a ruling in their favor.  
Political processes at the local level—including electing government offices, 
preventing the establishment of municipal rules, or establishing municipal rules—have 
been used to avoid regulations on exempt wells and to enhance groundwater recharge 
with the use of effluent. Overall, this study shows that the different actors connected to 
Prescott AMA’s water governance exercise power through litigation, legislation, or the 
political process based on the options most accessible to them (Table 8). However, the 
preference for litigation (based on the conditions identified) over deliberations is 
problematic given the inefficiency of litigation in resolving natural resource conflicts.   
Furthermore, mobilization of resources and the exercise of power in the study 
area’s water governance is guided by diverse water narratives. These narratives are either 
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growth related, libertarian, or sustainability-focused. These growth, libertarian, and 
sustainability water narratives determine the goals of actors or their anticipated outcome 
in mobilizing resources. For instance, growth-focused governance actors have pursued 
water augmentation through legislative intervention that allows the importation of water 
from the Big Chino basin into Prescott AMA. Also, governance actors with libertarian 
values have opposed potential exempt well regulations resulting from municipal codes 
through the political process of voting for a mayor that supported zero regulation of 
exempt wells. Finally, sustainability-focused governance actors used the political process 
to pass local-level initiatives that would require the permanent recharge of treated 
effluent from subdivisions with 250 or more acres. 
Mental, artefactual, natural, and monetary resources have been mobilized by both 
government and non-government actors across state, regional, and local levels in 
promoting each of these diverse water narratives (Table 8). For example, coordination 
exists in how power is exercised by governance actors across levels, specifically with 
respect to water augmentation. In this example, coordination occurs because state, 
regional, and local level actors desire economic growth and view augmented water 
supplies as essential to maintaining local to state level economic growth. To further this 
growth goal, government actors across levels present safe yield as the reason for water 
augmentation even though imported water supplies will not help the region reach safe 
yield or achieve water sustainability. Overall, the diverse water narratives of governance 
actors serve to satisfy their different goals but are barriers to sustainable water 
governance in the region due to the emphasis of growth and libertarian proponents on 
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water augmentation and zero water management. These management emphases result in 
asymmetric water governing practices where minimal demand management is enforced. 
Table 8.  
Water Narratives and Power in Prescott AMA’s Water Governance 
Water 
Narrative 
Actors Means of 
Exercising 
Power 
Form of 
Power/Resources 
Mobilized 
Outcome 
New water to 
support 
growth – 
Growth 
Narrative 
Municipality 
(Prescott and 
Prescott 
Valley); state 
government 
(legislators 
and governor) 
Legislation 
(using 
structural 
power) 
Innovative 
Power/ human, 
mental, natural, 
monetary 
resources  
Exemption 
authorizing 
transportation of 
groundwater from 
Big Chino into 
Prescott AMA 
passed by state 
legislature  
Maintaining 
individual 
control of 
water – 
Libertarian 
Narrative 
 
Individuals 
(Chino Valley 
residents) 
Political 
process 
Destructive 
Power/ human, 
mental, natural, 
monetary 
resources 
Ensuring that 
Chino Valley 
exempt wells 
remain 
unregulated and 
unrestricted 
Achieving 
safe yield and 
maintaining 
surface water 
flows – 
Sustainability 
Narrative 
Individuals 
(Prescott 
residents) 
 
Political 
process 
 
Innovative 
Power/ human, 
mental, natural, 
monetary 
resources 
Use of 250+ acre 
new development 
effluent for 
permanent 
recharge in 
Prescott 
(Reasonable 
Growth Initiative, 
Prop 400) and 
failed attempt to 
ensure Prescott 
residents’ approval 
before upcoming 
BCWR 
expenditures 
despite passed 
Initiative 
(Taxpayer 
Protection 
Initiative, Prop 
401) 
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Civil society 
(Center for 
Biological 
Diversity 
noted by 
Bolin et al. 
(2008)) 
Litigation 
(using 
federal law) 
Reinforcive 
Power/ human, 
mental, natural, 
monetary 
resources 
Provides legal 
opposition to 
BCWR pumping 
and water 
importation by 
Prescott and 
Prescott Valley 
using the 
Endangered 
Species Act of 
1973 
 
Out of the three narratives (growth, libertarian, and sustainability), the more 
powerful narrative is a function of the power of its proponents. Similar to Whitmire 
(2013), I found that state level actors (comprising legislators, judiciary, and the governor) 
exercise the most power in Prescott AMA and the Central Highland’s water governance. 
This is because, as a result of the authority constitutionally vested in their offices, these 
actors are able to mobilize artefactual, mental, monetary, and natural resources. Because 
the state is the most powerful actor in the region’s water governance, the narrative they 
support is inevitably the most powerful narrative in the region.   
Although all actors exercise a measure of power, not all actors are equally 
powerful (Table 9). In my case study, non-government actors exercised the least power in 
water governance due to their limited ability to mobilize different resources. Also, due to 
their institutional structure, non-government actors (both organizations and residents) are 
unable to exercise different forms of power (innovative, reinforcive, transformative, 
destructive) simultaneously (Table 9). For instance, CWAG, an active non-government 
actor in the study area, is classified as a 501(c)(3) organization by the Internal Revenue 
Service (IRS). Due to this classification, organization members are limited in the political 
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and legislative (including lobbying) activities the organization can be involved in 
(Internal Revenue Service, 2017). Overall, non-government organizations are engaged in 
regional water governance to the extent of their capacity but are limited in collaboration 
with government actors due to unresolved debates, for example, over growth.  
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Table 9.  
Forms of power exercised, and resources mobilized by actors linked to Prescott AMA’s 
water governance 
Levels Governance 
Actors 
Form of Power Resources Mobilized 
State Governor, 
legislators, 
judiciary 
Innovative power 
Reinforcive power 
Transformative 
power 
Destructive power 
Artefactual, Mental, Monetary, 
Natural resources 
Artefactual, Mental, Monetary, 
Natural resources 
Artefactual, Mental, Monetary, 
Natural resources 
Artefactual, Mental, Monetary, 
Natural resources  
 
ADWR Innovative power 
Reinforcive power 
Transformative 
power 
 
Mental resources 
Mental resources 
Mental resources 
Regional Prescott 
AMA GUAC 
Innovative power 
Transformative 
power 
 
Mental resources 
Mental resources 
CWAG Innovative power 
Reinforcive power 
Transformative 
power 
 
Mental, Monetary resources 
Mental, Monetary resources 
Mental, Monetary resources   
Local Municipal 
government 
and staff 
 
Innovative power 
Reinforcive power 
Transformative 
power 
 
Artefactual, Mental, Monetary 
resources 
Artefactual, Mental, Monetary 
resources 
Artefactual, Mental, Monetary 
resources 
 
 Residents Innovative power 
Destructive power 
Artefactual, Mental, Monetary 
resources 
Mental, Natural resources 
ADWR: Arizona Department of Water Resources 
GUAC: Groundwater Users Advisory Council 
CWAG: Citizens Water Advocacy Group 
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Conclusion 
In this chapter, I presented results to the three research questions posed in Chapter 
1. Regarding question one, this research shows that the majority of the avenues for 
interaction across levels are either mandated by the GMA or are a result of ADWR’s 
interpretation of the GMA. Interactions between the state and regional levels are mostly 
informational, with actors at both levels obtaining and transmitting information. With 
these informational interactions, safe yield is supposedly pursued through conservation 
and proposed water augmentation. Interactions between regional non-government actors 
and local level actors (for example, between CWAG and the municipalities) are mostly 
contentious. This contentious relationship possibly contributes to the ongoing conflicts in 
the study area.  Finally, interaction between the state and local level actors, regarding 
water governance and sustainability, revolve around water permitting and reporting. 
For the second research question, the municipalities had potential to collaborate 
around shared interest goals, but safe yield is not a shared interest goal among all 
municipalities in the AMA. Instead, there is a lack of cooperation in pursuing safe yield 
and sustainable water governance due to shared groundwater.  Cooperation currently 
exists between Prescott and Prescott Valley around their joint water importation. 
However, contentious interactions exist bilaterally between municipalities that share the 
same groundwater basin on issues of intra-basin transfers, the state’s framework for 
recharge and recovery, exempt wells, and disputes on the relationship between growth 
visions and the region’s water sustainability.  
The third research question reveals that governance actors exercise power through 
litigation, legislation, and the political process. Furthermore, any of these three means of 
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exercising power are employed by governance actors irrespective of their water 
narratives – whether libertarian, growth, or sustainability-focused. I found that 
coordinated resource mobilization exists among governance actors across levels with 
respect to water augmentation.  
In the next chapter (Chapter 5), I elaborate on the findings of this research in 
relation to water governance literature. I also make recommendations for water 
governance interactions and resource mobilization that support water sustainability. 
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CHAPTER 5 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
This chapter is divided into four parts. In the first part, I discuss the findings of 
this research and my contributions to water governance literature under the following 
headings: governance interactions and implications for water sustainability, power and 
ideological divides among governance actors, and revisiting the conceptual framework. 
Second, I highlight areas for future research. Third, I provide a summary of 
recommendations for Prescott AMA’s water governance. Finally, I offer concluding 
thoughts on the conditions for and barriers to water sustainability within specially 
instituted water governance structures where conflict persists among governance actors.  
 
Discussion of Findings 
Governance interactions and implications for water sustainability. In this 
study, vertical governance interactions were either informational, contentious, or 
administrative, and occurred because of both the stipulations and interpretations of 
Arizona’s Groundwater Management Act (GMA). Informational interactions revolved 
around the Groundwater Users Advisory Council’s (GUAC) meetings, 10-year 
management plans, Water Management Assistance Program (WMAP) funds, and 
Arizona Department of Water Resources’ (ADWR) expertise. Although actors in Prescott 
AMA interact in these ways to share information, safe yield and sustainable water 
governance are not being achieved because informational interactions are aimed at 
providing water for new growth, rather than promoting a balanced demand-supply water 
management approach. In other words, state mandates have led to governance 
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interactions among actors across local to state levels, but these interactions have not been 
productive in meeting the regional goal of safe yield or sustainable water governance 
otherwise.  
The informational interactions in the study area are not contentious. Instead, 
contentious interactions are due to disagreements on how growth should occur with 
respect to the region’s limited renewable water. Particularly, I found that disappointing 
past experiences that were never addressed, and the tendency to attack the messenger 
rather than debate the message, were key elements that eroded trust and the ability of 
governance actors to work together in reducing the region’s overdraft. For instance, 
undeliberated disagreements on growth currently limit the collaboration of both 
government and non-government actors in the region on conservation activities. In other 
words, debates about whether or not the region should grow currently limit the ability of 
regional non-government actors and municipalities to work together in establishing 
regional sustainable water governance.  
 Whereas Sayles and Baggio (2017) show that funded relationships can be more 
productive than mandated ones, this research suggests that decision-making authority is 
important to members in funded relationships and influences their perception of the 
relationship’s productivity. With respect to governance interactions, I found that 
perceptions of low productivity by GUAC members were influenced by how much 
authority for decision making the members possess. Specifically, unlike county Board of 
Supervisors or municipal council members, GUAC has no statutory authority to make 
and enforce rules. Instead, the GUAC’s statutory responsibility is limited to advising 
ADWR’s director through the AMA director, while ADWR decides, for example, on 
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what projects are funded with WMAP funds. The effect of GUAC’s lack of authority is 
seen in the council’s inability to implement its recommendations for pursuing safe yield 
at the Active Management Area (AMA) level (Groundwater Users Advisory Council, 
2006). Thus, GUAC’s lack of decision-making authority undermines sustainable water 
governance in Prescott AMA. 
With respect to horizontal governance, water governance coordination among 
municipalities was influenced by shared interests. However, out of the prevailing 
municipal interests in the study area (economic growth, individual water control, 
remaining rural), only one, economic growth, is shared by two municipalities. Prescott 
and Prescott Valley share economic growth interests and, thus, are collaborating on a 
local water augmentation project that involves groundwater importation from the 
neighboring Big Chino basin. However, as noted by Bolin et al. (2008), this water import 
is a spatial fix that only temporarily resolves the problem of insufficient supplies for one 
place by extracting water from another. If successful, the water importation project could 
trigger water scarcity in the Big Chino area. Overall, the absence of shared interests in 
water sustainability21 means that neither safe yield nor sustainable water governance are 
being collaboratively pursued by the AMA municipalities. I discuss the problems with 
seeking more supplies later in this chapter.  
Meanwhile, contentious interactions between municipalities in the same 
hydrologic basin are due to dissatisfaction over volumes of groundwater withdrawal 
versus recharge, differing urban and rural visions, and the proliferation of exempt wells. 
These issues, also undeliberated, limit cooperative efforts among all four municipalities 
                                                        
21 That is, water sustainability pursuits that maintain the integrity of socio-ecological systems 
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toward regional water sustainability. With respect to local actors, Prescott AMA residents 
generally engaged in water issues to the extent that they perceived its impact on their 
lives. At such points, residents have taken steps to protect water either for their own 
individual control (prompted by libertarian narratives as seen in Chino Valley) or for the 
common good (as seen in sustainability narratives from Prescott residents). It is 
noteworthy that even though libertarian narratives are dominant in Chino Valley and 
‘won’ in contributing to the sitting Mayor’s re-election loss, the municipality has 
residents with sustainability narratives (mostly those affiliated with non-government 
groups such as the Citizens Water Advocacy Group, CWAG). Similarly, in Prescott, 
although sustainability narratives ‘won’ in the passing of Prop 400 and 401 Initiatives 
(which were about effluent recharge and public votes for municipal expenditures above 
$40 million respectively), there are residents with either libertarian or pro-growth 
narratives in the municipality. In any case, within both Chino Valley and Prescott, 
residents have exercised power in the region’s water governance through the political 
process. I discuss these narratives and power further in the next sub-section.  
Given the foregoing, I support Whitmire’s (2013) call for deliberative platforms 
in resolving the Central Highlands’ water conflicts. Based on this study’s focus on water 
sustainability, I argue that deliberative platforms are an important means for fostering the 
sustainable water governance principle of socio-ecological civility and democratic 
governance proposed by Wiek and Larson (2012). Specifically, designing deliberative 
avenues to debate the options for, types of, and extent of growth could help bridge the 
current divide that exists between government and non-government actors in Prescott 
AMA to foster joint pursuits of water sustainability. This could involve shifting dialog 
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away from whether to pursue population growth or not and toward a more productive 
dialogue that stresses how to ensure the region thrives economically and otherwise. In the 
recommendation section below, I offer ideas for promoting collaboration between 
government and non-government actors. 
The GUAC could serve as a platform for this deliberative forum, but it would 
mean including actors such as environmental organizations22 who are not formally 
included on the current council. Changing the mode through which representatives are 
appointed to the GUAC, and providing the Council with decision-making authority23, are 
other important requirements for transforming the GUAC into a platform where 
conflicting interests can be deliberated with a view of developing a collaborative 
approach to regional water governance. I recommend modifying the GUAC rather than 
creating a different governance entity for two reasons. First, the current GUAC structure 
is weak in terms of its lack of authority and has limited effectiveness as a mid-level 
governance entity (between state and local governance actors). Second, mostly the same 
individuals are involved in water governance within the Central Highlands. Thus, it is 
better to restructure the current council rather than create a new council with a different 
name but the same people. For a newly constituted GUAC to be effective, sufficient 
access to financial resources would be essential. In the recommendation section, I further 
discuss these suggested changes to the GUAC’s structure. 
                                                        
22 Megdal et al. (2011) argues that the environment is a water user that is not currently recognized in 
Arizona. Since the GUAC is a council of water users and the environment is a water user, it is imperative 
that the environment is represented on a restructured GUAC. 
 
23 This would mean changing the GUAC’s structure from an advisory council to a different governance 
structure with decision-making authority. 
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Power and ideological divides among governance actors. Drawing on Avelino 
and Rotmans’ (2011) conceptualization of power, I define power as the mobilization of 
mental, monetary, artefactual, and natural resources by actors to achieve a goal. My 
approach is distinct in that I focus on mobilization, as opposed to the ‘capacity’ to 
mobilize resources (Avelino and Rotmans 2011). I focus on the actual mobilization of 
resources by governance actors to better understand how power has been and is being 
exercised in Prescott AMA’s water governance. In this section, I discuss resource 
mobilization by state, regional, and local actors, and the implications for Prescott AMA’s 
water sustainability. 
The water narratives found in this study are growth, libertarian, and sustainability 
narratives. The most dominant narrative was pro-growth due to it being favored by state 
level actors, who are the most powerful actors in the study area’s water governance. The 
power of state level actors (governor, legislators, judiciary, ADWR) stem from their 
constitutional and statutory authority, which largely enables them to mobilize artefactual, 
mental, monetary, and natural resources simultaneously. The exception is ADWR, whose 
ability to mobilize resources is mostly subject to the support of other state level actors, 
especially the governor. Specifically, ADWR’s director is appointed by the governor and 
serves at the governor’s pleasure (ARS 45-102). This relationship promotes coordination 
between the governor’s office and ADWR. Also, the relationship arguably places 
ADWR’s guiding ideology in alignment with those of the incumbent governor. Yet, the 
traditional pro-growth narrative is detrimental to water sustainability since perpetual 
supply augmentation is unsustainable (Larson et al., 2009; Hirt et al. 2017). 
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In this study, the promoters of libertarian and sustainability narratives were non-
government actors who exercised power through the political process to keep exempt 
wells unregulated and to increase permanent aquifer replenishment. Non-government 
actors generally had the least power due to, for example, legal limitations regarding 
political lobbying for organizations, and the limited ability of both organizations and 
residents to mobilize artefactual, mental, monetary, and natural resources simultaneously. 
Although libertarian and sustainability narratives were less dominant overall, the non-
government actors who espouse them still exercised power and influenced water 
governance. 
Specifically, citizen resistance within the study area has been effective in keeping 
the regulation of exempt wells off the agenda, which is an exercise of destructive power 
(Avelino and Rotmans, 2011). However, in opposing the regulation of exempt wells, 
residents inadvertently increase their own vulnerability to water scarcity. Collins and 
Bolin (2007) show that households on exempt wells are generally more vulnerable to 
water scarcity than those who receive water from municipal and private water providers. 
Their study reveals that households on exempt wells are also more vulnerable to arsenic 
exposure than those served by municipal and private water providers due to the 
prohibitive costs of removing arsenic from groundwater. Thus, residents have exerted 
political power to serve their short-term ideological interests in not being regulated. Yet 
in the long-run, the lack of monitoring for exempt wells heightens their own vulnerability 
to water scarcity since the status quo increases the likelihood of lowered water tables and 
declining water quality. Thus, libertarian ideologies may ultimately be detrimental to 
personal interests.  
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The seeming disinterest of Prescott Valley residents regarding safe yield and 
water sustainability is likely linked to the messaging of ‘sufficient supplies and good 
water management’ advertised by Prescott Valley government through various 
communication media, such as the Town’s website (Town of Prescott Valley, n.d.b). 
Prescott Valley’s messages are misleading and are resulting in a citizenry that is ignorant 
of the true state of water sustainability—or more accurately, unsustainability—in the 
region, thereby hampering citizen-instigated activities that contribute to sustainable water 
governance. Thus, even though citizens can wield power through political processes, the 
wielding of power (through resource mobilization) by residents depends at least 
somewhat on the type of information and messaging they receive. 
In effect, the direction and urgency of citizen action appears to correlate strongly 
with the type of information communicated to citizens and how that information is 
communicated. Even though interviewees noted that GUAC public meetings are not well 
attended by AMA residents, the citizen initiatives discussed in Chapter 4 show that 
residents are interested in water governance to the extent that they see a need for their 
involvement. For instance, the sitting Mayor of Chino Valley arguably lost re-election 
because residents perceived threats to their control or ownership of water. Thus, GUAC 
public meetings might be better attended if residents see the need for their engagement. 
Otherwise, as Whitmire (2013) noted, residents expect their elected officials to act on 
their behalf in making water governance and sustainability decisions.  
According to Mann’s (1986) sources of power24 cited by Avelino and Rotmans 
(2011), this dissertation shows that ideological power influences water governance in the 
                                                        
24 Mobilization of mental, human, and artefactual resources (ideological power); human and artefactual 
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study area. This ideological power serves as both a condition for and barrier to Prescott 
AMA’s water sustainability. However, while Avelino and Rotmans (2011, 798) identify 
“information, concepts, ideas, beliefs” as examples of mental resources, I found that 
beliefs (or water narratives as I describe them in this study) determine what ‘information’ 
is communicated. In other words, beliefs are not only a mental resource that can be 
mobilized in exercising power, they are also key in determining which mental resources 
are mobilized, and how the mental resources are mobilized. Furthermore, I argue that 
ideological power trumps Mann’s (1986) military or economic power in the study area’s 
water governance due to the decentralized water governance regime and individualistic 
social and political culture in Prescott AMA and the western United States generally. 
Meanwhile, building on Whitmire (2013), this study shows that more important 
than the power that exists with citizens is the goal for which such power is exercised. For 
instance, citizen power in Chino Valley was successful in overturning proposals to limit 
the proliferation of exempt wells. Citizens in this instance exercised power based on 
libertarian values of control over water. Though it is important that citizens were able to 
exercise power, exercising power based on libertarian values of water control serves to 
hinder sustainable water governance in the study area. The finding about libertarian 
narratives extends Bolin et al.’s (2008) research by showing that apart from growth 
narratives, libertarian narratives are influencing conflicts and water sustainability in the 
Central Highlands. 
Moreover, emphasizing broad value-based ideologies such as growth, individual 
property rights, and environmentalism in governance deliberations perpetuates a gridlock 
                                                                                                                                                                     
resources (military/physical power); mental, human, and natural resources (geopolitical power); human, 
artefactual, natural, and monetary resources (economic power). 
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in the pursuit of sustainable water governance. Instead, breaking these values down into 
specific concerns could help illuminate the nuances of individual or group perceptions of 
the specific issues. Within the study area, growth is a point of contention that divides 
residents into one of two camps: pro-growth or anti-growth.  Yet this framing is 
insufficient in breaking the stalemate of inaction in regional collaborative water 
governance. In fact, rather than a clear-cut resistance to economic and population growth, 
regional and environmental groups like CWAG appear to be advocating for a different 
type of economic growth that is not dependent on continuous residential development 
that will place additional pressure on the region’s water resources. Thus, again, 
deliberating the nuances of the type of growth desired—with an emphasis on the most 
sustainable pathways for economic development— could help move beyond the current 
gridlocks to collaboration among governance actors. 
Overall, value-based ideologies can hide barriers to sustainable water governance, 
as with the issue of exempt well regulation. Similar to the issue of growth, an argument 
framed around property rights hinders, for example, conversation about the 
vulnerability25 of exempt well owners relative to people dependent on municipal or 
private water providers (Collins and Bolin, 2007). Yet conversations on specific issues 
rather than broad ideologies could help residents understand the value of enforcing 
deliberated rules on individual well operation, which might help overcome the current 
polarized stand on exempt well regulation. As discussed by Whitmire (2013), science is 
not the problem in the Central Highlands’ water governance; instead, diverse values 
                                                        
25 Given the overallocation of Arizona’s water resources (both groundwater and surface water), a first step 
in better managing the state’s water resources will require keeping records of actual water demand from all 
water users including current exempt well owners. 
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perpetuate conflict and thwart water sustainability. Thus, the proposed recommendation 
aims to provide opportunity for non-polarizing deliberation on water governance 
activities that would support sustainable water governance. In the case of exempt wells, 
regulation will need to be clearly and fully defined. In addition, the tradeoffs of 
individual control over increased costs due to dry wells and the need to drill new ones, 
plus the costs of treating contaminated water, will need to be considered by exempt well 
owners. 
Revisiting the conceptual framework: governance interactions and power. In 
this sub-section, I discuss the reciprocal relationships between vertical governance, 
horizontal governance, and power. I conclude this section by summarizing the utility of 
the proposed conceptual framework. 
As expected, vertical interactions across state, regional, and local levels did not 
influence horizontal interactions—that is, at the local level among municipalities. 
However, rules that guide vertical governance, or rules formulated at the state level (in 
this case, ARS 45, the state’s water statutes) do affect horizontal governance. Regarding 
interactions, the state’s water statutes (Arizona Revised Statutes, Title 45) and conflicts 
between municipal priorities served as a basis for the cooperative and contentious 
interactions that exist among municipalities (local level). For instance, the BCWR project 
being pursued by Prescott and Prescott Valley is made possible by ARS 45-555, which 
mandates Prescott’s groundwater import from the Big Chino basin. Meanwhile, 
contentions around intra-basin water transfer, groundwater recharge, and exempt wells 
occur due to conflicting municipal priorities. Furthermore, the decentralized nature of 
water governance by each municipality means that, even though competing 
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municipalities share the growth narrative of state level actors, the cooperating 
municipalities are not necessarily more powerful than other municipalities at the local 
level. Thus, even though vertical interactions did not directly influence horizontal 
interactions, I found that vertical governance affected horizontal governance through 
rules and regulations made at the state level that influence local level water governance. 
Horizontal interactions did not affect vertical interactions. However, similar to the 
preceding paragraph, horizontal interactions possibly influence the values, decisions, and 
policies at the state level. For example, the protection of exempt well owners is one of the 
identified shortcomings of the GMA (Connall 1982, Maguire 2007). However, the 
example of citizen resistance in Chino Valley shows that there is local support for 
unregulated exempt wells that could have been a precursor to the GMA clause that 
allowed exempt wells. This clause now limits moving beyond the status quo to 
sustainable water governance. 
 In theory, horizontal governance could influence vertical governance to the 
extent that local actors move into positions of authority at other levels. This movement 
could lead to the transfer of ideologies prevalent in the local areas being transferred to or 
maintained, for example, at the state level. For instance, if a governance actor with 
libertarian water values is elected to the state’s legislature, they could work to maintain 
the status quo of unregulated exempt wells, thereby reinforcing that locally prevalent 
ideology at the state level. Since state level ideologies influence state statutes and vertical 
governance, this is one way horizontal governance could affect vertical governance26. 
                                                        
26 I do not have proof that this instance currently exists in the study area. However, it is noteworthy that one 
of the state’s senators is a former Mayor of Chino Valley.  
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In this study, vertical and horizontal governance did not determine how resources 
were mobilized or power exercised. Instead, vertical and horizontal interactions 
reinforced the current mode of resource mobilization and power exercise through 
litigation, legislation, and the political process, thereby maintaining the status quo. 
Breaking the status quo in water governance practices would require shifts in the 
narratives or ideologies that influence the mobilization of resources (that is, exercise of 
power). For instance, even though growth, libertarian, and sustainability narratives 
simultaneously exist in the study area, the dominance of growth narratives is responsible 
for the current management asymmetry that favors supply augmentation rather than a 
balanced approach that pursues demand and supply management, while cognizant of the 
limitations to sustainable supply development (discussed later in this section) 
In terms of the influence of power on vertical and horizontal governance, I found 
that ideologies and narratives of growth, individual water control, and sustainability 
determine how actors mobilize resources in their interactions with others across levels. 
None of these ideologies are explicitly stated by actors in their interactions but the 
divergent ideologies and water narratives foster water conflicts between actors, across 
levels. Because conflicting ideologies are not being or have not been explicitly 
deliberated by actors, there is room simultaneously for informational, contentious, and 
administrative (e.g., permitting and reporting) interactions due to the GMA’s mandates. 
At the local level, contentious interactions were a result of different municipalities 
exercising powers in ways that contradict the municipal priorities of others. Specifically, 
divergent municipal priorities determined how resources were mobilized. For example, 
the contentions over intra-basin transfer, groundwater recharge, and exempt well 
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proliferations were due to each municipality mobilizing the resources it had control over 
through litigation, legislation, and the political process to accomplish its municipal 
vision. Although there are studies that show how power asymmetry causes conflicts when 
less powerful actors engage with more powerful actors on environmental or natural 
resource governance issues (for example, Paulson et al., 2003), this study suggests that 
power in itself is not the cause of cooperation or contentions. Instead, power aids 
cooperation or worsens conflict based on whether interacting actors have shared or 
divergent goals.   
The finding that state level government actors are the most powerful with respect 
to Prescott AMA’s water governance is likely to be found in other places within Arizona 
and possibly across the United States due to a prevalent individualistic culture. In other 
words, individuals would usually act in their personal interests without thoughts of how 
their actions might affect neighbors, making regulations from other levels of authority, 
such as the state, necessary. These regulations putatively provide a safeguard to protect 
all users dependent on shared water resource (for example, groundwater in Arizona). 
However, the water sustainability outcome of state level government oversight or rules 
appears to depend more on the ideologies that guide implementation of the rules than the 
rules themselves. 
In terms of the outcomes of governance interactions, the most prevalent ideology, 
that is, the ideology of the most powerful actors determined the outcome of vertical 
interactions. For example, in this study’s vertical governance, state level actors 
(comprising governor, legislators, judiciary, ADWR) have interpreted the GMA and 
created associated rules to make room for economic growth without adequate regard for 
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the long-term integrity of regional water resources. Thus, the influence of power (that is, 
resource mobilization) on governance interactions is determined by the ideologies and 
narratives that drive the actions of governance actors. 
Meanwhile, the search for more water is problematic with respect to long-term 
sustainability. Specifically, freshwater in the Western United States is limited. Colorado 
River water, which meets about 32% of Central Arizona’s annual water demand (ADWR, 
2014d), cannot be relied on to supply increased population that are projected to need 18.1 
million-20.4 million acre-feet, while the Colorado River produces an average 15 million 
acre-feet annually (Hirt et al., 2017). Besides insufficient river flows, it was recognized 
when Prescott received Central Arizona Project (CAP)27 water allocations that the water 
could not be transported to the Central Highlands due to the prohibitive infrastructural 
costs (e.g., to pump water uphill over a long distance)—a situation that has not changed 
and is not likely to change in the future. 
In addition, dependence on Colorado River water and other surface water supplies 
is unreliable due to climate change-induced extended droughts which are reducing annual 
river flows. Climatic projections for the Southwest forecast severe and frequent droughts 
due to the impacts of climate change (Cook et al., 2015). Continuous attempts to move 
groundwater between basins is unreliable due to the non-renewable nature of Arizona’s 
groundwater, a condition that would only worsen if climate projections hold. Overall, 
non-renewable groundwater is a poor option to depend on for supply augmentation, as is 
being planned with the import of Big Chino groundwater into Prescott AMA. 
                                                        
27 CAP water is Arizona’s portion of Colorado River water. 
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Meanwhile, the proposals for desalination being considered for Prescott AMA are 
prohibitively expensive for the municipalities to afford. Instead, those funds could be 
better spent on demand management strategies that reduce the need for supply 
augmentation. However, even with cheaper desalination technologies, Hirt et al. (2017) 
extensively discuss the social, environmental, political, and equity implications that make 
reliance on desalinated water an unreliable pursuit for Arizona. Given the unreliability of 
various supply augmentation options, it is imperative that AMA and state level 
governance actors invest in demand management strategies as opposed to the current 
emphasis on supply augmentation. 
The conceptual framework utilized in this dissertation and explicit analysis of 
power reveals that coordination occurs not just because of water policies or mandated 
relationships but due to non-sustainability focused, interest-based water narratives 
(growth and libertarian). Yet, the emphasis of growth proponents on supply augmentation 
and libertarian opposition to regulations pose significant barriers to water sustainability. 
A conceptual framework that explicitly analyzes vertical governance, horizontal 
governance, and power is important because it helps identify the conditions for and 
barriers to water sustainability in different water governance regimes. Overall, based on 
the findings of this study, successful policy-based pursuits of water sustainability require 
an acknowledgment of the management asymmetries within current water policies and 
commitments to addressing them. In the next section, I discuss two important areas for 
future research based on the findings of this study. 
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Areas for future research  
Given the foregoing discussion, in this section, I highlight two important areas of 
future research needed to build on the findings of this study. These research needs relate 
to, first, rural versus urban water use, and second, research that explores the decoupling 
of economic and population growth with respect to water demand. 
There is a need for current research on rural water use due to the increasing 
tension between rural and urban areas sharing water resources. Within this study, 
residents of Dewey-Humboldt, a mostly rural municipality within Prescott AMA, 
advance the notion that remaining saves water. However, sufficient and current rural area 
research are not available to evaluate this notion. With respect to non-AMA water use, 
about 20% of Arizona’s population use over 40% of the state’s water (Jacobs and 
Megdal, 2004). This means that, per capita, non-AMA residents use up to three times the 
water used by AMA residents—in large part due to agricultural irrigation. Overall, a 
better understanding of rural water use could provide insight into ways to better manage 
the conflicts between rural and urban areas while otherwise coordinating water resource 
management across the state. Attention to non-AMA areas is also critical considering 
growth in regions such as Flagstaff, which has received little attention among water 
researchers. 
Also, there is a need for research that evaluates economic development options 
(asides from retail and agriculture) that are feasible in water-scarce regions (like the study 
area). The study area currently relies heavily on the retail industry and so population 
growth is important to its economic sustenance (Bolin et al., 2008). Given the extended 
droughts and reduced water supplies expected in arid regions due to climate variability 
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and change (Bates et al., 2008), decoupling economic and population growth is very 
important for the future. Such research will need to be interdisciplinary to be both 
comprehensive and meaningful. Also, interdisciplinary research is preferable so that 
sustainability outcomes in one sector do not lead to unsustainability in another and so that 
multifaceted trade-offs are considered in research and planning. Overall, future research 
needs to look at ways through which water sustainability can be supported at destination 
areas in spite of growth, especially in arid and fast-growing regions. 
 
Recommendations  
Prescott AMA provides a case where an institution supposedly created to promote 
water sustainability and resolve conflict among users instead legitimizes a culture of 
groundwater mining and perpetuates water conflicts. Many authors (for example, Jacobs 
and Holway, 2004; Maguire, 2007; Bolin et al., 2008; Hirt et al., 2008; Megdal et al., 
2011) have provided important thoughts on Arizona’s water law(s). In this section, I offer 
recommendations specific to Prescott AMA but which in certain respects would require 
policy changes at the state level.  
 As mentioned earlier, the GUAC can become more effective in the AMA’s 
regional water governance and a platform for deliberative governance at the 
regional/AMA level if it includes non-government actors who would represent the water 
use sectors in the region. Furthermore, groundwater users and sectors should determine 
their representatives rather than having them appointed by the governor. At the very least, 
there should be representatives for each of the following groundwater users: public and 
private water providers and residents on private (exempt) wells, as well as agricultural, 
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industrial, environmental, and other special interest groups. In terms of voting structure, 
which is important to ensure fairness in water governance, municipal water users could 
be entitled to only one vote despite having representatives for both exempt and non-
exempt well owners. More importantly, feasible and measurable goals should be 
commonly determined so that activities of all water use sectors are promoting and not 
hindering water sustainability. An example could be a goal to reduce overall demand by a 
certain amount in 12 months. In addition, a framework for the periodic evaluation of 
goals is needed to ensure that set goals are being met. 
 Water planning should involve residents, in part to monitor water levels and 
quality at particular wells. Given anti-government ideals in the region, Homeowner 
Associations (HOAs) or other non-government entities could help facilitate the 
installation of water meters for individual water providers with exempt wells. This data 
collection is important in any pursuits of water sustainability. Engaging exempt well 
owners in this manner helps them fulfill their responsibilities as resource managers in the 
state’s decentralized governance structure. Also, data on actual water use would remove 
some of the uncertainties in water resource planning, especially because people often 
think they need more water than they do (Seckel, 2017) or use less water than they do 
(Balling and Gober, 2007). 
If achieving safe yield requires eliminating a certain amount of overdraft, then 
reducing the current legal allocation of current water users would be a probable means of 
eliminating overdraft. Such a policy would require defining the actual allocation of 
exempt well owners, which is currently unknown and ranges anywhere from zero to 56 
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acre-feet/year28. Also, there may be need for water rights to be leased rather than 
allocating water to new users. However, a leasing of rights would maintain current levels 
of overdraft, which are not sustainable. Two actions that can be pursued simultaneously 
is to first, re-adjudicate (and possibly reduce) water rights across the board while records 
of previous allocations are kept. The second action would be to lease or transfer parts of 
adjudicated water rights, as needed, to new users instead of allocating water to new users. 
If/when the state has surplus water, initial water right owners can temporarily receive the 
rest of their allocation (pending another shortage) before water is allocated to new 
users/owners. However, it would be preferable to leave any surplus water in storage due 
to Arizona’s arid climate where annual demand would mostly always exceed supply. 
Finally, focusing on small wins would provide an opportunity to build trust 
among contending parties. One such win could form around river rafting, birding, and 
other outdoor activities (that is, Verde River tourism). A number of environmental groups 
in the area are developing these activities. Municipal governments can partner with these 
groups to not only stimulate economic growth but to also develop relationships that 
would foster meaningful discussions about water sustainability. In addition, the Central 
Highlands has a lot of history that could serve as tourist attractions (for example, the 
Sharlot Hall Museum). Developing these alternative economies provide substitutes for 
municipal dependence on a residential growth economy. Irrespective of the alternate 
growth pathways adopted, the Central Highlands would need to continually plan with an 
awareness of the region’s ‘water bucket’.  
 
                                                        
28 56 acre-feet of water would serve 280 individuals in a year, as one acre-feet serves a family of five 
annually (Arizona Department of Water Resources, 2009). 
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Conclusion 
In this dissertation, my goal has been to assess the conditions for and barriers to 
water sustainability in the face of persistent conflicts by investigating vertical and 
horizontal interactions among governance actors in Prescott AMA, as well as how power 
is wielded by different actors in the region’s water governance. Assessing sustainable 
water governance with a framework of vertical governance, horizontal governance, and 
power reveals that there is coordination across levels based on specific interests such as 
growth, libertarianism, and sustainability. However, of these interests, growth and 
libertarian water narratives are dominant, leading to an emphasis on water augmentation 
pursuits and zero water management preferences. These management emphases are 
promoting an asymmetric water management regime where demand management 
practices are minimal. 
Whether intentionally or not the GMA and associated rules are being used to 
legitimately increase Prescott AMA’s groundwater mining, a situation that is detrimental 
to the region’s water sustainability.  Overall, this case study shows how outcomes at the 
regional level are a result of not only regional actions but local and state level ones as 
well. Overall, Prescott AMA’s water sustainability is tied to Arizona’s water 
sustainability especially given the GMA, which guides the AMA’s water governance. 
Thus, sustainable water governance policies are needed at the state level to promote water 
sustainability in Prescott AMA.  
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A.1 Interview Guide for Water Resource Managers/Government Actors 
Topic 1: Background/Water Management 
1. What is your job title (or duties) and how do they relate to water management in 
this town/city?   
2. What would you say are the main water management goals in this area? 
3. What are the major water resource challenges facing your town/city? 
4. Do you have adequate water supplies? What are you doing about demand 
management? 
5. What AMA rules influence water governance in your city or town? 
6. What impact does the AMA designation have on water management activities? 
a. Probe: What benefits does your community’s water system enjoy from 
being part of the AMA? 
b. Probe: What are the downsides of being part of the AMA? 
7. How does the goal of safe yield translate into the planning and day-to-day 
functions of the community’s water system? 
8. Beyond safe yield, what other water management goals are central to your 
town/city?  
 
Topic 2: Vertical Governance 
1. How do you and your local department (town/city) interact with the ADWR 
(state) office? 
a. Probe: What type of relationship exists between your office/municipality 
and the ADWR office? 
b. Probe: What improvements do you hope to see in the interaction between 
your office/municipality and ADWR? 
c. Probe: What improvements do you hope to see in the flow of information 
or communication between your office/municipality and ADWR? 
2. What programs do you have to implement based on the Groundwater 
Management Act and goal of safe yield? 
a. Probe: How relevant have these programs been to (i) achieving safe yield 
(ii) municipal priorities? 
b. Probe: Who or what organization(s) provide oversight for these programs? 
How is this done? 
3. What programs do you have that are not a result of the Groundwater Management 
Act and goal of safe yield?  
a. Probe: Where did the initiatives for these programs come from? For 
example, town council, water resources office, residents, environmental 
groups, advocacy groups, ADWR. Please explain. 
b. Probe: What was/is the purpose of these initiatives? 
4. What groups are you aware of that collaborate around water beyond local groups 
within the AMA? How does your relationship with each work? 
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Topic 3: Horizontal Governance 
1. Do you meet and/or coordinate with certain individuals or groups in managing 
water resources?  
a. Probe: How and why do you do so? 
b. Probe: What would you say are the outcomes of those interactions?   
2. What sort of relationship exists between your department and local community 
groups around water?  
a. Probe: Please identify all the groups you are aware of.  
b. Probe: Which of the identified groups does the town/city collaborate with? 
Why? How does this take place? 
c. Probe: For those that the town/city does not collaborate with, why is this 
so? 
 
Topic 4: Water Sustainability  
1. What do you see as the major impacts of the Groundwater Management Act and 
goal of safe-yield on the community’s water system?  
a. Probe: What benefits or positive outcomes have come from the Act?  
b. Probe: What are the challenges or negative impacts of the Act?  
2. What are the chances of achieving safe yield by 2025? Please explain how or why 
not. 
 
3. What could have been the situation of water resources and management in this 
area without the Groundwater Management Act and goal of safe-yield? 
a. Probe: Which components of your community’s water system would be 
different if there was no AMA designation in the region? 
4. What critical steps need to be taken to ensure that your community’s water system 
is viable in the long term? 
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A.2 Interview Guide for Non-government Water Actors 
Topic 1: Background/Water Management 
1. How did you get involved with water issues?  
2. What would you say are the main water management goals in this area? 
3. What are the major water resource challenges facing this town/city/AMA? 
4. What do you see as the role of your committee/group in interacting with water 
resources in your community? 
a. Probe: What are the goals/responsibilities of your committee/group? 
b. Probe: What programs do you implement in order to achieve your group’s 
goals? 
c. Probe: What outcomes have you seen from these programs? 
5. What AMA rules influence water governance in your city or town? 
6. What impact does the AMA designation and goal of safe yield have on your 
committee/group’s activities? 
a. Probe: What benefits does your community’s water system enjoy from 
being part of the AMA? 
b. Probe: What are the downsides of being part of the AMA? 
7. Beyond safe yield, what other water management goals are central to your 
committee/group’s functions?  
 
Topic 2: Vertical Governance 
1. How do you and your committee/group interact with the ADWR (state) office? 
a. Probe: What type of relationship exists between your committee/group 
and the ADWR office? 
b. Probe: What improvements do you hope to see in the interaction between 
your committee/group and ADWR? 
c. Probe: What improvements do you hope to see in the flow of information 
or communication between your committee/group and ADWR? 
2. What groups are you aware of that collaborate around water beyond local groups 
within the AMA? How does your relationship with each work? 
 
Topic 3: Horizontal Governance 
1. Do you meet and/or coordinate with certain individuals or groups in managing 
water resources?  
c. Probe: How and why do you do so? 
d. Probe: What would you say are the outcomes of those interactions?   
2. What sort of relationship exists between your committee/group and other 
community groups around water?  
d. Probe: Please identify all the groups you are aware of.  
e. Probe: Which of the identified groups does your committee/group 
collaborate with? Why? How does this take place? 
f. Probe: For those that your committee/group does not collaborate with, 
why is this so? 
3. What sort of relationship exists between your committee/group and the local 
government? 
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Topic 4: Water Sustainability  
1. What do you see as the major impacts of the Groundwater Management Act and goal 
of safe-yield in this area?  
c. Probe: What benefits or positive outcomes have come from the Act? What 
benefits does your community’s water system enjoy from being part of the 
AMA? What are the upsides of being part of the AMA? 
d. Probe: What are the challenges or negative impacts of the Act? What are 
the downsides of being part of the AMA? 
2. What are the chances of achieving safe yield by 2025? Please explain how or why 
not. 
 
3. What could have been the situation of water resources and management in this 
area without the Groundwater Management Act and goal of safe-yield? 
a. Probe: Which components of your community’s water system would be 
different if there was no AMA designation in the region? 
4. What critical steps need to be taken to ensure that your community’s water system 
is viable in the long term?  
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A.3 Additional Questions for State Level Governance Actors 
1. What are the responsibilities of your office in ensuring the Prescott AMA region 
achieves safe yield? 
2. What particular programs is your office currently overseeing in each of the 
municipalities? How about in the past? Any plans for the future? 
3. What type of relationship exists between your office and the municipal water 
departments in Prescott AMA? Is your correspondence the same with all of them? 
Does size play a role in your expectations of those offices or their expectations of 
yours? 
4. Does your office mandate programs, recommend them or do you coordinate those 
suggested by the municipalities? Please explain. 
5. What is the response of each of the municipalities to current programs? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  192 
APPENDIX B 
ARIZONA STATE UNIVERSITY’S INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD  
 
  193 
 
EXEMPTION GRANTED 
 
Kelli Larson 
Geographical Sciences and Urban Planning, School of 
480/727-3603 
Kelli.Larson@asu.edu 
Dear Kelli Larson: 
On 5/26/2015 the ASU IRB reviewed the following protocol: 
Type of Review: Initial Study 
Title: Water Governance, Scale, and Power:  
Governing the Transition to Sustainability in 
Arizona’s Central Highlands 
 
Investigator: Kelli Larson  
IRB ID: STUDY00002689 
Funding: None 
Grant Title: None 
Grant ID: None 
Documents Reviewed: • Interview Questions.pdf, Category: Measures 
(Survey questions/Interview questions /interview 
guides/focus group questions); 
• Water Governance in the Prescott Area 3.0.doc, 
Category: IRB Protocol; 
• Short Consent Form 3.pdf, Category: Consent Form; 
 
The IRB determined that the protocol is considered exempt pursuant to Federal 
Regulations 45CFR46 (2) Tests, surveys, interviews, or observation on 5/22/2015.  
In conducting this protocol you are required to follow the requirements listed in the 
INVESTIGATOR MANUAL (HRP-103). 
Sincerely, 
IRB Administrator 
cc: Deborah Ayodele 
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GOVERNING THE TRANSITION TO WATER SUSTAINABILITY IN 
ARIZONA’S CENTRAL HIGHLANDS 
I am a graduate student under the direction of Professor Kelli L. Larson in the 
Department of Geography at Arizona State University.  I am conducting a research study 
to understand current water governing activities in the Prescott Area with the goal of 
identifying pathways to long-term water sustainability not just in this area but in the 
broader region.   
Please consider this letter as your invitation to voluntarily participate in an interview of 
about 45-60 minutes.  The interview questions are related to how different stakeholders in 
this area coordinate and collaborate around water issues. There are no foreseeable risks or 
discomforts to your participation and you have the right not to answer any question or to 
stop participation at any time. There might be need for a follow-up interview but your 
continued participation is entirely voluntary. You must be 18 or older to participate. 
I would like to audio record this interview, but the interview will not be recorded without 
your permission. Please let me know if you do not want the interview to be recorded; you 
can also change your mind after the interview starts, just let me know. 
Your responses will be confidential. The research team will be the only ones to have 
access to the interview.  Audio recordings will be securely stored on ASU’s server and 
the field research computer. These storage devices are password protected for added data 
security. Meanwhile, the recorded interviews will be transcribed and analyzed with 
qualitative data analysis software to understand water governance in this area and identify 
pathways to long-term water sustainability. The results of this study may be used in 
reports, presentations, or publications but your name will not be used. Quotes may be 
used from this interview but your name will not be attached to any. 
If you have any questions concerning the research study, you can email me at 
doayodel@asu.edu or my research advisor at Kelli.Larson@asu.edu. If you have any 
questions about your rights as a participant in this research, or if you feel you have been 
placed at risk, you can contact the Chair of the Human Subjects Institutional Review 
Board, through the ASU Office of Research Integrity and Assurance, at (480) 965-6788. 
Your participation in the interview will be considered your consent to take part in this 
study. 
 
Thank you. 
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D.1. Inductive Codebook for Research Question One: Avenues of Water Governance 
Interactions Across State, Regional, and Local Level Actors  
Code Definition Exemplar from data 
Management 
Plans 
 
These are references to 
the statutory periodic 
plans to be developed 
by ADWR to support 
the region’s safe yield 
management goal 
“The management plan we are in the 
fourth management plan now and those 
plans are developed by ADWR and our 
staff” (Prescott; March 2016) 
Technical 
resource  
These are references to 
the supply of technical 
assistance. 
“We have a modeling section with 
excellent modeling staff, hydrologists. 
They’ve been involved with the modeling 
of both the Prescott AMA and the Big 
Chino. The formal study, itself, I don’t 
believe that involves the Big Chino but 
we're certainly involved in that, and the 
groundwater modeling work that we've 
done for the Prescott AMA certainly 
interacts with the modeling in the Big 
Chino.” (Phoenix; October 2015) 
Funding These refer to 
instances about 
financing for the group 
in question, how those 
funds are used, and 
what they can (and 
cannot) be used for. 
“Well, it came from the legislation. The 
funds came from the charge to mainly the 
municipalities” (Prescott; March 2016) 
Meeting These are reference to 
in-person meetings, 
their frequency, 
attendance, and 
composition of 
attendees. 
“I think we try to meet quarterly. 
Sometimes even more often, but we try to 
meet quarterly.” (Dewey-Humboldt; June 
2015) 
Conservation 
 
These are references to 
water saving or 
reduction measures 
whether for municipal, 
agricultural, or 
industrial purposes. 
“I don’t think people here even realize 
how much water conservation we actually 
do. Cause they don’t see it cause we’ve 
been doing so steadily along the way.” 
(Prescott; June 2015) 
Growth 
 
These are references to 
increase in population 
and economic growth. 
 
“New houses. Subdivisions, that sort of 
thing. It is not something that you just 
stop. Nobody has authority over it. If … 
said ‘Stop growth’, then it just goes over 
there. It just goes next-door” (Prescott 
Valley; June 2015)  
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Permitting  
 
These refer to all 
processes of receiving 
or assigning permits 
for different aspects of 
water use, and 
governance. 
“everything flows through the Phoenix 
office and that has to do with well permits 
and a lot of things” (Prescott; March 
2016) 
Reporting 
 
These include 
references to statutory 
record keeping and 
document filing that 
different water users in 
the region have to 
perform. 
“Essentially once we drill wells and 
create a pipeline there, the AMA rules 
apply to our parcel of land on items such 
as well spacing, water report withdrawals, 
reporting the withdrawals, that sort of 
thing.” (Prescott Valley; June 2015) 
Communication These include 
references to the 
dissemination of 
information, whether 
as an exchange or one-
sided. 
“We do have interaction with irrigation 
right holders, both with filing annual 
reports and with dealing with their 
flexibility account balances. We notify 
them each year if they are in compliance 
or not.” (Phoenix; October 2015) 
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D.2. Inductive Codebook for Research Question Two: Avenues of Interaction among 
Local Level Water Governance Actors  
Code Definition Exemplar from data 
Big Chino 
Water Ranch 
(BCWR) 
project 
 
These are references to 
the proposed water 
import from the Big 
Chino basin. 
“There are lots of fighting happening over 
water between Prescott and the Verde side as 
Chino Valley and Prescott Valley and 
Prescott start looking at, as they start looking 
at the Upper Big Chino” (Chino Valley; June 
2015) 
Intra-basin 
water transfer 
 
These are references to 
the movement of water 
from one point within a 
sub-basin to another 
where municipal 
boundaries are crossed. 
“It’s just standard operating procedure in 
Arizona to go through this when you have an 
issue over other persons’ or parties’ water 
use. Talks initially fail. They always do. You 
go into litigation, and then everybody kind 
of figures out their positions and strengths 
little bit better, and then you go back and 
you negotiate. That’s standard operating 
procedure. There hasn’t been a water right 
settlement in Arizona without at least one 
iteration of litigation. Typically, there’s two 
iterations of litigation for these things.” 
(Prescott Valley; June 2015) 
Groundwater 
recharge 
 
These are references to 
groundwater storage 
either through recharge 
stations, or recharge 
beds.  
“our recharge facility is in the Little Chino 
sub-basin and our pumping is in Little 
Chino.” (Prescott; June 2015) 
Growth 
 
These are references to 
increase in population 
and economic growth. 
 
“They have to do something to guide their 
growth, how they want to grow and then 
have these programs to be put in place to 
encourage growth or one or the other. But 
we don’t...” (Dewey-Humboldt; June 2015) 
Exempt wells 
 
These are references to 
private wells that can 
pump up to 35 gallons 
per minute. They are 
exempt from 
conservation, and 
reporting requirements 
that other water 
providers are bound by.   
“There are a lot of well owners that have 
been reporting reduced water levels, some of 
them have had their wells going dry” 
(Phoenix; October 2015) 
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E.1. Deductive Codebook for Human Resources 
Mnemonic Hu-R 
Short 
Description 
Human Resources 
Inclusion 
Criteria 
Text passage where the respondent refers to or describe the role, 
activities or actions of people or groups of people or organized 
groups involved in the region’s water governance or needed in its 
water management, even when brought in from outside the region.  
Only direct/specific references to the ADWR office in Phoenix, 
Verde watershed and Yavapai County stakeholders should be 
included, if the reference directly relates to Prescott AMA water 
issues.  
Direct/specific references to state level stakeholders (who influence 
statewide water governance and management) should also be 
included   
Exclusion 
Criteria 
The mention of persons that are neither directly nor indirectly related 
to the region’s water management and governance. For example, 
references to Verde watershed in broad terms or references to 
persons in Phoenix AMA or state level users and stakeholders 
should not be included 
Typical 
Exemplars 
Skilled workers, technicians, engineers, geologists and other persons 
who currently practice a particular skill area. I/We/They are 
involved in… (where there is a specific person/unit/organization 
being identified) 
Atypical 
Exemplars 
Exempt well owners, forest service 
Close but no Reference to retired engineers and other retired persons unless their 
area of work being described is different from the skill area they 
retired from. Also, broad general description of sectors or users that 
do not refer to specific known units/individuals within the region. 
For instance, text passages that refer to the statewide conservation 
requirement of municipal users need not be coded unless the passage 
contains specific reference to Prescott Area water issues 
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E.2. Deductive Codebook for Artefactual Resources 
Mnemonic Ar-R 
Short 
Description 
Artefactual Resources 
Inclusion 
Criteria 
Passage of text that refers to infrastructure or construction materials 
and other man-made materials that are necessary to or relate in one 
way or another to the region’s water management and governance. 
It could be artifact from outside the study region and does not have 
to be administered in it but must be contributing to their (the study 
region’s) water sustainability. 
Only code references to Salt River Project, Central Arizona Project 
or Big Chino Ranch project that refer to the artefactual aspects of 
the projects. 
Exclusion 
Criteria 
Exclude artifact that do not relate either directly or indirectly to the 
study region’s water management and governance 
Do not code artefactual resources that specifically refer to city 
development activities and not water governance. For example, 
building houses, and similar.  
Do not code generic drilling of wells. It has to refer to a specific 
project or instance. 
Typical 
Exemplars 
Pipes, desalination plant 
Atypical 
Exemplars 
Water pump, recharge facility, sewer system, water line/system, the 
act of drilling a well, specified projects29, drill 
Close but no Reservoir, exempt well, lot split, build houses.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
29 Do not code ‘Salt River Project’. SRP is the name of a company not necessarily reference to a particular 
project. Include references to CAP, BCR project. 
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E.3. Deductive Codebook for Mental Resources 
Mnemonic Me-R 
Short 
Description 
Mental Resources 
Inclusion 
Criteria 
Text passage where respondents refer to or describe the need for 
ideas, suggestions, or solutions both tangible and intangible that 
dictate how water is used or will be used in study area. These 
references must be about a specific product. 
Exclusion 
Criteria 
The mention of expertise should be excluded and coded as human 
resources 
Typical 
Exemplars 
Information, recommendations, informational videos, outreach, 
talks, meetings 
Statutes, law, bills, regulations 
Models, Master plan/blueprint, step-by-step plan/strategies 
Atypical 
Exemplars 
Research product, modeling activities 
informative workshop, websites/webinars, formal negotiations 
Conservation plans 
Close but no Informal discussions, other use combination of permit which do not 
refer to a document e.g. ‘permitted’, generic reference to 
conservation, the use of ‘bill’ in reference to payment for a service. 
Do not include generic references to meetings. Current or old 
websites should not be coded. 
 
E.4. Deductive Codebook for Monetary Resources 
Mnemonic Mo-R 
Short 
Description 
Monetary Resources 
Inclusion 
Criteria 
Text passage where reference is made to money, finances, payment, 
and funding even when described as ‘funding for project’. This 
should be an explicit mention or reference related to the region’s 
water governance 
Exclusion 
Criteria 
All implicit references to, or inferences about money, finances, and 
funding are excluded 
Typical 
Exemplars 
Dollars, money, funds, financing, purchase, shop, sell 
Atypical 
Exemplars 
Economic turn, cost of household water 
Close but no The value of water, rich people 
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E.5. Deductive Codebook for Natural Resources 
Mnemonic Na-R 
Short 
Description 
Natural Resources 
Inclusion 
Criteria 
Passages of text that refer directly to water resources of the study 
area or water resources that are being used, will be used or is needed 
in the study area. 
The references have to do with a specific source or allocations of it. 
That is, sources of, dimensions and types of water 
Exclusion 
Criteria 
References to other natural resources that are not part of the 
hydrosphere 
Typical 
Exemplars 
Rainwater, groundwater, surface water, lake, creek, stream 
Atypical 
Exemplars 
Reclaimed water, groundwater recharge, Water permit, harvested 
rainwater/rainwater harvesting, water right, paper (back) water, 
reservoir, well field, exempt well, wastewater, private water 
company30 
Close but no Safe yield 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
30 Private water companies but not municipal water providers are included because the interview transcripts 
contain the exact water source(s) of municipal water providers but not for private water companies.  
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APPENDIX F 
COMPREHENSIVE LIST OF THE ACTOR/ACTOR GROUPS DERIVED FROM THE 
SECOND CYCLE CODING (RESEARCH QUESTION THREE) 
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F. 1. Human resources or actors from second cycle coding (described by respondents) 
 
 
 
 
 
Active Management Area (AMA) 
residents     
Non-water supply stakeholders 
ADWR Prescott AMA staff Non-water supplying municipalities             
Agricultural water users 
Northern Arizona Municipal Water 
Users Association (NAMWUA) 
Arizona Department of Environmental 
Quality 
Other Municipal Water Users 
Associations (Central and Southern 
Arizona) 
Arizona Department of Real Estate Officials in the Prescott Valley area 
Arizona Department of Water Resources 
(ADWR) staff 
Paulden residents                                                                  
Arizona governor Prescott AMA communities 
Brokers of Groundwater Management 
Act 
Prescott AMA elected officials 
Camp Verde Prescott AMA Homeowners Association 
Camp Verde council Prescott AMA residents 
Center for Biological Diversity (Tucson) Prescott Homeowners Association 
Charlie Arnold 
Prescott Valley Homeowners 
Association 
Chino Valley council Prescott Valley Town Manager 
Chino Valley former employee Prescott Valley Water Manager 
Chino Valley public works director Prescott Yavapai Indian Tribe 
Chino Valley resident Press 
Chris Hoy, CWAG Private water companies 
Citizens Water Advocacy Group 
(CWAG) 
Professional agencies and organizations 
Judiciary* Realtors* 
City of Prescott council       Residents being served water 
City of Prescott Mayor Residents surrounding Chino Valley     
City of Prescott Mayor candidates Retired Chino Valley City Manager 
City of Prescott municipal staff Salt River Project 
City of Prescott residents Sierra Club 
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*possibly the same actor described elsewhere by respondents in a different way  
City of Prescott water committee State judiciary 
City of Prescott water manager State legislators   
City of Sedona                                                    The Nature Conservancy                                               
City of Sedona council Town of Clarkdale                                                     
Commerce industry   Town of Clarkdale council 
Comprehensive Agreement Number 
One parties 
Town of Prescott Valley council 
Cottonwood residents Town of Prescott Valley graduates 
Cottonwood council Town of Prescott Valley municipal staff 
County residents within City of 
Prescott's service area 
Tribal President                                                    
CWAG supporters United States Fish and Wildlife Service                                                  
Developer United States Forest Service 
Dewey-Humboldt United States Geological Survey (USGS) 
Dewey-Humboldt council members Unnamed downstream rights holder 
Drillers* 
Unnamed water rights holder (willow 
lake) 
Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) 
Upper Verde River Watershed Protection 
Coalition (UVRWPC) 
Exempt well owners Utilities 
Federal government                                                       
Verde River Basin Partnership (1st 
formation)                     
Federal judiciary 
Verde River Basin Partnership (2nd 
formation) 
Federal legislators  Verde River Institute 
Former owners of Chino Valley 
Irrigation District 
Verde Valley communities 
Geologists and other scientists Verde Watershed Association 
Groundwater Users Advisory Council Walton Family Foundation 
Homebuilders Association Water Infrastructure Finance Authority 
Hydrologist 
Water Resources Development 
Commission                                                        
John Munderloh, Prescott Valley Well drillers 
Kyl Center for Water Policy Western Resources Advocate 
Landowner along BCWR line Williamson Valley                                                  
Lawyers and other legal professionals Yavapai County 
Mark Holmes Yavapai County communities 
Municipal water suppliers Yavapai County government    
Ned Warren 
Yavapai County Water Advisory 
Committee  
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APPENDIX G 
CLASSES OF GOVERNANCE ACTORS 
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Within the power framework adopted, governance actors are human resources.  
For clarity in analysis, I separated the 110 coded human resources (governance 
actors/actor groups) into classes. The classes were developed based on who ‘creates’ the 
particular actor group and who its ‘members’ are. This typology was created due to the 
observation that actors with similar formation-type and membership exhibited similar 
characteristics in what resources they could mobilize, and hence, how they exercised 
power. The seven classes are:   
• Government-formed government actor group – This includes all formal 
government groups/associations whose members are individuals with government 
positions, whether elected or appointed (e.g. municipal staff) 
• Citizen-elected government actors – This includes all elected government 
officials at different jurisdictional levels (e.g. city councilor) 
• Government professionals – This includes government workers who are 
professionals in the water industry, including public water providers (e.g. 
municipal or government agency staff) 
• Government-formed non-government actor group – This includes formal non-
government actor groups whose members are individuals with government 
positions, whether elected or appointed irrespective of jurisdictional level (e.g. 
legislators or municipal staff) 
• Citizen-formed non-government actor group – This includes formal non-
government groups whose members are individuals without public office. An 
example from this research is the Citizens Water Advocacy Group (CWAG) 
• Market actors – This includes for-profit water providers and investors. Examples 
from this research include Salt River Project (SRP), Water Asset Management, 
Humboldt Water Systems, among others. 
• Informal actors – This includes residents who are neither part of government or 
formal non-government groups (e.g. municipal residents) 
Within these classes, no actor/actor group is in more than one class. However, it is 
possible to have a particular actor in more than one group, and hence, more than one 
class. The selected governance actors in Table G.1 provide a representative coverage of 
water stakeholders specifically linked to the study area’s water governance.  
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G.1. Main Actors Linked to Prescott AMA’s Water Governance 
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APPENDIX H 
DEDUCTIVE ANALYSIS OF POWER IN WATER GOVERNANCE 
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H.1.  Definitions of Innovative Power by Resource Mobilization 
“Innovative Power is the capacity of actors to create or discover new resources” 
(Avelino and Rotmans, 2009, p. 552). It is the ability to introduce into the AMA’s 
water governance regime, forms of a resource that used to be absent or outside it. 
Artefactual Bringing in artefactual resources that are new either from the 
outside or newly created by the actor. Depending on the 
specific case, the actor wielding power could be the one that 
authorizes the project or the one who provides money to fund 
the project.  
Mental Bringing in mental resources from the outside or creating from 
the inside new mental resources. Any of the agencies whose 
jurisdiction extend beyond the boundaries of the AMA have an 
ability to wield this power.  
Monetary The giver of the funds is the one that possesses innovative 
power over the monetary resource. To fit in this category the 
resource has to come from outside the AMA but can be brought 
in by someone within. Only that the actor within would have to 
be the giver, for power to be attributed to him/her OR the 
resources must be something that is not currently existent in the 
study area. The giver is the one that wields innovative power. 
Natural Bringing in natural resources that did not exist before in the 
study area, into it. For example, the one who awards a new 
water right (not re-awarding an existing one) exercises 
innovative power over the natural resource. 
Adapted from Avelino and Rotmans, 2009:552, 2011:798-799; Avelino 2012:72 
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H.2. Definitions of Reinforcive Power by Resource Mobilization 
“Reinforcive Power is the capacity of actors to reinforce and reproduce existing 
structures and institutions, thereby constituting the way resources are distributed and 
valued” (Avelino, 2011, p. 72). Actor groups that can sustain current institutions so that 
the distribution of resources remain the way it is exercise reinforcive power. 
 
Artefactual The one who exercises power is the one who ensures the plans 
for specified projects (artefactual resources) are implemented.  
For example, Big Chino Ranch project, desalination etc.  
 
Mental The one who exercises power is the one who ensures that report 
writing, modeling studies, and production of other mental 
resources continue. 
 
Monetary The one who exercises power is the one who keeps funding 
allocation the way it is right now. 
 
Natural The one who exercises power is the one who maintains the 
current network of water rights. 
Adapted from Avelino and Rotmans, 2009:552, 2011:798-799; Avelino 2012:72 
 
H.3.Definitions of Transformative Power by Resource Mobilization 
Transformative Power is “the ability to transform the distribution of resources, either 
by redistributing resources and/or by replacing old resources with new resources” 
(Avelino and Rotmans, 2009, p. 553). This involves the ability to redistribute/replace 
the artefactual, mental, monetary, and natural resources that frame water governance 
activities.  
Artefactual The one who exercises power is the one with authority to change 
location of project construction. For example, desalination 
plants, recharge, recovery plants among others. 
Mental The one who exercises power is the one who makes water-
related bulletins or study results available to a different or wider 
audience.  
Monetary The one who exercises power is the one who diverts money from 
one place to another. There is an origin and a destination. In this 
study, the destination is Prescott AMA. 
Natural The one who exercises power is the one who changes the current 
network of water rights. 
Adapted from Avelino and Rotmans, 2009:552, 2011:798-799; Avelino 2012:72 
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H.4. Definitions of Destructive Power by Resource Mobilization 
“Destructive Power is the ability to destroy or annihilate existing resources” (Avelino 
and Rotmans, 2009, p. 552). Destructive power could be positive (needed) if ends 
unsustainable or damaging practices while destructive power could be negative if it is 
used to undermine or end practices that encourage water sustainability 
 
Artefactual Destroying artefactual resources or stopping construction 
activities or projects involves the exercise of destructive power.  
 
Mental Keeping an issue off the agenda by getting rid of it completely or 
discrediting mental resources is an exercise of destructive power. 
 
Monetary Withholding and/or stopping finances or funding is an exercise 
of destructive power. 
 
Natural Stopping the ability to bring natural resources in is an exercise of 
destructive power. 
 
Adapted from Avelino and Rotmans, 2009:552, 2011:798-799; Avelino 2012:72 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
